US embassy cable - 05PARIS7201

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MFA READOUT ON PA PRESIDENT ABBAS, LEBANESE PM SINIORA VISITS TO PARIS

Identifier: 05PARIS7201
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS7201 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-10-20 15:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IS KPAL FR LE SY PTER UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IS, KPAL, FR, LE, SY, PTER, UNSC 
SUBJECT: MFA READOUT ON PA PRESIDENT ABBAS, LEBANESE PM 
SINIORA VISITS TO PARIS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (C) Senior MFA officials told us PA President Abbas raised 
three main points in his October 17 meeting with President 
Chirac: the need to give Abbas support and more time in 
addressing Hamas participation in January elections; the need 
to relaunch the roadmap; and the need to improve daily living 
conditions for Palestinians by pressing Israel to implement 
the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings.  MFA officials described 
Abbas as worried about Hamas and Gaza, while at the same time 
appearing confident that he will prevail with international 
support. Abbas reportedly was not bothered by PM Sharon's 
decision to cancel their planned summit, and told the French 
that he needed more time to prepare for the meeting.  MFA 
officials described Abbas as supportive on the question of 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon and ready to cooperate with 
Lebanese PM Siniora, though Abbas' ability to influence the 
camps in Lebanon remains questionable. 
 
2. (C) On the October 17-18 Siniora visit to Paris -- which 
included separate meetings with the French FM and PM, PA 
President Abbas, and UN Special Envoy for 1559 implementation 
Terje Roed-Larsen --  MFA officials described the Lebanese PM 
as talking a lot but saying little of substance, perhaps due 
to the presence of his "Hizbullahi" FM.  In his meetings with 
the GoF, Siniora addressed his commitment to reforms, support 
for the Core Group and a Lebanon conference before year-end, 
and the need to focus on UNSCR 1595 (vice UNSCR 1559) and 
bring to justice all those who "instigated, organized and 
executed" the Hariri assassination.  MFA contacts told us PM 
Villepin reminded Siniora of the need to implement UNSCR 1559 
and the need to quickly start a "national dialogue" leading 
to Hizballah disarmament, in contrast to Siniora's apparent 
long-term approach on the issue.  MFA contacts told us they 
did not have a readout of the October 18 Siniora-Abbas 
meeting, but press statements confirm the two reached 
agreement on the need for Palestinian camps to respect 
Lebanese sovereignty and obey Lebanese law.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle East 
Jean-Francois Thibault and MFA DAS-equivalent for 
Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot briefed Pol M/C and poloff late 
October 19 on recent, simultaneous visits of PA President 
Mahmoud Abbas and Lebanese PM Fouad Siniora to Paris. 
(Thibault's comments on BMENA and a possible Iraq UNSCR are 
reported septel.)  PA President Abbas met with President 
Chirac for 90-minutes on October 17, and met separately 
October 18 with Lebanese PM Siniora, Lebanese MP Sa'ad 
Hariri, and UN Special Envoy Roed-Larsen.  PM Siniora, 
meanwhile, met with FM Douste-Blazy October 17, and with PM 
Villepin, Abbas, and Roed-Larsen on October 18. 
 
ABBAS-CHIRAC: HAMAS, SHARON, GAZA, LEBANON, SYRIA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (C) Thibault, who attended the Chirac-Abbas meeting, 
described the PA leader as seeking French support on the 
issue of Hamas participation in January elections, the need 
to relaunch the roadmap, and the need to bring rapid 
improvement in Palestinians' daily lives via implementation 
of the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings.  Thibault described 
the PA leader as at once worried, and sure of himself.  He 
noted that Abbas was nervous about Hamas, and told Chirac 
that he could not be expected to declare "civil war" against 
Hamas.  Instead, Abbas said the international community 
needed to allow him to pursue his own policy on January 
elections, and to work the political and security issues to 
bring Hamas on board.  Thibault described Abbas as worried 
about prospects for resumed violence in Gaza, and as seeking 
more time from the international community to allow him to 
handle the Hamas issue. Thibault said Abbas appeared 
confident that he could prevail over Hamas in January 
elections, with international support, and that the path of 
non-violence he advocated with the Palestinian people was the 
right one. 
 
5. (C) Thibault described Abbas as sanguine on PM Sharon's 
decision to cancel their planned summit, in the wake of the 
killing of three Israelis by Palestinian militants, which 
Abbas condemned publicly.  Abbas told Chirac that it was not 
the first or the last time that Sharon had suspended 
contacts, and that perhaps it was not a bad thing that the 
meeting was canceled, as he needed more preparation time.  In 
the meantime, Abbas said he would ask the U.S. to pressure 
Israel to do more to implement the Sharm al-Sheikh 
understandings, particularly on prisoner releases, the 
transfer of four West Bank towns to PA control, and resolving 
the issue of the deportees from the Church of the Nativity. 
Thibault said Abbas told Chirac that he wanted to advance 
with the Israelis, but he needed help in order to do so. 
Abbas stressed that he had to deliver quickly and give 
Palestinians a sense that their daily living conditions were 
improving, which was currently not the case. 
6. (C) On Gaza, Besancenot noted that Abbas asked for French 
help with the port, to which France was amenable.  He noted 
that Abbas also briefly confirmed to Chirac his non-objection 
to a possible 3rd party EU role in border control, an 
initiative floated by FM Douste-Blazy during his early 
September visit to Gaza (reftel).  Besancenot concluded that 
the EU needed to discuss the border monitor issue further 
with Israel, Egypt, the U.S. and Quartet Special Envoy 
Wolfensohn. 
 
