US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2855

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NETHERLANDS: DASD THOMAS VISIT TO THE HAGUE FOR QDR CONSULTATIONS

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2855
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2855 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-10-21 06:48:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: MARR PREL NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002855 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DASD THOMAS VISIT TO THE HAGUE FOR 
QDR CONSULTATIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  DASD for Resources and Plans James P. Thomas 
visited The Hague for consultations with Dutch MOD and MFA 
officials October 10 on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
 Thomas provided an overview of the ongoing QDR and sought 
Dutch views and comments.  He emphasized the importance of 
adopting multinational approaches to address security 
challenges such as terrorism.  He highlighted a common goal 
shared by the Netherlands and the United States: maintaining 
and growing civil society to address growing trans-national 
problems.  Finally, he outlined emerging QDR capability 
priorities required to achieve the QDR's focus areas. 
 
2. (C) Cont. Summary: Dutch interlocutors expressed their 
appreciation for the opportunity to consult during the 
ongoing QDR deliberations, and reacted favorably to the QDR's 
themes and emerging priorities.  They inquired how QDR might 
affect the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.  They also 
drew parallels to their own attempts to enhance security 
sector reform in Africa, and suggested enhancing ties between 
NATO, the UN, the EU and the African Union.  End Summary. 
 
3. (U) During his consultations in The Hague, DASD Thomas met 
with Admiral Nagtegaal (Defense Planning Process), BrigGen 
Veltman (International Military Cooperation), and Sebastian 
Reyn (Deputy Director, General Policy Directorate, MOD).  In 
attendance on the USG side were Charge, DATT CAPT Frank 
Buerger, ODC Chief COL David Kelly, CAPT Mac Bollman, and 
Polmiloff Jason Grubb.  At the MFA, DASD Thomas met with 
Robert de Groot (Director, Security and Defense Policy 
Department), Rob Gabrielse (Deputy Director, Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Response Operations), Hans Sandee 
(Deputy Director, Security and Defense Policy), Karen van 
Stegeren (Advisor, International Security Policy), and Eric 
Strating (Security and Defense Policy).  DATT, CAPT Bollman 
and Polmiloff attended for the USG. 
 
MOD Meeting -- Importance of Building Partner Capacity 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
4. (S) After thanking MoD officials for Dutch contributions 
to ISAF, NTM-I and Hurricane Katrina relief, and noting the 
importance of the Netherlands as a long-standing U.S. Ally, 
DASD Thomas opened consultations with MOD officials by 
outlining major QDR cross-cutting themes.  He explained that 
the Pentagon, in concert with other elements of national 
power, was emphasizing multinational preventive approaches to 
international security, including the maintenance and 
expansion of global civil society and peacetime engagement 
activities to prevent problems from becoming crises, and 
crises from becoming conflicts.  Shoring up effective and 
legitimate governments and enabling partners is key -- as 
part of the QDR, the Department of Defense is exploring 
mechanisms to deepen partnerships not only with traditional, 
stable allies, but also with vulnerable states in the 
developing world.  Thomas also noted the importance of the 
"indirect approach" for addressing the challenges posed by 
terrorist extremism -- working by, with, and through others 
to defeat the threat.  He noted that while the QDR emphasizes 
the need to develop new capabilities and skill sets 
associated with irregular warfare, such as language 
capabilities and cultural intelligence, DoD would maintain 
its conventional capabilities.  Finally, he explained that 
achieving unity of effort with other Federal, state and local 
agencies for homeland defense and homeland security was also 
an important theme in the QDR. 
 
5. (S) Admiral Nagtegaal said that the themes raised by 
Thomas suggested significant changes in security policy 
that extend beyond defense.  Thomas agreed that the security 
challenges facing the Netherlands and U.S. demand holistic 
approaches that harness all instruments of national and 
allied power.  Just as the Department of Defense has a 
unified command plan that assigns "supported" and 
"supporting" roles and responsibilities for warfighters, he 
suggested the need to explore the development of similar 
arrangements across governments.  He stressed the need for 
dialogue, and pointed to the NATO Defense Planning Committee 
generation of force goals as a good example of multinational 
force planning.  He suggested building upon that process to 
address a wider range of security challenges.  The nature of 
the challenges we face are such, he said, that unilateral 
approaches cannot work.  We must integrate multinational 
considerations more deeply into our national force planning. 
 
