US embassy cable - 02ANKARA8305

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 008305 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012 
TAGS: PTER, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 201772 
 
 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM ROBERT S. DEUTSCH; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
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OVERVIEW 
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2. (U) COMBATING TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN A PRIORITY FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY (GOT).  IN ITS EARLY AND STRONG SUPPORT 
OF THE COALITION IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERROR AND ITS 
SUBSEQUENT TAKING-OVER OF ISAF LEADERSHIP, THE GOT HAS 
REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.  DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL 
TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TARGETED TURKS AND FOREIGNERS, 
OCCASIONALLY INCLUDING USG PERSONNEL, FOR OVER 40 YEARS. 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN 
TURKEY INCLUDE MARXIST-LENINIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, 
SEPARATIST, AND PRO-CHECHEN.  IN RESPONSE TO THESE THREATS, 
GOT HAS DEVELOPED BOTH STRONG DETERMINATION AND THE 
CAPABILITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM.  TURKEY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT 
THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH. 
 
3. (U) FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TURKEY'S INTERNAL 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ALTERED THEIR OPERATING PROCEDURES. 
WITH THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION STRONGLY AGAINST TERRORISM AND 
THE GLOBAL COALITION INCREASING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 
THESE ORGANIZATIONS ENTERED INTO A PERIOD OF LITTLE OR NO 
ACTION.  ACTING AS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, MANY OF THESE 
GROUPS HAVE REVERTED TO RECRUITMENT OF SUPPORTERS AND 
STRATEGY PLANNING. 
 
U.S. DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
4. (U) ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE NAMED THE 
SEPARATIST KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE 
MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, 
FORMERLY KNOWN AS REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, DEV-SOL), MAKING THEM 
SUBJECT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 
OF 1996.  ON OCTOBER 11, 2001, THE SECRETARY OF STATE RENEWED 
THOSE DESIGNATIONS FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS.  (THE PKK HAS SINCE 
CHANGED ITS NAME TO THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY 
CONGRESS, KADEK.) 
 
MARXIST-LENINIST 
 
5. (U) THE MAIN RADICAL-LEFT TERROR ORGANIZATION, DHKP/C, 
CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST TURKS AND FOREIGNERS 
ALIKE (ARMED ATTACKS ON UNIFORMED POLICE, SUICIDE AND OTHER 
BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS).  THIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOT 
CONDUCTED ANY MAJOR EVENTS WITHIN TURKEY IN 2002, ALTHOUGH IT 
CONTINUES TO ORGANIZE ITSELF, PREDOMINANTLY WITHIN EUROPE. 
ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, DHKP/C COOPERATES WITH 
OTHER GROUPS IN EUROPE BY PROVIDING SUPPORT, SHELTER, AND 
ARMS TO EACH OTHER'S ORGANIZATIONS.  TURKISH AUTHORITIES 
SEIZED DHKP/C WEAPONS FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER IN 
SEPTEMBER 2002.  THESE WEAPONS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN 
OPERATIONS CAUSING DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH NATIONAL 
ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002. 
 
6. (U) OTHER FAR-LEFT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS STILL ACTIVE 
INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY/MARXIST-LENINIST 
(TKP/ML), THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS LIBERATION ARMY 
(TIKKO), AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY (MLKP). 
TKP/ML AND TIKKO PRIMARILY OPERATE IN THE AREAS OF ORDU, 
TOKAT, AND SAMSUN.  MLKP CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST 
OPERATIONS, USUALLY USING PIPE BOMBS, WITHIN METROPOLITAN 
AREAS. 
 
RADICAL ISLAMIST 
 
7. (U) THE PRIME, RADICAL ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP OF TURKEY IS 
THE TURKISH HIZBULLAH.  ALTHOUGH KNOWN TO FIGHT RIVALS, 
NAMELY THE PKK AND OTHER RIVAL ISLAMIC GROUPS, IN FAVOR OF 
CONFRONTATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES, TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT 
CARRIED OUT ANY MAJOR OPERATIONS IN 2002.  IT STAGED A 
SPECTACULAR JANUARY 2001 AMBUSH IN DIYARBAKIR THAT TOOK THE 
LIFE OF DIYARBAKIR SECURITY DIRECTOR GAFFAR OKKAN AND FIVE OF 
HIS BODYGUARDS.  TWO UNDERCOVER POLICE WERE KILLED IN ANOTHER 
HIZBULLAH ATTACK IN OCTOBER 2001.  ACCORDING TO STATE 
AUTHORITIES, HIZBULLAH CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN ITS ACTIVITIES 
ON A THEORETICAL BASIS. 
 
