US embassy cable - 05ATHENS2759

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, OSCI, HRIGHTS 
SUBJECT: VIEW FROM ATHENS: MOVING FORWARD ON MINORITY 
RIGHTS IN GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6316 
 
     B. ATHENS 1962 (NOTAL) 
     C. ISTANBUL 1825 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Embassy Athens welcomes the ideas presented in 
ref A, and the possibility of progress on minority rights 
issues between Greece and Turkey.  From our side, Ambassador 
pitched the Halki-Athens mosque connection in July (ref B), 
to no avail.  Unfortunately, the Greeks see this (with some 
justification) not as a bilateral issue, but one which 
involves Turkey's obligations to the EU.  With Turkey's 
accession negotiations now entering a new phase, the GoG will 
likely be even less interested in dealing with the issue 
bilaterally.  The subject of Turkish teachers from Turkey, 
however, might be a goal to pursue, especially since the 
Ministry of Education has recently come up with a plan to 
teach Turkish to minority students in mainstream Greek public 
schools in Thrace.  In any event, both sides need to come up 
with deliverables for PM Karamanlis' anticipated visit to 
Ankara and we should do our part in pushing them to think 
creatively.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A New Mosque and Reopened Halki? 
-------------------------------- 
2.  (C)  Ref A idea of pairing the reopening of Halki under 
GoG sponsorship with opening of a mosque in Athens under GoT 
sponsorship seems logical to us.  In fact, Ambassador raised 
it with Foreign Minister Molyviatis in July (ref B).  The FM 
quickly dismissed the idea, arguing that Greece had promised 
a group of Arab states that it would allow them to open the 
mosque, while saying that Turkey is any case obligated to the 
EU, not to Greece, on the reopening of Halki.  Molyviatis 
made clear that Halki was not a bilateral issue.  Now that 
accession talks have opened with Turkey, Molyviatis and the 
GoG are probably even less willing to entertain the idea of 
working the issue bilaterally.  Given this atmosphere, we 
doubt a joint approach by us to the Greek and Turkish 
governments would have much impact here.  As the Education 
Minister Yiannakou was reported to have said Oct 20 in 
Istanbul, "respect of the Christian Orthodox believers' 
religious freedom and the unhindered operation of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate as a religious institution comprise a 
primary condition for Turkey's European course." 
 
3.  (C)  The above notwithstanding, we can and will continue 
to push the Greeks to make good on their promise to open a 
mosque in Athens, among other reasons because if they did so 
it might make it easier for the GOT to do the right thing on 
Halki.  Athens is the only major capital in Europe without a 
mosque (the city's numerous Muslims worship in unofficial 
prayer rooms) and there has been no progress on construction, 
despite a 2000 law that provided a legal framework for one. 
The proposed location of the "Athens" mosque -- in a small 
exburban town (Peania) without a significant Muslim community 
(and on land designated for forest use) -- shows how divorced 
from reality the GoG can be when considering the spiritual 
welfare of the growing number of Muslims here. 
 
Turkish Teachers in Thrace 
-------------------------- 
4.  (C)  Regarding education issues, we agree that we must 
look creatively at how we can help the two sides remove 
restrictions on their respective minorities.  The problem is 
that the GoG does not see the two as comparable.  GoG 
officials, including the Thrace MFA representative, have told 
us it is impossible to have mutual agreements or concessions 
on minority issues when there are not comparable minority 
populations.  Regarding the specific issue of the need of 
Turkish language teachers, when we last raised this point 
with the Director of Minority Schools in Thrace, he intimated 
that since there is very limited need for Greek teachers in 
Turkey, there is little incentive to allow additional Turkish 
teachers into Thrace.  Greeks see the introduction of 
teaching material and teachers as another effort to "control" 
the Muslim minority in Thrace, and have cited other examples 
of Turkey trying to "propagandize" the Muslim minority -- 
such as through unsanctioned after-school programs funded by 
the GOT and recent discussions of opening private schools. 
 
5.  (C)  A possible goal to pursue that is in line with ref A 
comments is the Greek Ministry of Education's novel idea to 
provide Turkish language instruction in Greek public schools 
in Thrace.  This would allow the 75 percent of secondary 
students from the Muslim minority who attend mainstream Greek 
public schools to have Turkish language instruction, perhaps 
taught by teachers from Turkey.  This would be far more 
palatable to the GoG since these teachers would be 
administering to minority students already integrated into 
the Greek public school system. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT:  While we agree with Ankara a Halki-Athens 
mosque explicit linkage won't fly for either side, Greece and 
Turkey both need to focus on deliverables for an eventual 
visit of PM Karamanlis to Ankara.  Karamanlis accepted PM 
Erdogan's invitation some time ago, had planned on visiting 
in late August, then both sides postponed to October, and now 
it is unclear when his travel will take place.  When we 
broached the subject of deliverables with FM Molyviatis in 
July, we found a dearth of ideas (ref B).  Now is the time to 
prod both sides into coming up with initiatives in 
anticipation of this visit -- the first by a Greek PM in over 
40 years.  Without referring to direct trade-offs, we should 
do our part behind the scenes by encouraging both sides to do 
the things they have promised to do anyway (Greece, to open a 
mosque in Athens; Turkey, to allow greater religious freedom 
(e.g., open Halki), as part of its EU commitments).  Maybe we 
can get a virtuous circle going.  END COMMENT. 
RIES