US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1199

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, SA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, BM, IN, PK, CE, NP, BG 
SUBJECT: SOUTH ASIAN VIEWS ON BURMA: ENGAGE THE GENERALS 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1198 
     B. RANGOON 1053 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Burmese regime has generally looked 
North and East (China and ASEAN) for its foreign political 
relationships and to China and Thailand for its primary 
economic ties to the outside world.  India's two-year old 
policy of sustained engagement with the current SPDC regime, 
however, has resulted in at least some of the regime's 
attention shifting to the West.  The Charge's recent round of 
courtesy calls on the Ambassadors of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal revealed a familiar chorus 
of calls for engaging the regime, but once again few examples 
that such an approach has yielded results.  End Summary. 
 
INDIA: AN OPENING COULD BRING THE CHAPS AROUND 
 
2. (C) Newly arrived Indian Ambassador Bhaskar Kumar Mitra 
told the Charge during an early October courtesy call that 
"in principle" India can't take exception to the U.S. and EU 
policies of applying pressure on the Burmese regime.  He said 
that Western isolation, however, had cut the SPDC off and 
given the Chinese "free reign" to exert influence in Burma. 
It's clear that Burma has been isolated for too long, Mitra 
said, and India had felt (in 2003) the need to reassess its 
own approach after 15 years of no results. 
 
3. (C) Modestly declaring himself no expert on Burma (he 
served as DCM here 1989-1993), Mitra said he could "easily 
observe that every approach to the regime has failed."  He 
noted that the overall political and economic situation was 
deteriorating, and the 2004 ouster of former Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt had "aggravated" the situation.  If there 
was only some small opening, he lamented, "we might be able 
to bring these chaps around."  He suggested that India had 
previously held some expectation that oil and gas exploration 
would open things up politically in Burma, but "even that 
hasn't happened." 
 
4. (C) The Charge countered that she saw absolutely no signs 
that the regime's top leadership intends to open up, or to 
alter their behavior in any way that undercuts their priority 
of keeping power.  "It's not the international community that 
is responsible for decline," she pointed out, "it's the 
generals who have no interest in the welfare of their own 
people."  When Mitra offered that "at least education is not 
too bad here," the Charge disagreed, saying that while the 
older generation had benefited from good education, standards 
had steadily deteriorated under the military. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Mitra inquired about efforts to raise Burma 
at the UN Security Council.  The Charge said that a UNSC 
discussion had merit, given the regime's utter disregard for 
all other efforts by the UN and the international community. 
She cited the example of Avian Influenza, noting that every 
ASEAN member, except one, Burma, had taken important steps to 
address the regional and global threats posed by this 
disease.  Mitra appealed for engagement with the senior SPDC 
leaders, "Why not at least try?" he asked.  The Charge 
responded that the generals dismiss such overtures, noting 
that Secretary Rice had met recently with ASEAN foreign 
ministers in New York, and FM Nyan Win "didn't even respond" 
to her points on Burma. 
 
6. (C) The Charge told Mitra that it would be helpful if the 
SPDC heard messages on the importance of dialogue. democracy, 
and human rights from a variety of countries in the region, 
observing that "Burma is not just a Western issue."  Mitra 
agreed, but said that an abrupt transition in Burma could 
lead to chaos, which would not be in India's best interests. 
The Charge responded that for this reason the USG advocated a 
national reconciliation process that includes all parties in 
Burma; "the regime needs to talk to the opposition, not 
imprison them." 
 
PAKISTAN:  SANCTIONS NEUTRALIZED BY NEIGHBORS 
 
7. (C) During a September 28 courtesy call, Pakistani 
Ambassador Mohd Nawaz Chaudry expressed support for Western 
efforts to restore democracy to Burma, but also doubts over 
the current policy of pressure.  Chaudry said that the 
engagement efforts of the three main foreign actors in Burma 
today--China, India and ASEAN--effectively "neutralize" the 
effects of Western pressure and sanctions.  He claimed that 
the impact of sanctions had been largely borne by the poor, 
and asked how the SPDC could be forced into any sort of 
political compromise.  The Charge stated that the West had 
not damaged the country, but rather the SPDC had, and it 
appeared no foreign country had any leverage at present. 
8. (C) Ambassador Chaudry noted that until the late 1990s, 
the Indians, Chinese, and Malaysians, as well as senior 
Burmese military figures, regularly met with Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK), but they have now all abandoned her and the NLD.  He 
said he disagreed with those who felt ASSK was unwilling to 
negotiate.  The key challenge, he said, was how to make the 
SPDC willing to talk, but added that the regime had 
marginalized ASSK.  Chaudry admitted that ASSK would still 
easily win a fair election, but asked how the SPDC could ever 
allow such a result.  He opined that the NLD under ASSK has 
no effective structure or party rank and file, just a cult of 
personality.  He added that the SPDC would more likely 
collapse from internal strains.  Chaudry expressed the hope 
that new military leaders might recognize the importance of 
change and reform, but felt that the GOB had focused its 
efforts on the ethnic cease-fire groups because they 
represented a greater threat to the GOB than ASSK. 
 
9. (C) The Pakistani Ambassador cited former PM Khin Nyunt as 
someone who had not been born a democrat, but had learned to 
be more open over the years.  He said the current perception 
is that the SPDC has been severely weakened by his ouster, 
and questioned whether the top two generals might be replaced 
soon.  He called General Thura Shwe Mann (current Armed 
Forces Joint Chief of Staff) "the man to watch" and noted his 
youth, ambition, and recent prominence in local media events. 
 Chaudry mentioned that Burma's "National Security Advisor" 
(NFI) had recently visited Pakistan and met with Musharaff. 
When asked about whether the GOP had raised the need for 
democracy and reform with him, Chaudry ignored the question 
and launched into a lengthy defense of reforms and democracy 
within Pakistan. 
 