8. (U) OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS INCLUDE THE GREAT EASTERN 
RAIDER'S FRONT (IBDA-C), FEDERAL ISLAMIC STATE OF ANATOLIA 
(KAPLANCILAR), SELAM GROUP, ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION 
(IHO), THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, SELEFILER, SOFULAR, AND 
BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM.  BOTH IBDA-C AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM ARE 
KNOWN TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO AL QAIDA. 
 
SEPARATIST 
 
9. (U) KADEK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE PKK, REPRESENTS THE 
LARGEST SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION GROUP IN TURKEY, THOUGH ITS 
CAPABILITY TO OPERATE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED DUE TO 
VIGOROUS AND ON-GOING COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS OF THE 
TURKISH ARMED FORCES, JANDARMA, TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE 
(TNP), AND VILLAGE GUARDS (A PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCE 
RECRUITED FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS).  THIS EFFORT ULTIMATELY LED 
TO THE ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN IN 
1999.  THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) DESIGNATED THE PKK A TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION IN MAY 2002. 
 
10. (U) IN APRIL 2002 THE GROUP UNDERWENT A RE-ORGANIZATION 
AND NAME CHANGE.  RENAMED THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY 
CONGRESS (KADEK), THE ORGANIZATION HAS EXPANDED ITS 
OPERATIONS BY FOCUSING UPON MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.  KADEK 
RETAINS THE SAME SYMBOL AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP 
OF THE PKK, THOUGH IT HAS EXPANDED THIS COUNCIL TO ELEVEN 
INSTEAD OF NINE MEMBERS.  ACCORDING TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT 
EXPERTS AND NGOS, KADEK ALSO MAINTAINS APPROXIMATELY 
500-ARMED MILITANTS IN TURKEY AND UP TO 5000 ARMED MILITANTS 
IN NORTHERN IRAQ.  WHILE THE ORGANIZATION LARGELY CONTINUES 
TO FOLLOW THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED SEPTEMBER 1, 1999, 
CEASE-FIRE, IT HAS ISSUED WARNINGS VIA SUPPORTIVE NEWSPAPERS 
OF FUTURE ARMED ATTACKS IF CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE NOT TAKEN. 
SMALL CELLS AND SYMPATHIZERS REMAIN THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BUT 
THESE HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED TO THE POINT THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICIALS, RATHER THAN THE MILITARY, OVERSEE MOST OPERATIONS 
AND INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
CHECHENS IN TURKEY 
 
11. (U) IN APRIL 2002, MUSTAFA YILMAZ SEIZED THE MARMARA 
HOTEL IN ISTANBUL AND HELD 13 HOSTAGES FOR APPROXIMATELY 
TWENTY MINUTES UNTIL HE SURRENDERED WITHOUT INCIDENT. 
YILMAZ, WHO IS OF CHECHEN ORIGIN, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STAGED 
THE RAID TO PROTEST RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN CHECHNYA.  HE IS 
PRESENTLY IN CUSTODY AND ON TRIAL IN THE ISTANBUL BEYOGLU 
SECOND HEAVY CRIMINAL COURT UNDER A VARIETY OF CHARGES, 
ALTHOUGH NOT UNDER TURKEY'S TOUGH ANTI-TERROR LAW.  THIS 
FOLLOWS AN APRIL 22, 2001, SEIZURE OF ISTANBUL'S SWISS HOTEL 
BY 13 PRO-CHECHEN TURKISH CITIZENS WHO HELD 150 HOSTAGES, 
INCLUDING 37 AMERICANS, FOR APPROXIMATELY 12 HOURS.  LARGE 
NUMBERS OF TURKS, MANY WITH ROOTS IN THE CAUCASUS, ARE 
SYMPATHETIC TO CHECHEN AMBITIONS. 
 
12. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL 
QUESTIONS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM 
(A) 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
13. (U) TURKISH SUPPORT FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11 
CEMENTED GOT'S COMMITTED POLICY ON FIGHTING TERROR.  GOT 
ISSUED STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ATTACKS.  IN 
THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE 
LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE 
GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE 
STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL IN SUPPORT OF 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).  TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE 
FIRST COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO ISAF AND ASSUMED THE 
LEADERSHIP ROLE IN JUNE 2002. 
 