QDR Capability Priorities 
------------------------- 
 
6. (S) DATT repeated a frequent question from MOD contacts 
regarding how the USG could afford the reforms required by 
the QDR, especially following the financial aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.  Thomas noted that DoD faces a number of 
challenges, including ongoing operations, the growth of 
personnel health care costs, recapitalization of aging 
equipment, and the need to contribute to broader Federal 
deficit reduction efforts.  That said, however, the QDR was 
not simply a "budget drill".  He expected that there would be 
a number of proposals for new or increased investment in key 
areas, such as counterterrorism and homeland defense, and 
that any spending cuts would be made in light of the longer 
term strategic vision.  Thomas outlined several emerging QDR 
capability priorities, including homeland defense and, in 
concert with broader interagency efforts, developing medical 
countermeasures against advanced, genetically-engineered 
bio-terror agents.  He noted that emerging non-lethal 
technologies might be used to hold and secure a multitude of 
WMD-producing sites for eventual disarmament.  Thomas also 
outlined plans to increase the numbers/capabilities of DoD 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal personnel to render safe nuclear 
devices, as well as irregular warfare training for general 
purpose forces and increases in some special operations 
forces. 
 
7. (S) Thomas explained the importance of improving language 
and culture capabilities, in particular by attracting 
American heritage speakers to join the military.  Thomas 
stressed the need to recruit individuals who are not only 
bilingual but also bicultural to improve the U.S. military's 
local knowledge and cultural awareness in less familiar areas 
of the world.  Gen. Veltman related problems the Dutch faced 
in attracting individuals from different ethnic backgrounds 
to join the military -- often, these individuals or their 
families feel threatened if they cooperate with Dutch forces. 
 Charge Blakeman suggested that linguistic skill was perhaps 
a contribution that the Netherlands and other NATO countries 
could make in future coalition operations; Gen. Veltman 
concurred.  Thomas noted that such contributions would be 
welcomed. 
 
8. (S) Thomas noted that enhancing deterrence was also an 
important topic within the QDR and in this regard stressed 
the importance of missile defenses to deter adversaries 
through the prospect of denying their objectives.  He also 
noted that achieving Persistent Intelligence Surveillance 
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities was another area of 
emphasis in the QDR.  In this regard, he explained that 
avoiding a "Pearl Harbor" scenario in which space assets 
could be attacked was a concern.  Thomas also related recent 
cyber operations originating from China appear to have 
targeted USG unclassified computer networks, resulting in 
large volumes of compromised information pertaining to 
logistics and defense acquisition programs.  As such, net 
centricity and information assurance capabilities are vital. 
 
Affect on JSF? 
-------------- 
 
9. (S) Adm. Nagtegaal asked how the QDR might affect plans 
for the JSF program.  Thomas explained that no decisions have 
been taken on JSF but that deliberations are ongoing. 
Multinational participation in the program is a 
consideration.  He said that QDR deliberations were informed 
by a long-term strategic framework and the transition over 
time to unmanned aircraft.  In this regard, he noted that JSF 
would likely be the last major manned tactical aircraft 
program.  A key question would be how JSF and other aircraft 
programs would fit into such a transition.  DoD is looking at 
a number of options, including reducing the number of JSF 
variants.  Thomas noted that international participation 
informed deliberations about the program.  He noted that on 
their current timelines some of the studies and analyses that 
would inform decisions on JSF would not be completed until 
after the QDR report was submitted.  Thus, some decisions 
might not be made until sometime in 2006.  Adm. Nagtegaal 
said that he would advise his leadership that reducing the 
number of JSF variants was under consideration although no 
decisions have been taken. 
 
10. (S) Reyn related past concerns by the Dutch Parliament 
regarding QDR consultations, and asked that the USG 
coordinate any QDR-related consultation statements with the 
Dutch prior to releasing them to the public.  In this regard, 
he also expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to 
hold bilateral consultations on the QDR in advance of the 
review's completion.  Thomas agreed to coordinate any 
statements about these or future consultations, and asked 
that the Dutch do the same with the USG. 
 
MFA Meeting: QDR Focus Areas 
---------------------------- 
 
11. (U) Sandee referred to an article in the Dutch press in 
March 2005 regarding Washington interest in consulting with 
Allies on this iteration of the QDR; as such, there is much 
interest in the Netherlands.  Thomas confirmed that was the 
purpose of his trip, and looked forward to any comments or 
constructive criticism so that Dutch concerns might be better 
taken into account in QDR development.  He explained the QDR 
timeline, noting the report's anticipated release in February 
2006. 
 