10. (C) From an economic perspective, Chaudry said that 
Singapore had about US$1.2 billion invested in Burma; China 
had US$900 million; and India only US$6 million.  Black 
market trade likely dwarfed official trade figures.  He 
claimed the Indians sought to bring Burma into their sphere 
of influence.  India wants to build a blue-water navy from 
Arabia to Australia, he said, and the Chinese also see Burma 
as an avenue to blue water access.  Chinese investment in 
extending road networks (a new "Burma Road") and building a 
pipeline from western Burma to Kunming were designed to bring 
the country closer into its resource and transportation 
networks. 
 
11. (C) Chaudry noted that the 150-300 companies that trade 
with the Generals are getting richer, while everyone else was 
shut out.  "The SPDC," he said, "controls the Rangoon 
largesse, while people are dying of hunger in the provinces." 
 He added that Burma's political and economic mess was so 
deep-seated and complex that it would take decades for even a 
benign government to manage the situation.  He agreed that 
democracy was the best system of governance, but doubted it 
would be ideal for a nation like Burma.  Chaudry saw little 
future for the country unless the SPDC and the opposition can 
unite.  He suggested the West adopt fixed benchmarks as 
incentives: "do this much and you will get this." 
 
12. (C) Bio Note: Chaudry has been in Burma for over a year 
and is himself a former political prisoner, jailed in 
Pakistan as a student leader for supporting former PM Ali 
Bhutto.  He expressed sympathy for political prisoners in 
Burma, but defended the SPDC regime.  He is very windy; he 
spoke for 85 minutes of the Charg's 90-minute call, and 
extended the meeting with an unsolicited 10-minute exposition 
on Kashmir and what he saw as Indian manipulation of the 
situation there.  End Bio Note. 
 
BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AND NEPAL:  NOT PLAYERS 
 
13. (C) Newly arrived Bangladeshi Ambassador Mohammed 
Khairuzzaman, during the Charge's October 6 call, 
enthusiastically advocated engagement with the SPDC, 
suggesting that the UN process had proven ineffective.  "The 
regime looks inward and distrusts the UN system," 
Khairuzzaman said, "and since everyone has a price, we need 
to give (the Burmese generals) something from our side like 
Thailand, Singapore, and China do."  Khairuzzaman observed 
that the SPDC generals fear persecution by an eventual 
tribunal, and claimed that ASSK seeks a top post in a future 
government, "a position that is not helpful to a political 
resolution."   The Charge replied that they needed to talk 
together to determine their future; history offered many 
examples of possible ways forward. 
14. (C) Khairuzzaman pressed again for engagement, suggesting 
that "a little shift" from either side can change many 
things.  The Charge replied that the regime did not respond 
to overtures and has no desire to engage.  She added that it 
was important to look at the fundamental objectives of the 
SPDC regime: the generals want to hang on to power and they 
have demonstrated they will do everything necessary to keep 
it.  The Charge urged Bangladesh to join an international 
consensus that pressed the regime to be inclusive in reaching 
any political resolution, observing that the National 
Convention process could not work because it had excluded key 
actors.  Khairuzzaman again raised engagement, but also 
expressed deep frustration with multiple delays that 
Bangladesh had experienced in securing cooperation from the 
GOB to complete a road project linking his country with 
Burma. 
 
15. (C) Khairuzzaman said he plans to spend most of his time 
focusing on issues in Rakhine State on the border with 
Bangladesh, in particular encouraging the regime to change 
its posture on dealing with Rohingya Muslims.  He described 
his bewilderment that Muslims in this area were not even 
permitted to plow their fields to support themselves.  Apart 
from this, he said he could "accept the fact" that the GOB 
would not permit Muslims to travel outside their townships 
(Note: Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State are 
stateless and denied many basic rights, e.g. refused 
passports and identity cards, denied the right to marry, 
prohibited from relocating to neighboring towns, blocked from 
attending post-secondary institutions, etc.  End Note.) 
 
16. (C)  During a September 27 courtesy call, Sri Lanka 
Ambassador D.M.M. Ranaraja focused on his own domestic 
situation, describing Sri Lanka's recent elections as a 
disaster and complaining about the frequent policy changes 
that come with each new election. On Burma, however, he said 
that foreign policy remains the same: engagement is 
preferable to sanctions.  Ranaraja noted, however, that 
minimal trade existed between the two countries, intimating 
that Sri Lanka had no influence over the SPDC.  Posted to 
Burma for the past two years, he observed that the GOB had 
the practice of starting rumors to control public opinion and 
manipulate the population. 
 
17. (C) Nepali Ambassador Victory SJB Rana, a retired General 
who recently filled a long vacancy in Rangoon, also indicated 
that relations between Burma and India were minimal.  The 
most significant issue to occupy his time, and not very much 
of it, is a fairly sizable Nepali community that emigrated to 
Burma years ago.  Rana indicated these Nepali were 
curiosities more than problems, with few family ties left in 
Nepal but still interested in maintaining cultural ties. 
 
COMMENT:  ASK NOT WHAT WE CAN DO 
 
18. (C)  The Indians and Pakistanis are the obvious 
candidates for applying pressure on the regime.  Both 
recognize the need for a more democratic system, yet appear 
unlikely to pursue it themselves.  As with the ASEANS 
(reftels), they appear to be thinking more of what the United 
States can do, rather than how either India or Pakistan might 
be able to make a difference.  End Comment. 
Villarosa