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| Identifier: | 05PARIS7202 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05PARIS7202 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Paris |
| Created: | 2005-10-21 08:27:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV SR IN FR KO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007202 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR, IN, FR, KO SUBJECT: U/S BURNS DISCUSS INDIA NONPRO, BALKANS, CENTRAL ASIA WITH RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS ONS 1. 4 B/D 1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns met with Russian DFM Sergei Kislyak on October 19 in Paris to discuss, among other issues, India nonproliferation, the Balkans (especially Kosovo), and Secretary Rice's recent trip to Central Asia. Kislyak raised Russian concerns regarding access for its diplomats to the Green Zone in Baghdad, saying the current situation in which only the Ambassador and DCM received expedited access privileges was "absolutely unacceptable." On India nonproliferation, U/S Burns previewed his trip to India. Both agreed that the U.S. and Russia shared the same interests in ensuring Indian acceptance of a civil/military nuclear separation. U/S Burns reviewed his recent trip to Kosovo and Belgrade, emphasizing the importance of using U.S. and Russian influence to pressure parties involved in final status negotiations to compromise. End summary. 2. (SBU) Under Secretary Burns met October 19 in Paris with Russian DFM Sergei Kislyak at the Russian Ambassador's Residence. DAS Kramer, P staff Toby Bradley and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (notetaker) accompanied. Kislyak was joined by Russian Embassy Political Counselor Leonid Kadyshev and two staffers. ---------------------- INDIA NONPROLIFERATION ---------------------- 3. (C) Kislyak emphasized that Indian external and internal stability depended on access to a steady supply of energy. He speculated that in 5-10 years, India would be a "huge" presence in the market for fossil fuels, given its relative lack of domestic supply. Given these pressures, India needed to increase its reliance on nuclear energy. Kislyak added that he had been in India four months ago, and had encouraged the Indians to stop their "war against the NPT" although he understood their opposition. Still, India had acted responsibly on WMD issues, said Kislyak. They had introduced a number of changes in their legislation and had put into place substantial export controls. 4. (C) Kislyak outlined three points regarding the Indian nonproliferation issue. First, he said a Russian redline was that the case of India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should be treated as an exception, and that all efforts should be made to dissuade other countries from following India's example. He added that Pakistan's cooperation regarding nonproliferation was "terrible." Russia wanted more information on Pakistan's clandestine networks, said Kislyak, but the Pakistani government had been "less than transparent." Kislyak said Russia had developed an argument he hoped would convince other NSG members that India should be given an exception based on reasons of economic and political stability, as well as India's nonproliferation record. He said Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine would be tough to convince, given that they had already renounced nuclear weapons. Second, Kislyak said Russia did not support giving India nuclear weapon status. He said the international community must invent an "exceptional status" for India. Regarding verification, Kislyak proposed a "quasi-153" verification system that would be similar to the IAEA's 153 verification system for non-nuclear weapons states, but would only apply to India's civilian nuclear energy sector. Third, Kislyak argued that India must clearly and credibly demonstrate its commitment to separating its civilian and military nuclear sectors before the NSG and the U.S. and Russian legislatures could move to grant India an exception. 5. (C) U/S Burns agreed that India had acted responsibly regarding proliferation concerns. He welcomed the Russian decision to discuss India nonproliferation during the Russian G-8 Presidency and said he hoped to hear concrete proposals from the Indians during his upcoming visit on how they planned to separate the civilian and military nuclear facilities. Kislyak said Russia would have two distinct discussions on South Asia within the G-8; one on peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, and the other on the Pakistani/Indian nuclear competition. Russia had no interest in mingling the issue of the Indian nuclear exception with a discussion of competition between Pakistan and India, said Kislyak. U/S Burns said it would be helpful if both the U.S. and Russia proceeded on parallel tracks to encourage India on civil and military nuclear separation. Kislyak agreed, and added that any Indian actions must be transparent and credible. It is one of the few cases, said Kislyak, where the U.S. and Russia can easily reinforce each other. ----------------------------- U.S.