12. (S) Thomas commented on four QDR focus areas.  The first 
involved building partnerships to defeat terrorist 
extremism.  The challenge underscored the importance of 
integrating multinational considerations into force planning. 
 A second focus area is defending the homeland in-depth -- 
both internally by working with other Federal agencies, state 
and local governments, as well as by working with 
international partners globally as many potential problems 
cross borders (Avian Flu, international terrorism).  Shaping 
choices of countries at strategic crossroads is a third focus 
area.  He described the fourth focus area as preventing 
hostile states or non-state actors from acquiring or using 
WMD.  Our approach should have a preventive dimension along 
the lines of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Think Globally, Act Locally 
--------------------------- 
 
13. (S) Thomas reviewed several QDR cross-cutting themes, 
including the balance between prevention and response.  He 
emphasized the need to prevent states from failing -- instead 
of attempting to rebuild them after failure -- by 
maintaining and growing civil society.  Thomas noted the 
importance of enabling both traditionally strong and 
crisis-bound partners, especially at the local level.  He 
referred to the indirect strategy, noting that the United 
States seeks to transform the character of the conflict with 
terrorist extremists by empowering moderates within the 
Islamic world to confront and ostracize extremists.  He 
stressed the need to build local institutions and training 
trainers, harnessing local knowledge, and adopting tailored, 
differentiated approaches that are culturally or regionally 
appropriate, i.e., "thinking globally but acting locally". 
 
14. (S) De Groot described the shift in thinking as "quite 
incredible," and suggested that the change will be 
difficult as different mind-sets are required to effectively 
carry out this "soft power" transition.  He suggested that 
"lessons learned" be included in the QDR process, especially 
regarding the military's role in post-conflict and the 
transition from military operations to the international 
community reconstruction effort.  Gabrielse pointed to the 
Dutch MOD/development assistance "integrated approach" to 
security sector reform (SSR) in Africa.  Thomas agreed on the 
importance of integrated approaches to security sector 
reform, stabilization and transition missions.  He noted that 
U.S. and allied militaries can help set the security 
conditions for nation building, but ultimately the success 
would depend on local leaders taking the responsibility to 
build or rebuild their own nations; he recalled the 
President's statement from his 2nd inaugural address that "we 
stand with others when they stand for freedom." 
 
NATO, UN, EU, and African Union 
------------------------------- 
 
15. (S) De Groot asked if NATO was capable of carrying out 
such an integrated approach to security sector reform, 
especially in connection to Africa.  Thomas said that NATO 
probably has the capacity, as demonstrated by ISAF in 
Afghanistan and NTM-I.  But NTM-I is a relatively modest 
effort -- NATO can do more with training missions, he said. 
Gabrielse agreed, pointing to NATO's role in transforming the 
post-Soviet Bloc.  Thomas noted the effectiveness of the 
Partnership for Peace program, but cautioned against applying 
the Eastern European model for security sector reform and 
particularly institutional reform at the expense of 
constructive field training. 
 
16. (S) De Groot noted that training for SSR was different, 
involving advisors and small teams, not military units. 
Noting the difference in mind-sets, he asked if the USG 
envisioned two separate battalions for fighting and 
post-conflict phases.  Thomas said there should be no 
differentiation or specialization of general purpose forces 
-- ideally, military units in this capacity should be able to 
shift from conflict to stabilization and back to conflict 
phases, if necessary.  They should also be trained to develop 
new skill sets and counter-insurgency techniques. 
 
17. (S) De Groot noted that better relations between NATO, 
the UN, and the African Union (AU) should be developed. 
Thomas agreed, adding that DoD welcomed the development of 
such regional security institutions.  Gabrielse asked if the 
QDR had examined NATO-EU relations in connection to SSR. 
Thomas explained that the QDR had not focused much on the EU, 
while observing that the EU might be better suited to address 
some non-traditional security issues.  De Groot and Sandee 
highlighted expertise being developed in the EU with regard 
to civil-military coordination and suggested that the QDR 
factor the EU into the equation. 
 
18. (U) DASD Thomas has cleared on this cable. 
 
BLAKEMAN 

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