US embassy cable - 05MINSK1284

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 001284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, BO 
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS DISCUSS IMPACT OF 
MILINKEVICH'S CANDIDACY 
 
Ref: A) Minsk 1205 B) Minsk 1236 
 
MINSK 00001284  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Since the October 2 nomination of 
Aleksandr Milinkevich by the democratic congress, Emboffs 
have conducted a series of meetings with civil society 
leaders and political analysts to assess the significance 
of the democratic congress and of Milinkevich's 
presidential bid.  Most observers viewed the congress and 
Milinkevich's nomination as a catalyzing event but noted 
the significant obstacles that remain in the way of 
democratic change in 2006, including continued 
fragmentation in the opposition camp, Lukashenko's strong 
popular support, and Russia's likely backing of the 
Lukashenko regime.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Emboffs have met with various civil society 
leaders with opposing views during the past three weeks to 
assess the impact of Aleksandr Milinkevich's 10+ coalition 
nomination for presidency in the 2006 elections (ref A). 
This report will draw mainly from comments made by: 
 
-- Andrey Vardomatsky, Director of Novak Opinion Research 
Center 
-- Aleksandr Voitovich, former Speaker of Upper Chamber of 
Parliament and possible presidential contender in the 2006 
elections 
-- Anatoly Federov, close advisor to Voitovich 
-- Petr Martsev, owner of independent newspaper BDG 
-- Vladimir Labkovich, member of human rights NGO Vyasna 
-- Valentin Stepanovich, member of Vyasna 
-- Oleg Gulak, deputy in human rights NGO Belarus Helskinki 
Committee 
-- Andrey Sannikov, International Coordinator for human 
rights NGO Charter 97 
-- Andrey Federov, political analyst 
-- Valery Karbalevich, political analyst 
-- Andrey Sudaltsev, political analyst and advisor to Chair 
of Belarusian Congress of Independent Trade Union Aleksandr 
Yaroshuk 
 
Democratic Congress Exceeded Expectations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Civil society leaders generally considered the 
October 1-2 democratic congress a success.  The event was 
highly organized, professional, and represented a 
significant achievement in the opposition movement.  Andrey 
Vardomatsky, who was one of the delegates at the 
convention, told Pol/Econ Chief on October 6 most people in 
the pro-democracy camp and in the Lukashenko regime 
expected the congress to be poorly attended and to be rife 
with infighting among party leaders.  (Note: Vardomatsky 
and others have heard that Lukashenko expected no more than 
a hundred delegates and guests to attend the convention, 
which is why he allowed it to take place in Minsk.)  To 
everyone's surprise, high turnout of delegates and domestic 
and international VIPs, good press coverage in independent 
and foreign media, and a generally democratic election 
process marked the democratic convention.  Human rights 
activist Vladimir Labkovich explained to Pol/Econ Chief in 
a separate meeting that although the most recent democratic 
congress was the fifth such congress in Belarusian history, 
the October 1-2 event stood out because it unified the 
greatest number of pro-democracy groups and leaders. 
 
 
Most Say Milinkevich Is the Best Choice 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Most people in the NGO and human rights community 
are pleased with Milinkevich's candidacy.  Vardomatsky and 
others noted it was a difficult choice to decide between 
Milinkevich and runner-up candidate Anatoly Lebedko because 
the latter is more "energetic" and experienced in politics. 
Milinkevich, according to several contacts, seems ill 
suited for stirring up the masses to oust Lukashenko (ref 
B).  However, Vardomatsky ultimately voted for Milinkevich 
because Lebedko has too much "political baggage."  For all 
his personal qualities, Lebedko has remained relatively 
unpopular among voters, and Vardomatsky believes this 
scenario will not likely change. 
 
5.  (C) On October 5, human rights leader Andrey Sannikov 
told the Ambassador and Pol/Econ chief he is also satisfied 
Milinkevich is the 10+ candidate.  In his view, the 
opposition needed new blood and a new face.  He considers 
 
MINSK 00001284  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
the 5+ "experiment" (pre-cursor to the 10+) an utter 
failure, mainly because it was built relatively around 
hollow and unattractive political parties.  Milinkevich's 
deep contacts in the NGO community should help the 10+ 
coalition attract voters.  (Note: Sannikov and his Free 
Belarus movement have long been competitors of the 5+ and 
Lebedko.  Sannikov stressed to Econoff that Milinkevich is 
the right choice because he will work with groups outside 
the traditional political party opposition.) 
 
