US embassy cable - 05PARIS7198

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SU, CD, FR 
SUBJECT: DARFUR TURMOIL DARKENING THE OUTLOOK FOR CHAD 
 
REF: A. STATE 190682 B. NDJAMENA 1546 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
1.  (C) France is not currently advocating a Chadian 
conference on Darfur, Africa A/S Equivalent Bruno Joubert 
declared during an October 17 meeting with Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan. 
 
SIPDIS 
Joubert informed Africa Watcher that the Quai d'Orsay was 
still reserving judgment, although the French ambassador in 
N'djamena was championing the conference as a means to 
reinforce President Deby's increasingly shaky position. 
Joubert remarked that the spillover of the Darfur conflict 
into Chad was becoming more than Deby could handle, as seen 
by increasing Zarghawa desertions in Eastern Chad.  The 
precariousness of Deby's situation was partly linked to his 
own situation, including his health, but Joubert added he was 
also "deeply suspicious of the game the Sudanese are playing." 
 
2.  (C) A Chadian conference would correspond to Deby's 
perceived need to engage personally on Darfur, Joubert 
stated.  Deby was thinking in terms of reviving the call in 
the April 2004 agreement for rebel cantonment, though Joubert 
was not sure how this could work.  Deby was also talking 
about somehow incorporating Janjaweed leaders into a 
conference.  Joubert was amenable to the U.S. proposal for a 
November Nairobi workshop.  He had thought the U.S. was open 
also to the option of a Mini Minawi organized event, 
prompting Africa Watcher to note our concern that such an 
initiative might further fuel rebel divisions (Ref A). 
 
3.  (C) Joubert commented to DASD Whelan that he had reached 
the conclusion -- in the course of the last two weeks -- that 
the Sudanese no longer wanted peace in Darfur.  Instead, 
Khartoum is "buying time" and "back to old tactics," like 
stoking differences among rebel commanders. Perhaps relieved 
by Garang's death and fortified by SPLM troop withdrawals, 
Khartoum was also going slow on CPA implementation, prompting 
doubts about its commitment, Joubert judged.  He repeatedly 
lamented the lack of ready international leverage on 
Khartoum, apart from resort to the ICC.  He asked Whelan 
whether the U.S. was pulling its punches because of the need 
for CPA implementation. 
 
4.  (C) Recent violence in Darfur was now posing a challenge 
to the credibility of the African Union (AU) and it was vital 
to counter any perception of AU failure, Whelan remarked.  A 
political settlement on Darfur within the near future did not 
appear a realistic prospect, short of a huge diplomatic 
breakthrough.  Joubert, for his part, wondered whether AMIS 
could last another 12 months, given both the stress on donors 
and the structural and capacity problems of the AU itself. 
Expansion to 7,000 had "mortally broken" AMIS, he said. EU 
funding would continue for another 5-6 months at most. 
 
5.  (C) Joubert said DPKO U/SYG Guehenno had told him at a 
10/17 lunch that the UN had no expectation of beginning a 
Darfur operation before mid-2006, at best.  Guehenno fingered 
key obstacles to UN deployment as i) lack of an AU exit 
strategy, and, ii) the need for an Abuja success.  Moreover, 
UNMIS itself was heavy going.  To commit the UN to another 
major operation, likely 12,000 more troops, would have 
significant cost implications, too, for both the USG and 
France, Joubert noted.  Guehenno called for new "software, 
not hardware" in addressing the problem, meaning that Abuja 
headway and rebel cohesion could count for more than 
international troop increases. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON