US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6351

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006351 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, CY, GR, EU 
SUBJECT: SUSTAINING INTERCHANGE WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 1617 
 
     B. ATHENS 2647 
     C. BRUSSELS 3756 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  In line with Embassies Nicosia and Athens 
ideas for a post-October 3 way forward on Cyprus, Embassy 
Ankara offers two suggestions:  initiating a sustained 
interchange with Turkish Cypriot authorities in areas of 
unassailable U.S. interest; and offering financing assistance 
for companies seeking to develop projects on non-Greek 
Cypriot land or infrastructure in the north.  We hesitate to 
predict that either of these would even begin to untie the 
Cyprus knot, but they could in small measure contribute to 
furthering the existing USG policy goals of ending Turkish 
Cypriot isolation, bolstering pro-solution forces in Turkey 
and the north, and continuing support for Turkey,s EU 
accession.  "TRNC President" Talat,s October 28 visit to 
Washington could present a good opportunity to launch these 
initiatives.  With October 3 behind us, the first crucial 
year in Turkey's EU accession process before us, and the UK 
and perhaps Russia considering new approaches to Cyprus, 
Talat's visit is a golden opportunity.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Athens and Nicosia have offered their views on the 
current Cyprus situation (refs A and B).  We too see this 
issue as stalemated.  Perhaps post October 3, we have a small 
window in which to start to make some progress.  It strikes 
us as worth a try. 
 
3.  (C) In the aftermath of the April 2004 Cyprus referenda, 
the USG embarked on a policy of ending Turkish Cypriot 
isolation.  The Turks genuinely and publicly appreciate USG 
efforts to date.  Our efforts have done little to ease the 
sense here that Turkish Cypriots remain isolated and that 
Turkey has received little concrete reward for the political 
capital it spent on seeking settlement in 2004.  Absent a 
signal of flexibility from the ROC, this limits Turkey's room 
for maneuver on Cyprus and contributes to the stalemate in 
overall settlement efforts. 
 
4.  (C) "TRNC President" Talat's visit to Washington and 
October 28 meeting with Secretary Rice is the USG's latest 
and most high-profile effort to reach out to Turkish 
Cypriots.  In line with our policy of engagement, the USG 
could use Talat's visit as an opportunity to initiate 
regular, sustained Washington-based interchange with Turkish 
Cypriots. 
 
5.  (C) One possibility would be for the Secretary, during 
her October 28 meeting with Talat, to offer to begin regular 
contact with "TRNC" authorities in areas of unassailable U.S. 
interest, with an eye toward capacity building and training. 
Such areas include law enforcement, counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, anti-terror finance, anti-money laundering, 
aviation safety, and maritime search and rescue. 
 
6.  (C) If this seems a useful approach, the Department could 
work to foster contacts between "TRNC" authorities and the 
FBI, DHS, Treasury, and the Coast Guard, and through the 
Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in 
Budapest.  A companion idea would be for the USG to 
systematize mid-level contact between "TRNC" and USG 
authorities from outside the island by regular visits to the 
north. 
 
7.  (C) As seen from Ankara, sustained interchange from the 
U.S. could help ease Turkish Cypriot isolation; strengthen 
the hand of pro-settlement forces in Ankara and northern 
Cyprus; and furnish a road map for nations outside the EU to 
reach out to Turkish Cypriots.  It could also do what the EU 
cannot (viz., the ROC-blocked trade and aid package to the 
north, promised in 2004), helping start to pave the way for a 
revival of the UN-brokered final settlement on Cyprus.  And 
it could accomplish this within the bounds of existing U.S. 
policy, the ultimate goal of which is settlement. 
 
8.  (C) In the context of Talat's visit, the USG could also 
consider offering OPIC or TDA financing for projects in the 
north not involving Greek Cypriot land or infrastructure. 
This would, in small measure, contribute to closing the 
economic gap between the two sides of the island, preparing 
the ground for eventual reunification. 
MCELDOWNEY