US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ENRG, IR, IN, India_Iran 
SUBJECT: INDIA'S STANCE ON IRAN AND THE IAEA CONTINUES TO 
AROUSE CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION 
 
Classified By: Charge' Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The spate of media and political criticism 
touched off by the GOI's decision to vote with the US and the 
EU3 (UK, France, and Germany) at the September 24 IAEA 
meeting on Iran is increasing rather than dying down. 
Foreign Secretary Saran recently summoned Ambassadors from 
the EU3 to push for resolving the Iran issue without referral 
to the UNSC.  Meanwhile, Iran is stepping up its own 
pressure.  Tehran announced another pipeline Working Group 
meeting for October 24, and Iran's Ambassador in New Delhi 
has mounted a high-profile lobbying campaign.  Public 
interest in the debate is continuing, spurring speculation 
that the GOI is under growing pressure to backtrack from its 
earlier stance.  The left is most outspoken, predictably 
accusing India of caving in to American pressure, but others 
from across the political spectrum are joining the chorus. 
Only a minority of strategic analysts supported India's 
decision, arguing that it serves India's interests, heightens 
the GOI's credibility within the IAEA, and makes the point 
that the country has moved beyond blind obiedience to the 
non-alligned movement (NAM) position.  The October 21-22 
visit of U/S Burns will offer us an opportunity to present 
our case with Saran and key opinion makers.  End summary. 
 
MEA Position 
------------- 
 
2. (C) On October 13, Indian Foreign Secretary Saran summoned 
the EU3 (UK, France, and Germany) Ambassadors to discuss 
potential political solutions for Iran that would keep the 
matter out of the UNSC.  The German Embassy's Polcouns 
offered Poloff a detailed read-out on the meeting.  According 
to the German, the Indians want to avoid confrontation with 
Iran by keeping the nuclear issue within the IAEA.  Saran 
insisted that the recent BOG vote instigated debate within 
the Iranian government to reconsider its position.  He urged 
the EU-3 to encourage Teheran to compromise by presenting a 
"face-saving" way to return to the negotiating table.  Noting 
that in the past, the international community has discussed 
confidence-building measures with Iran, Saran suggested that 
the EU-3 propose a compromise in which Iran would: 
 
- reduce feedstock in Esfahan by 50%  (Note: "Feedstock" 
refers to the gases needed for enrichment and to "feed" the 
rest of the nuclear fuel cycle.  End note.); 
 
- stop conversion at the U4 stage rather than proceeding to 
the more advanced U6 stage; and/or 
 
- export finished nuclear materiel rather than storing it 
within Iran. 
 
3.  (C) Our German interlocutor added that Saran emphasized 
that Iran could become more confrontational if backed into a 
corner.  Saran reportedly indicated that New Delhi is willing 
to speak to Iran, but needs joint parameters from its allies. 
 A UK poloff confirmed to us on October 19 that Saran was 
sincerely interested in a dialogue with the EU3 and its 
allies.  She posited that although there is no guarantee 
India will vote the same way again at the November IAEA 
meeting as it did on September 24, the GOI's willingness to 
step away from pro-NAM or pro-Iran rhetoric and 
constructively plan ahead and engage with others is an 
encouraging sign. 
 
But Politics Persist... 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Internal debate on India's IAEA vote referring Iran 
to the UNSC is also heating up.  In a recent London School of 
Economics speech, Hindu Editor-in-Chief N. Ram described 
India's vote as a massive foreign policy "blunder," contrived 
to convince the US that it was an ally, and earn Washington's 
support for an Indian Security Council seat.  Ram was not 
alone in this assessment- a variety of pundits and 
politicians have painted India's decision in the same harsh 
light, increasing the pressure on Manmahon Singh's government 
to abstain in any future IAEA vote.  On October 3, party 
leaders from the leftist CPI(M), CPI, Forward Bloc, and RSP 
agreed to begin a nation-wide "campaign of agitation" to 
begin October 28.  The campaign will try to force the GOI to 
reverse its position on referring Iran to the UNSC.  In 
addition to reports on the left's activities, numerous op-ed 
pieces have pointed out that India's relationship with Iran 
will be strained and that India will now be perceived as 
subject to undue American influence.  Nevertheless, the 
debate in the media has not been one-sided.  Some analysts 
have posited that India has actually enhanced its reputation 
of fairness and independence by breaking with the NAM in the 
IAEA vote.  Furthermore, the MEA's media spin argues that 
India's inputs to the resolution allowed Iran further time to 
negotiate before being referred to the Security Council. 
 
Iranian Lobbying 
----------------- 
 
5. (U) Despite the MEA's publicity efforts, it seems Tehran 
sees a faultline within the GOI and is attempting to broaden 
that rift.  Press reports indicate that senior Iranian 
diplomats met key leftist politicians with the hopes of 
recruiting allies within the GOI.  Also, on October 15, 
Iran's Ambassador to India S.Z. Yaghoubi called on External 
Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh.  Although the MEA press 
statement provided no details, there was broad speculation in 
the media that the meeting was part of an Iranian campaign to 
pressure India to change its IAEA stance.  Yaghoubi has also 
taken his campaign public, writing op-eds carried in the 
Times of India and Hindustan Times that talk up Iran-India 
energy cooperation and decry "politically motivated" pressure 
from "foreign colonial powers" against Iran- an argument that 
resonates with domestic critics of India's vote. 
 
6. (SBU) On October 19, Iran added another element to the 
GOI's decision-making dilemma by unexpectedly calling for an 
October 24 meeting of the Joint Working Group on the proposed 
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.  Iran is expected to continue 
to lobby the GOI to abstain in November's vote.  Media have 
reported that a GOI delegation will attend the meeting in 
Tehran, but the MEA's Iran desk told us that it is unclear as 
yet whether MEA or the Ministry of Petroleum will be leading 
that group. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
7. (C) The Congress-led UPA Alliance committed itself to the 
September 24 vote without attempting to garner support from 
Parliament or political leaders.  In an October 15 
conversation with the Charge', Indo-US Parliamentary Forum 
Chairman Jay Panda commented that Prime Minister Singh has 
gone well beyond the national consensus in siding with the US 
in the IAEA's September vote.  Against the background of 
leftist agitation, he predicted, the Prime Minister will now 
be obliged to back down.  Prime Minister Singh himself has 
let it be known that he is committed to his current course, 
but that opinion is not unanimously shared amongst our 
Congress contacts.  Although India voted with the US in 
September, the GOI may not have the required domestic support 
to sustain that position.  The GOI faces intense domestic 
criticism and pressure to back down from its stance, and is 
hoping to avoid further controversy by resolving the Iran 
issue through behind the scenes diplomatic negotiations that 
would avoid a November IAEA vote.  Our German colleague told 
us that Saran mentioned an "exit in honor" for Iran.  As New 
Delhi pursues this course, we will need to be very clear 
about our own red lines, especially if those diverge from the 
EU3.  End comment. 
 
 
BLAKE