14. (U) THE ARREST OF THREE AL QAIDA SUSPECTS IN THE 
SOUTHEASTERN CITY OF VAN IN FEBRUARY 2002 AND ONE IN ISTANBUL 
IN AUGUST 2002 HIGHLIGHT TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) 
EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.  FIRAS SULEYMAN, YUSUF SALIM 
HUSAYN, AND AHMAD MAHMUD WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH 
ENTERING TURKEY ILLEGALLY VIA IRAN IN FEBRUARY 2002.  MEMBERS 
OF BAYT AL-IMAM, A JORDANIAN GROUP WITH CLOSE TIES TO AL 
QAIDA, THE THREE MEN WERE FOUND TO HAVE MET AND RECEIVED 
MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM USAMA BIN LADEN AND HAD BEEN PLANNING 
BOMBING ATTACKS ON ISRAELI AND US TARGETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 
 THESE MEN WERE RETURNED TO JORDAN IN SEPTEMBER 2002.  AHMET 
ABDULLAH WAS ARRESTED IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 AFTER AN 
OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE ISTANBUL SECURITY FORCES BECAUSE 
OF HIS LINKS TO BAYT AL-IMAM. 
 
15. (U) TURKEY HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH UN SECURITY RESOLUTION 
1373, RATIFYING ALL UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON COMBATING 
TERRORISM.  THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE FROZEN THE ASSETS 
OF THOSE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONS, AND ENTITIES FOUND 
ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUING A DECREE TO 
FREEZE ALL FUNDS AND RELATED ASSETS.  THE INITIAL DECREE, NO. 
2001/2483, DATED DECEMBER 22, 2001, HAS BEEN UPDATED BY NO. 
2002/3873, DATED MARCH 21, 2002, AND NO. 2002/4206, DATED MAY 
16, 2002. 
 
----------------------------------- 
RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B) 
----------------------------------- 
 
16. (U) STATE SECURITY COURTS (DGM) IN EIGHT PROVINCES, WITH 
JURISDICTION FOR ALL CRIMES THAT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 
THE ANTI-TERROR LAW, TAKE A VIGOROUS APPROACH TOWARDS 
PROSECUTING TERROR-RELATED CRIMES.    AVERAGE TRIAL TIMES RUN 
MORE THAN A YEAR, AND DEFENDANTS ARE USUALLY INCARCERATED 
DURING THEIR TRIALS. 
 
17. (U) ABDULLAH OCALAN, THE LEADER OF THE PKK CONVICTED OF 
TREASON IN JUNE 1999 AND SENTENCED TO DEATH.  FOLLOWING THE 
EU REFORM PACKAGE PASSED BY THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST 2002 OUTLAWING THE DEATH PENALTY, 
OCALAN'S SENTENCE WAS CONVERTED TO LIFE IN PRISON. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
18. (U) IN 2002, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY DID NOT SEEK THE 
EXTRADITION OF ANY SUSPECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES ON 
TERROR-RELATED CHARGES, NOR DID THE UNITED STATES SEEK THE 
EXTRADITION OF SUCH SUSPECTS FROM TURKEY.  THERE ARE NO 
IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
 
19. (U) IN THE PAST, TURKEY HAS FACED DIFFICULTY IN 
EXTRADITING TERROR-RELATED SUSPECTS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. 
ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TURKEY HAS REQUESTED THE 
EXTRADITION OF 245 HIGH LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS FOR TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1991.  SYMPATHY WITH KURDISH POLITICAL 
AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOME EUROPEAN STATES, ALLEGATIONS 
OF TORTURE BY TURKISH OFFICIALS, AND TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION 
FOR THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE ALL PROVED IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCH 
EXTRADITIONS.  HOWEVER, IN AUGUST 2002, AS A PART OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION REFORM PACKAGE, THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSED 
A LAW BANNING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E) 
------------------------------------ 
 