 
His Competitors Think Otherwise 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Opposition candidate and former Parliamentary 
Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich and his advisor Anatoly Federov 
recently told the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief they were 
pleased Milinkevich won the 10+ nomination, but only 
because Milinkevich seems the most willing to "reach a 
compromise" with other opposition presidential contenders. 
Voitovich pointed out he and several other non-party 
leaders, excluding likely presidential candidate Anatoly 
Kozulin, signed an agreement with the 10+ candidates a few 
days prior to the democratic convention to unite democratic 
forces.  However, Voitovich seriously doubted any 10+ 
candidate other than Milinkevich would honor the agreement. 
Voitovich and two other members of the recently formed non- 
party democratic coalition, former Agricultural Minister 
Vasily Leonov and former MP Valery Frolov, have repeatedly 
told Emboffs there will likely be a single opposition 
candidate to face Lukashenko but this decision will not be 
made until later in the election process.  It is clear, 
however, that they expect Milinkevich to realize sooner or 
later that he is no match for Lukashenko. 
 
7.  (C) Voitovich and Federov have determined Milinkevich 
is incapable of attracting a large share of voters 
primarily because he lacks strong ties to Belarus' economic 
elite and to Russia, and because he maintains strong ties 
to a nationalistic political party, the Belarusian Popular 
Front (BPF).  First, Federov explained the importance of 
appealing to and representing the nomenclature and economic 
elite in any successful strategy to defeat Lukashenko. 
According to Federov, the nomenclature is more likely to 
support someone like Voitovich, or even Kozulin, than 
Milinkevich.  Other political analysts refute the notion 
that the nomenclature can be drawn away from Lukashenko. 
Political analyst Valery Karbalevich told the Ambassador on 
October 12 the nomenclature is not fond of Lukashenko and 
would probably abandon ship quickly if Lukashenko was on 
the verge of losing power, but it would be "pure nonsense" 
to think the nomenclature would risk losing their jobs and 
privileges for any opposition candidate this early in the 
game. 
 
8.  (C) Second, Federov believes Milinkevich will be unable 
to convince Russia he is a better choice than Lukashenko, 
mainly due to the perception Milinkevich would steer 
Belarus, including its economy, toward the West.  Neither 
Federov nor Voitovich were willing to declare that Russia 
would look more favorably on a Voitovich candidacy; their 
concern was only that Milinkevich was a non-starter for the 
Kremlin.  Finally, Voitovich believes nationalism does not 
play well in Belarusian politics, and the BPF's formal 
backing of Milinkevich will surely taint his candidacy. 
 
 
Election Campaign Must Be Bold 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Vardomatsky, Sannikov, human rights activist Oleg 
Gulak and others remain concerned that Milinkevich's timid 
personality will limit his ability to sway voters away from 
Lukashenko.  Sannikov stressed Milinkevich must be willing 
to take the necessary risks to gain voter support, even if 
it means falling prey to GOB repressive tactics.  Gulak 
emphasized that frequent and massive street rallies, 
relentless door-to-door campaigns, and innovative use of 
available media outlets are necessary ingredients for an 
effective campaign strategy (a report on the 10+ campaign 
strategy and platform will be sent septel).  Civil society 
leaders agreed that Lukashenko's tight restrictions on 
information dissemination and public gatherings make it 
extremely difficult for Milinkevich to mount a successful 
campaign in the next nine months, but they are convinced 
the secret lies in Milinkevich surrounding himself with 
creative, energetic people to do much of the legwork around 
the country. 
 
MINSK 00001284  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
10.  (C) Sannikov added the campaign message should steer 
clear of populism.  The human rights leader maintained that 
voters do not want to hear promises from Milinkevich that 
he will "fix their houses and repair their roads; 
Lukashenko has this market cornered."  Instead, Milinkevich 
should focus on serious issues such as long-term economic 
stability, Lukashenko's involvement in the 1999 and 2000 
disappearances of prominent Belarusian activists, and a 
balanced economic and political policy towards Russia and 
the West.  Clearly, the substance of Milinkevich's platform 
is the subject of much debate among political observers, 
and there are many who disagree with Sannikov's viewpoint. 
 
