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| Identifier: | 05PARIS7201 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05PARIS7201 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Paris |
| Created: | 2005-10-20 15:46:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL IS KPAL FR LE SY PTER UNSC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007201 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 TAGS: PREL, IS, KPAL, FR, LE, SY, PTER, UNSC SUBJECT: MFA READOUT ON PA PRESIDENT ABBAS, LEBANESE PM SINIORA VISITS TO PARIS Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------- 1. (C) Senior MFA officials told us PA President Abbas raised three main points in his October 17 meeting with President Chirac: the need to give Abbas support and more time in addressing Hamas participation in January elections; the need to relaunch the roadmap; and the need to improve daily living conditions for Palestinians by pressing Israel to implement the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings. MFA officials described Abbas as worried about Hamas and Gaza, while at the same time appearing confident that he will prevail with international support. Abbas reportedly was not bothered by PM Sharon's decision to cancel their planned summit, and told the French that he needed more time to prepare for the meeting. MFA officials described Abbas as supportive on the question of Palestinian camps in Lebanon and ready to cooperate with Lebanese PM Siniora, though Abbas' ability to influence the camps in Lebanon remains questionable. 2. (C) On the October 17-18 Siniora visit to Paris -- which included separate meetings with the French FM and PM, PA President Abbas, and UN Special Envoy for 1559 implementation Terje Roed-Larsen -- MFA officials described the Lebanese PM as talking a lot but saying little of substance, perhaps due to the presence of his "Hizbullahi" FM. In his meetings with the GoF, Siniora addressed his commitment to reforms, support for the Core Group and a Lebanon conference before year-end, and the need to focus on UNSCR 1595 (vice UNSCR 1559) and bring to justice all those who "instigated, organized and executed" the Hariri assassination. MFA contacts told us PM Villepin reminded Siniora of the need to implement UNSCR 1559 and the need to quickly start a "national dialogue" leading to Hizballah disarmament, in contrast to Siniora's apparent long-term approach on the issue. MFA contacts told us they did not have a readout of the October 18 Siniora-Abbas meeting, but press statements confirm the two reached agreement on the need for Palestinian camps to respect Lebanese sovereignty and obey Lebanese law. End summary. 3. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault and MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot briefed Pol M/C and poloff late October 19 on recent, simultaneous visits of PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Lebanese PM Fouad Siniora to Paris. (Thibault's comments on BMENA and a possible Iraq UNSCR are reported septel.) PA President Abbas met with President Chirac for 90-minutes on October 17, and met separately October 18 with Lebanese PM Siniora, Lebanese MP Sa'ad Hariri, and UN Special Envoy Roed-Larsen. PM Siniora, meanwhile, met with FM Douste-Blazy October 17, and with PM Villepin, Abbas, and Roed-Larsen on October 18. ABBAS-CHIRAC: HAMAS, SHARON, GAZA, LEBANON, SYRIA --------------------------------------------- ---- 4. (C) Thibault, who attended the Chirac-Abbas meeting, described the PA leader as seeking French support on the issue of Hamas participation in January elections, the need to relaunch the roadmap, and the need to bring rapid improvement in Palestinians' daily lives via implementation of the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings. Thibault described the PA leader as at once worried, and sure of himself. He noted that Abbas was nervous about Hamas, and told Chirac that he could not be expected to declare "civil war" against Hamas. Instead, Abbas said the international community needed to allow him to pursue his own policy on January elections, and to work the political and security issues to bring Hamas on board. Thibault described Abbas as worried about prospects for resumed violence in Gaza, and as seeking more time from the international community to allow him to handle the Hamas issue. Thibault said Abbas appeared confident that he could prevail over Hamas in January elections, with international support, and that the path of non-violence he advocated with the Palestinian people was the right one. 5. (C) Thibault described Abbas as sanguine on PM Sharon's decision to cancel their planned summit, in the wake of the killing of three Israelis by Palestinian militants, which Abbas condemned publicly. Abbas told Chirac that it was not the first or the last time that Sharon had suspended contacts, and that perhaps it was not a bad thing that the meeting was canceled, as he needed more preparation time. In the meantime, Abbas said he would ask the U.S. to pressure Israel to do more to implement the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings, particularly on prisoner releases, the transfer of four West Bank towns to PA control, and resolving the issue of the deportees from the Church of the Nativity. Thibault said Abbas told Chirac that he wanted to advance with the Israelis, but he needed help in order to do so. Abbas stressed