US embassy cable - 05CAIRO8111

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ARAB LEAGUE AMRE MOUSSA ELICITS POSITIVE RESPONSE

Identifier: 05CAIRO8111
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO8111 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-10-20 13:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG IZ Arab League
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 008111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, IZ, Arab League 
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ARAB LEAGUE AMRE 
MOUSSA ELICITS POSITIVE RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. STATE 192650 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. CAIRO 8016 (NOTAL) 
     C. CAIRO 7982 (NOTAL) NODIS 
     D. CAIRO 7963 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The Ambassador delivered the Secretary's oral message 
(ref A) during a meeting late October 19 with Arab League 
Secretary General Amre Moussa - the eve of his departure to 
 
SIPDIS 
Iraq.  Moussa received the message positively while focusing 
attention on the issues of a conference venue and MNF 
"withdrawal."  Moussa intends to propose a "preparatory" 
meeting in Cairo as a "practical necessity, not an AL 
political requirement."  He acknowledged that the Iraqi 
Transitional Government and the majority of Iraqis themselves 
might insist on meeting only in Iraq, and agreed that he 
would comply with Iraqi wishes.  Moussa also repeated his 
expectation that he will "need" to address with Iraqis the 
topic of foreign troop withdrawal, while taking aboard our 
attempt to re-direct such a conversation more positively 
toward helping Iraqis stand on their own.  While again 
commending Moussa's willingness to visit Iraq and engage 
politically, the Ambassador stressed the importance of 
avoiding in any way undermining either the elected Iraqi 
government or the political process put in place by UNSCR 
1546, including the constitution.  As part of his mission to 
Iraq, Moussa intends to announce the establishment in Baghdad 
of an Arab League diplomatic presence at the Ambassadorial 
level.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Secretary's Oral Message Reviewed 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) During a late October 19 meeting at the residence of 
Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa, hours before 
Moussa's departure for Iraq, the Ambassador conveyed the 
Secretary's oral message (ref A) on his visit and on Arab 
 
SIPDIS 
League efforts on Iraq (refs B and C).  The Ambassador 
underscored our fundamental concern that Moussa and the 
League must convey clearly to the Iraqis and the broader 
public that th AL recognized the legitimacy of both the Iraqi 
Transitional Government (ITG), UNSCR 1546, and the results of 
the constitution referendum and do nothing that could be 
perceived as undermining them.  Moussa stated that he "liked" 
the Secretary's message and Ambassador Jeffrey's statement of 
support for his mission. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Arab League Next Steps:  Meeting Venue, Baghdad Office 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.  (C) Discussing the AL proposal to host a national 
conference of Iraqis, Moussa readily agreed that the Iraqis 
themselves will determine whatever name such a gathering 
would be given.  But, Moussa underscored his interest in 
first hosting a "preparatory" gathering of Iraqis in Cairo at 
the Arab League "to allow the maximum number of regional 
foreign ministers and others to participate."  Asked if the 
Cairo venue was a League political requirement, Moussa 
clarified that a meeting in Cairo was not a political 
objective but rather a "practical necessity" to increase 
participation of Arab ministers and others who might be 
unwilling to travel to Iraq due to security concerns.  The 
Ambassador advised that the majority of Iraqis from all walks 
of life would probably want the meetings held in Iraq as a 
matter of national pride.  Moreover, Iraqis more readily 
trust foreigners that come to them, thereby experiencing the 
day-to-day living conditions faced by Iraqis.  They would be 
less likely to trust those who refused to visit Iraq, and 
indeed may draw unfavorable contrasts between the fearful 
Arab VIPs who dare not ever visit Baghdad, versus the many 
westerners who both visit and stay there.  Moussa took the 
point, saying that he would discuss the topic at length in 
Iraq. 
 
4.  (C) Moussa told the Ambassador that another outcome of 
his mission would be an announcement of plans to open an Arab 
League diplomatic mission in Baghdad in the near future. 
Moussa explained that he was thinking of sending someone with 
"Head of Mission rank with Ambassadorial title."  (Note: 
October 20 press reporting quotes AL sources as saying that 
the League would establish an office in Baghdad:  a notably 
forward-leaning move on Moussa's part.  End note).  By 
establishing an Arab League mission in Baghdad, Moussa added, 
AL member states would feel compelled to follow suit. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
MNF Withdrawal Still High on Moussa's Agenda 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) As expected, Moussa returned to the topic of MNF 
withdrawal and his need to at least discuss the issue with 
the Iraqis during his visit.  While asserting that he aimed 
to support the UNSCR 1546 process, and certainly had no 
intention to undermine it or the ITG, Moussa insisted that 
additional efforts (i.e., those of the League and its member 
states) were required to bring disaffected (though not 
terrorist) groups into the political process and drain 
support for the resistance and insurgency.  The Ambassador 
again cautioned Moussa to avoid taking any position that 
could even be taken to imply an AL effort to establish 
alternative processes to either the elected Iraqi government 
or the UNSCR 1546 political process.  Any discussion of 
"withdrawal," in particular, should aim directly at 
supporting Iraqis in building their own security forces and 
taking full responsibility for their national security. 
Moussa said he "understood," and did not demur. 
 
6.  (C) Moussa said he had received death threats in addition 
to pleadings from friends and strangers not to make this 
trip.  His wife was particularly unhappy but "accepts his 
responsibilities."  Zarqawi and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
had both publicly criticized him for his trip.  But, Moussa 
insisted that he would not be deterred from his mission. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Additional Itinerary Details of Visit 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Moussa noted his pleasure over his expected meeting 
Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad October 20.  Moussa also 
explained that President Talabani requested their meeting 
take place in Sulaymaniyah on October 22, immediately before 
Moussa meets with Barzani in Irbil.  He extended his visit by 
one day to accomodate both Kurdish leaders.  Moussa expressed 
personal anxieties over the possible use of helicopters to 
get from Baghdad to Najaf, and from Irbil to Sulaymaniyah, 
but indicated his readiness to do so if necessary.  Moussa 
and delegation plan to remain in Irbil overnight October 22, 
departing for Cairo on October 23. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04