20. (U) TURKS SEE THEMSELVES TO BE AMONG THE WORLD'S PRIMARY 
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.  THEY CITE THE 15-YEAR INSURGENCY OF 
THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), AND THE WORLDWIDE 
ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKISH DIPLOMATS AND 
THEIR FAMILIES BY ARMENIAN ACTIVISTS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S. 
THEY HAVE LONG COMPLAINED ABOUT LIBERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' 
HARBORING KURDISH (PKK), LEFTIST (DHKP-C) AND ISLAMIST 
(HIZBOLLAH, KAPLANISTS) "TERRORISTS."  THEY FEEL OTHER 
NATIONS DO NOT APPRECIATE TURKEY'S SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF 
THESE PARTIES.  THUS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA WERE 
QUICK TO RESPOND TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11.  AT ALL 
LEVELS, THERE WAS AN OUTPOURING OF SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY. 
BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS THE CONSTANT REMINDER THAT NOW OTHERS 
WERE BEGINNING TO EXPERIENCE WHAT TURKS HAD LIVED WITH FOR 
YEARS.  TURKEY'S PRE-9/11 HISTORIC COOPERATION WITH THE US IN 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS 
ONLY INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR WITH PUBLIC COMMITMENTS OF 
SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM FROM THE PRESIDENT, 
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MILITARY.  THERE HAS BEEN VERY 
VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS AT OUR 
MISSION'S BUILDINGS BY LOCAL POLICE.  AS THE STORM BROKE ON 
THE NOVEMBER 17 ARRESTS IN GREECE, THERE WAS INTENSE COVERAGE 
WITH A NEW "I TOLD YOU SO" IMPLICATION IN THE GOVERNMENT 
PRINT MEDIA. 
 
21. (U) THE TURKISH STAND ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN "SOFTER" IN 
THE CASE OF THE CHECHENS.  CHECHENS ARE, OF COURSE, MUSLIMS 
AND THERE ARE CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN TURKS AND CHECHENS AND 
LONG TIME RIVALRY WITH RUSSIA.  THE ARMED, BUT NOT VIOLENT, 
TAKEOVERS OF A FERRYBOAT IN 1996 AND A HOTEL IN 2001 IN 
ISTANBUL WERE TREATED MORE LIKE PROTESTS THAN LIKE TERRORIST 
ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA.  THAT CHANGED WITH THE OCTOBER 23, 2002 
CAPTURE OF A THEATER IN MOSCOW WITH OVER ONE HUNDRED DEAD. 
TURKEY DID CONDEMN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING, BUT WITH THE MEDIA 
STILL ADDRESSING THE SUFFERING OF THE CHECHEN PEOPLE. 
 
22. (U) TURKEY HAS A FREE PRESS.  IN THE LEFTIST AND ISLAMIC 
FRINGE PRESS, CHECHEN REBELS, PALESTINIAN SUICIDE BOMBERS AND 
EVEN AL QAIDA MEMBERS CAN BE PORTRAYED AS "FREEDOM FIGHTERS." 
 TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN AN INTEREST OF ACADEMICS AND WRITERS 
IN TURKEY.  IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL 
CONFERENCES ON THE TOPIC.  THOSE ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS OF 
THE STATE HAVE BEEN SEEN AS TOOLS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM.  PRIVATELY-FUNDED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS HAVE BECOME 
MORE FOCUSED ON ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND THE 
ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F) 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
23. (U) THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSIVE 
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN 2002.  FOR EXAMPLE, IN A JOINT 
OPERATION, THE TURKISH CUSTOMS GUARD AND THE NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (MIT) SEIZED NINE KALASHINIKOV RIFLES AND 
ONE SCORPION ASSASSINATION PISTOL WITH SILENCER FROM A CAR AT 
THE KAPIKULE BORDER GATE IN SEPTEMBER 2002.  THESE WEAPONS 
ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE 
DHKP/C TO BE USED IN SUPPOSED OPERATIONS TO CREATE 
DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN 
NOVEMBER 2002. 
 
24. (U) ADDITIONALLY, THE GOT APPREHENDED THREE SUSPECTED AL 
QAIDA OPERATIVES NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER (NEAR VAN).  THE GOT 
FOLLOWED UP BY ARRESTING DOCUMENT FORGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
THREE, NEAR BURSA IN NORTHWESTERN TURKEY. 
 
25. (U) THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ACTIVE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
PKK/KADEK, THOUGH ITS SECURITY OPERATIONS TEMPO HAS BEEN 
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN LINE WITH A REDUCTION IN THE 
CONFLICT.  IT CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE ORGANIZATION'S 
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO STEM ANY POTENTIAL 
DISTURBANCES. 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G) 
------------------------------------ 
 
26. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.  TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW 
ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS 
CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
27.  (U) TURKEY SHARES BORDERS WITH, AND HAS BEEN AN HISTORIC 
TRADING PARTNER OF SYRIA, IRAN AND IRAQ.  IT BALANCES A 
CONDEMNATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES 
(INCLUDING PROVIDING HAVENS FOR THE PKK) WITH THE NEED TO 
ACCESS HISTORIC TRADE ROUTES.  THUS TURKEY WILL PROVIDE BASES 
FOR OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SENDING 
LARGE TRADE DELEGATIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.  PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS AGAINST STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM ARE CLEAR. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I) 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
28. (U) SINCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, THE GOT HAS TAKEN 
AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLDWIDE OPPOSITION AGAINST TERRORISM. 
 IN MAY 2002 THE EUROPEAN UNION PLACED THE PKK AND DHKP/C ON 
ITS LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS AFTER AN INTENSIVE PUSH BY THE 
GOT FOR THE EU TO ADOPT TOUGHER MEASURES AGAINST TURKISH 
TERROR GROUPS OPERATING IN EUROPE.  IT CONTINUES TO PRESS THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RECOGNIZE KADEK AS THE SUCCESSOR 
OF THE PKK AND THUS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J) 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
29. (U) TURKEY REMAINS A STAUNCH ALLY IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM.  IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, 
PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A 
RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS 
ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON 
TURKISH SOIL TO SUPPORT OEF.  AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE 
RESOLUTION, TURKEY OFFERED A 90-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT 
FOR DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN.  THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) 
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT PROTECTION OF US DIPLOMATIC AND 
MILITARY FACILITIES THROUGHOUT TURKEY. 
 
30. (U) IN 2002, TURKEY RATIFIED THE UN CONVENTION ON 
SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST FINANCING.  IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS 
CONVENTION, TURKEY ADDS TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL 
NAMES ADDED TO THE ASSET FREEZE LIST MAINTAINED BY THE UN 
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE UNDER UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373. 
 
31. (U) TURKEY IS ALSO AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE 
DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.  SINCE 1999, 
THE TURKS ACCEPTED ELEVEN ATA COURSES, TO INCLUDE A SENIOR 
LEVEL FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR AND A 
FOLLOW-ON FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR FOR 
INVESTIGATORS. 
 
(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX) 
 
32. (S) THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ALSO OFFERED THE USE OF AN 
ADDITIONAL AIRBASE TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD ON INCIRLIK AFB AND 
EASED FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS TO EASE US SUPPORT OF FORCES 
OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN.  OTHER TURKISH ACTIONS IN SUPPORT 
OF OEF INCLUDE: 
 
-     ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF 
TROOPS ABROAD AND STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL FOREIGN TROOPS IN 
TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM; 
 
-     ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO OFFER SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES (OFFER OF 90) 
 
-     ALLOWED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE AS THE KEY 
TRANSIT POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE 
(INCLUDING LETHAL MUNITIONS) TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND US 
SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN; 
 
-     OFFERED THE USE OF ADDITIONAL AIR BASES IN TURKEY FOR 
OEF-RELATED OPERATIONS; 
 
-     AUTHORIZED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE TO TRANSIT 
TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA DETAINEES FROM AFGHANISTAN TO GTMO; 
 
-     STREAMLINED CUSTOM PROCEDURES AND GRANTED BLANKET 
OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES FOR US OEF-RELATED AIRCRAFT (OVER 5,000 
FLIGHTS TO DATE); 
 
-     PROVIDES KC-135 TANKER SUPPORT AND BASING FOR THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM.  TURKEY ALREADY HAS CONTRIBUTED CLOSE TO 80 
KC-135 OEF-RELATED MISSIONS FROM TURKEY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX) 
 
33. (C) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, 
GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION.  THE GOT HAS PROCESSED 
REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS 
TREATY.  HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS 
UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS.  CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE 
TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE THE PROCESS. 
 
---------------------------- 
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2) 
---------------------------- 
 
34. (U) THE GOT COORDINATES CLOSELY WITH THE USG ON 
ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING INITIATIVES.  IN RESPONSE TO USG 
REQUESTS TO FREEZE TERRORIST-RELATED FINANCIAL ASSETS, THE 
GOT HAS ADDED TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES OF 
INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS RELATED TO UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373 (NAMES 
RELATED TO FINANCING OF TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA.)    THE GOT 
ALSO INVESTIGATES THESE NAMES AND FREEZES ASSETS FOUND IN 
TURKEY.  TO DATE, THESE EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN FREEZING 
ABOUT USD 2 MILLION IN FINANCIAL ASSETS OWNED BY AN 
INDIVIDUAL ON AN USG EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZE LIST.  THE GOT IS 
REVIEWING THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING ITS LEGAL PROCESS FOR 
FREEZING FINANCIAL ASSETS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE QUICK 
REACTION TO NEW INFORMATION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS- PREVENTION (L) 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED 
CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND 
PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 
TURKEY.  GOT RESPONSE IS ALWAYS IMMEDIATE AND SUBSTANTIAL 
WHEN ALERTED TO THREAT OR INCIDENT INVOLVING US INTERESTS. 
 
 
PEARSON