7. (C) Thibault characterized Abbas as "open" on the issue of 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon, during his discussion with 
Chirac.  Abbas expressed respect for Lebanese sovereignty and 
readiness to cooperate with PM Siniora, and understanding of 
Lebanese concerns that Palestinians should not display arms 
outside the camps.  Thibault said Abbas was critical of 
Syrian interference in Lebanon and confirmed reports that 
Syria had been transferring arms into Lebanese camps.  Abbas 
also confirmed his total support for international law on 
Lebanon, presumably a reference to UNSCR 1559, and the Mehlis 
investigation.  Thibault concluded that though Abbas' 
goodwill on Lebanon was not in question, his capacity to 
influence the camps remained questionable. 
 
SINIORA VISIT: CORE GROUP, HIZBALLAH, MEHLIS REPORT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (C) Thibault described Lebanese PM Siniora as talking a 
lot, but saying little of substance during his October 17-18 
meetings with FM Douste-Blazy and PM Villepin.  Thibault 
speculated that Siniora's lack of candor was due perhaps to 
the presence of his "Hizbullahi" FM Salloukh, who accompanied 
him throughout the meetings. Thibault said Siniora thanked 
France for its support on Lebanon, particularly its role in 
ensuring a successful Core Group ministerial in New York. 
Siniora stressed the need to maintain the goal of holding a 
"Friends of Lebanon" conference before year-end, even if the 
situation became more complicated -- to which the GoF agreed. 
 He discussed his reform program and expressed confidence 
that reforms could be achieved in such areas as fiscal 
responsibility, the VAT, and the budget -- all issues which 
Siniora had championed as Finance Minister. 
 
9. (C) On Hizballah, Thibault said Siniora avoided raising 
the issue in the context of UNSCR 1559 and instead concluded 
that the Hizballah problem could not be resolved until the 
GOL had both a national consensus and a social policy for 
southern Lebanon.  Thibault said the GoF was struck by 
Siniora's apparent strategy "of several months" for 
addressing the disarmament issue, and noted that the GoF 
urged him to address the issue with more immediacy.  PM 
Villepin reminded Siniora that UNSCR 1559 remained 
unresolved, and that Siniora needed to begin quickly the 
national dialogue leading to Hizballah disarmament.  Thibault 
observed that the presence of FM Salloukh during the meeting 
illustrated the difficulty of Siniora's position.  In an 
October 20 "Le Monde" interview, Siniora warned against 
"haste" on the issue of Hizballah disarmament, which he 
described as a topic of inter-Lebanese dialogue. In the same 
interview, Siniora described Hizballah as "not just a group 
of combatants," but representing a large sector of Lebanese 
society, with representation in government. 
 
10. (C) On UNSCR 1595, Thibault reported that Siniora 
expressed full support for pursuing the Mehlis report 
findings and for making UNSCR 1595 the immediate priority 
before UNSCR 1559 implementation.  Siniora insisted that all 
those who "instigated, organized, and executed" the Hariri 
assassination should be brought to justice and punished.  PM 
Villepin commended Siniora for his courage in arresting the 
four former security chiefs.  Thibault noted that Siniora 
made a general appeal for French judicial assistance in the 
aftermath of the Mehlis report, but offered no specifics. 
 
SINIORA-ABBAS MEETING 
--------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Thibault told us he had no information on the Abbas 
meetings with Siniora, Sa'ad Hariri and UN Special Envoy 
Larsen which took place in Paris October 18.  According to 
press reports, the joint statement issued after the 
Siniora-Abbas meeting confirmed the need for Palestinians in 
Lebanon to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and laws, as well as 
Abbas' full support for GOL efforts to prohibit weapons 
outside Palestinian camps and to halt the illegal entry of 
weapons and people into Lebanon.  The Abbas-Siniora statement 
also confirmed that Palestinian-Lebanese dialogue should deal 
with Palestinian refugee issues in Lebanon, as well as lead 
to implementation of all relevant UNSCRs which address 
Palestinian weapons in Lebanon (i.e. UNSCR 1559), in line 
with the Ta'if agreement and without confrontation between 
Lebanese authorities and armed Palestinian groups.  In press 
remarks after the meeting, PM Siniora confirmed that the 
Lebanese government had, for the first time told the 
Palestinians that there was no justification for an armed 
presence outside the refugee camps.  Abbas, for his part, 
confirmed publicly that Palestinians are guests in Lebanon 
who must respect the law and should not interfere in 
Lebanon's affairs. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON 

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