that he had to deliver quickly and give Palestinians a sense that their daily living conditions were improving, which was currently not the case. 6. (C) On Gaza, Besancenot noted that Abbas asked for French help with the port, to which France was amenable. He noted that Abbas also briefly confirmed to Chirac his non-objection to a possible 3rd party EU role in border control, an initiative floated by FM Douste-Blazy during his early September visit to Gaza (reftel). Besancenot concluded that the EU needed to discuss the border monitor issue further with Israel, Egypt, the U.S. and Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn. 7. (C) Thibault characterized Abbas as "open" on the issue of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, during his discussion with Chirac. Abbas expressed respect for Lebanese sovereignty and readiness to cooperate with PM Siniora, and understanding of Lebanese concerns that Palestinians should not display arms outside the camps. Thibault said Abbas was critical of Syrian interference in Lebanon and confirmed reports that Syria had been transferring arms into Lebanese camps. Abbas also confirmed his total support for international law on Lebanon, presumably a reference to UNSCR 1559, and the Mehlis investigation. Thibault concluded that though Abbas' goodwill on Lebanon was not in question, his capacity to influence the camps remained questionable. SINIORA VISIT: CORE GROUP, HIZBALLAH, MEHLIS REPORT --------------------------------------------- ------ 8. (C) Thibault described Lebanese PM Siniora as talking a lot, but saying little of substance during his October 17-18 meetings with FM Douste-Blazy and PM Villepin. Thibault speculated that Siniora's lack of candor was due perhaps to the presence of his "Hizbullahi" FM Salloukh, who accompanied him throughout the meetings. Thibault said Siniora thanked France for its support on Lebanon, particularly its role in ensuring a successful Core Group ministerial in New York. Siniora stressed the need to maintain the goal of holding a "Friends of Lebanon" conference before year-end, even if the situation became more complicated -- to which the GoF agreed. He discussed his reform program and expressed confidence that reforms could be achieved in such areas as fiscal responsibility, the VAT, and the budget -- all issues which Siniora had championed as Finance Minister. 9. (C) On Hizballah, Thibault said Siniora avoided raising the issue in the context of UNSCR 1559 and instead concluded that the Hizballah problem could not be resolved until the GOL had both a national consensus and a social policy for southern Lebanon. Thibault said the GoF was struck by Siniora's apparent strategy "of several months" for addressing the disarmament issue, and noted that the GoF urged him to address the issue with more immediacy. PM Villepin reminded Siniora that UNSCR 1559 remained unresolved, and that Siniora needed to begin quickly the national dialogue leading to Hizballah disarmament. Thibault observed that the presence of FM Salloukh during the meeting illustrated the difficulty of Siniora's position. In an October 20 "Le Monde" interview, Siniora warned against "haste" on the issue of Hizballah disarmament, which he described as a topic of inter-Lebanese dialogue. In the same interview, Siniora described Hizballah as "not just a group of combatants," but representing a large sector of Lebanese society, with representation in government. 10. (C) On UNSCR 1595, Thibault reported that Siniora expressed full support for pursuing the Mehlis report findings and for making UNSCR 1595 the immediate priority before UNSCR 1559 implementation. Siniora insisted that all those who "instigated, organized, and executed" the Hariri assassination should be brought to justice and punished. PM Villepin commended Siniora for his courage in arresting the four former security chiefs. Thibault noted that Siniora made a general appeal for French judicial assistance in the aftermath of the Mehlis report, but offered no specifics. SINIORA-ABBAS MEETING --------------------- 11. (SBU) Thibault told us he had no information on the Abbas meetings with Siniora, Sa'ad Hariri and UN Special Envoy Larsen which took place in Paris October 18. According to press reports, the joint statement issued after the Siniora-Abbas meeting confirmed the need for Palestinians in Lebanon to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and laws, as well as Abbas' full support for GOL efforts to prohibit weapons outside Palestinian camps and to halt the illegal entry of weapons and people into Lebanon. The Abbas-Siniora statement also confirmed that Palestinian-Lebanese dialogue should deal with Palestinian refugee issues in Lebanon, as well as lead to implementation of all relevant UNSCRs which address Palestinian weapons in Lebanon (i.e. UNSCR 1559), in line with the Ta'if agreement and without confrontation between Lebanese authorities and armed Palestinian groups. In press remarks after the meeting, PM Siniora confirmed that the Lebanese government had, for the first time told the Palestinians that there was no justification for an armed presence outside the refugee camps. Abbas, for his part, confirmed publicly that Palestinians are guests in Lebanon who must respect the law and should not interfere in Lebanon's affairs. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON
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