-RUSSIA C/T WORKING GROUP ----------------------------- 6. (C) U/S Burns said most C/T working groups were doing well and that S/CT Ambassador Crumpton had been in touch with his Russian counterparts. However, he said the working group on bioterrorism had not met. Kislyak replied that, for experts to meet, they must have a mandate of issues to discuss. The two agreed that a step forward would be for Ambassador Crumpton to meet with Russian Special Envoy Anatoly Safanov to conduct exploratory talks aimed at laying a foundation for bioterrorism discussions. ----------- THE BALKANS ----------- 7. (C) U/S Burns previewed USG plans to commemorate in Washington the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Accords. The USG was focused, said U/S Burns, on convincing Muslim, Serb and Croatian stakeholders to decide at a political level to begin discussions on modernizing the Dayton structure through constitutional reform. A modern Bosnian state would have a single President, a strong Prime Minister, and a more efficient parliament. U/S Burns said he had discussed this with Bosnian Serb leaders, and was told they were open to committing to a political process. U/S Burns also told Kislyak that he had expressed to Bosnian Muslim leaders USG concern about the continued presence of foreign Muslim fighters who had gone there in the early 1990s to fight. He urged Bosnian Muslim leaders to pass tough citizenship laws that would restrict the citizenship requests and possibly revoke the Bosnian citizenship of these foreigners. Kislyak said this was helpful and returned to the subject of the Washington 10th anniversary commemoration, asking whether Russia would be invited. U/S Burns said the involvement of other Dayton participants, including Russia and the EU, was being discussed, and that he awaited further proposals from A/S for European Affairs Dan Fried. Given the largely ceremonial nature of the event, U/S Burns said it might be easier if Washington-based Ambassadors were invited. 8. (C) Turning to Kosovo, U/S Burns said he had spoken recently with UN SYG Kofi Annan and soon-to-be-named UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtissari regarding the importance of consultations with the Contact Group. The U.S. planned on naming a mid-level diplomat to serve as a member of Ahtissari's expert staff and would also name a U.S. envoy to the final status discussions. The envoy would support Ahtissari's work 100 per cent and would speak for the U.S. Kislyak asked what role U/S Burns envisioned for the U.S. envoy, especially in the event of any differences of opinion between Ahtissari and the USG. U/S Burns said the U.S. envoy would wholeheartedly support Ahtissari's efforts, given that the U.S. had not prejudged the outcome of final status discussions. He added that both the U.S. and Russia had particular influence in the region, and it was important for both countries to use that influence to move all parties closer to an agreement. 9. (C) U/S Burns said his recent visit to the region had left him with a clear understanding of how difficult final status negotiations would be. It seemed impossible that the Serbian government would support Kosovar independence, and the Serbs had not elaborated any further on their proposal for "less than independence, more than autonomy." On the Kosovar Albanian side, the two most powerful leaders, the ailing President Rugova and accused war criminal Ramush Haradinaj, were not available to push for consensus, and the other leaders were not playing helpful roles. U/S Burns said he had warned Kosovar Albanian leaders that they must compromise and take into account the need to safeguard Serb religious sites and the Serb minority presence. Kislyak agreed that Serb Prime Minister Kostunica would not agree to Kosovo independence and added that no Serb government could agree to independence and expect to survive. In a related final status issue, Kislyak said the paper on guiding principles was almost complete. He suggested it be adopted by the UNSC as soon as it was ready. U/S Burns said this was not a problem, but he suggested that Ahtissari be given a chance to review the paper before the UNSC adopted it. Kislyak said he "did not disagree." ------------ CENTRAL ASIA ------------ 10. (C) Kislyak said FM Lavrov and President Putin appreciated the Secretary's readout of her trip to Central Asia. However, he had the impression that during her trip, the Secretary was advocating for a regional forum on cooperation, to include Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, that would clearly exclude Russia and China. Russia had a problem, given its significant interests, in regional cooperation that did not include it, said Kislyak. U/S Burns said the Secretary had focused on the need for the region to better its economic ties and to work with Afghanistan against narcotic flows. However, the U.S. had not considered any formal grouping that would exclude Russia. --------------------------------------- GREEN ZONE ACCESS FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS --------------------------------------- 11. (C) At the end of the meeting, Kislyak raised Russian diplomat access to the Green Zone in Baghdad. Coalition military authorities, said Kislyak, had recently told the Russian Embassy that only the Ambassador and the DCM would be allowed unimpeded access. All other personnel would need to stay in a security line before entering. This was extremely dangerous for Russian diplomats, said Kislyak, and was "absolutely unacceptable." The Russian government had raised this with Ambassador Burns in Moscow and had been told subsequently that if the Russian Ambassador were accompanied by note takers, they could still be given unimpeded access to the Green Zone. However, this did not help those Russian diplomats who had meetings that the Ambassador and the DCM did not attend. Furthermore, said Kislyak, the DCM had still not been given a full access badge. FM Lavrov asked Kislyak specifically to raise this with U/S Burns. Russia has not gone public, said Kislyak, and wants to solve this problem amicably. He noted as well that FM Lavrov had sent a letter to the Secretary 12 days ago regarding this issue, and had not yet received a response. U/S Burns said he understood the seriousness of the issue, and would get back to Kislyak shortly. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON
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