 
"Russia Will Stick By Lukashenko" 
--------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Many political observers and civil society leaders 
predict the Kremlin will ultimately back Lukashenko, and 
therefore without Kremlin backing, Milinkevich's (or any 
other opposition candidate's) prospects in the 2006 
elections are significantly reduced.  Karbalevich and 
political analyst Andrey Sudaltsev agree with other 
observers' assessments that in the opposition there is no 
viable alternative to Milinkevich, but they seriously doubt 
the 10+ nominee will be able to attract the Kremlin's 
attention.  Milinkevich, according to Karbalevich and 
Sudaltsev, is perceived by many in Belarus and Russia as a 
"Western project" Q i.e., someone groomed by the U.S. and 
EU to wrestle Belarus from the hands of Russia. 
Independent newspaper owner Peter Martsev concurs with 
Karbalevich and Sudaltsev, adding that Lukashenko's 
continuation in power plays an important role in President 
Putin's economic, political, and military policy towards 
the West.  Most civil society leaders conceded Lukashenko 
represents an embarrassment to Russia, but the Belarusian 
leader's hostility to the West outweighs his faults. 
 
 
"It's Still Worth a Shot To Engage Russia" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) Vardomatsky told Emboffs other analysts overrate 
the ties between Lukashenko and President Putin.  He 
maintains that Lukashenko is enough of an embarrassment to 
Putin that the Russian leader could be persuaded to 
withdraw Kremlin support for the Lukashenko regime. 
Specifically, Vardomatsky recommended a combination of 
external and internal (i.e. within Russia) pressures be 
applied to Putin.  On the external side, the EU and USG 
should emphasize to Putin that Lukashenko's reelection in 
2006 would be a reflection of Putin's personal image, and 
Russia's future in the Group of Eight and WTO could be 
thrown into jeopardy.  Within Russia, Vardomatsky knows of 
a number of intellectuals with close ties to the Kremlin. 
These intellectuals could be called upon to deliver a 
similar message to Putin.  Vardomatsky refused to reveal 
the names of the Russian intellectuals, in part because we 
were meeting in his office and the Belarusian KGB was 
likely listening to the conversation. 
 
 
"Belarusian Voters, Not Russia, Are The Determining Factor" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
13.  (C) Labkovich, Gulak, and human rights activist 
Valentin Stepanovich hold a different opinion on Russia's 
influence in the upcoming presidential elections.  They 
agree that Lukashenko is an asset to the Putin regime, but 
they believe others overestimate Russia's role in 
Belarusian politics.  Labkovich argued that, "events in 
Ukraine proved we don't need Russia to win over voters." 
He believes the 10+ should focus its efforts on reaching 
out to voters with an attractive message.  If the 
opposition is successful in this endeavor, Stepanovich 
argued the Kremlin would likely re-evaluate its 
relationship with Lukashenko. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (C) Most civil society leaders and activists agree 
that Aleksandr Milinkevich's nomination as the 10+ 
presidential candidate was a significant and positive 
development in the opposition camp.  The opposition has 
never before beQ so organized and unified. 
 
MINSK 00001284  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
15.  (C) However, all of our interlocutors made it clear 
that significant Q almost insurmountable Q obstacles remain 
in the way of democratic change in 2006.  First, the strong 
presidential aspirations of Voitovich, Kozulin, and 
possibly other non-party opposition leaders clearly 
indicate the democratic forces will continue to suffer from 
fragmentation.  Second, Milinkevich is an unknown quantity 
to the electorate, which can be considered one of his 
strengths, but he must work extra hard in a repressive 
environment to attract voters.  Third, Belarus' economy 
continues to grow (even if it is unsustainable), and most 
voters associate its growth with Lukashenko and his 
policies.  Fourth, despite what some analysts believe, 
Russia's continued support for Lukashenko persuades most 
voters to stand by Lukashenko, or at least not stand by the 
opposition candidate.  Overall, the opposition has a steep 
road to climb, but it seems that Milinkevich's nomination 
has started the opposition up the hill. 
 
KROL