US embassy cable - 05DUSHANBE1702

S E C R E T  DUSHANBE 001702 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL, EB 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, RS, TI 
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  AMBASSADOR ZARIPOV COUNSELS NO SHARP RESPONSE 
TO RUSSIAN PROVOCATIONS 
 
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1696  B) FBIS CEP2005101927067  C) DUSHANBE 1681 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy 
Dushanbe. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with Tajikistan's Ambassador to 
the United States Zaripov (strictly protect throughout), 
Ambassador Hoagland and he both agreed that the U.S.-Tajikistan 
relationship is generally solid, with few sharp ups and downs. 
They discussed primarily the potential of U.S.-Russia 
cooperation to develop Tajikistan's hydropower and on-going 
problems for U.S. NGOs.  The conversation stayed relatively 
general, perhaps because Zaripov had a Foreign Ministry minder 
with him, until a final pull-aside in Embassy Dushanbe's garden. 
 Zaripov let loose with details about Moscow's paranoia about 
the United States and its intentions in Tajikistan.  He 
counseled patience and "no sharp response to provocations."  His 
bottom line was that Russia is increasingly playing hardball to 
limit U.S. influence in Tajikistan.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (SBU) While on home leave and consultations, Tajik 
Ambassador to Washington Homrahon Zaripov called on the 
Ambassador on October 19.  Sirozh Rajabov, the Foreign 
Ministry's Deputy Chief of Administration for Europe and North 
America, accompanied him as note-taker. 
 
EVERYTHING'S MORE OR LESS FINE~ 
 
3.  (C) The ambassadors agreed that in principle the bilateral 
relationship is on track and about 90 percent smooth.  Zaripov 
noted that President Rahmonov is generally satisfied, especially 
because "he does not like sharp ups and downs in relationships." 
 
4.  (C) Zaripov expressed pleasure that U.S-Russia (i.e., AES 
and RAO UES) cooperation appears possible to develop 
Tajikistan's hydropower potential.  He recounted how he had been 
an early champion of this cooperation, and how he had worked 
hard in the United States to promote it, "even though it is 
dangerous to be involved in such big business."  Ambassador 
Hoagland noted a successful collaboration between AES and RAO 
UES would have political value because it would concretely 
 
SIPDIS 
demonstrate U.S.-Russia cooperation for economic development in 
Central Asia. 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador briefed Zaripov in detail about the 
October 13 visit of Secretary of State Rice.  Zaripov had little 
to say, but did express surprise about the Secretary's visit to 
the Central Mosque and Girls' Madrassa.  He confirmed it had not 
been reported on Tajik State TV and said no one had mentioned it 
to him. 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador handed Zaripov a copy of the Tajik 
Government's recent diplomatic note requesting what, in our 
view, seems to be excessive information about all U.S. NGOs 
working in Tajikistan (ref A).  Zaripov read it carefully, 
glanced at Rajabov, and noted it was the first he had heard of 
such a request and, thus, was unprepared to comment on it.  He 
added that both sides should be patient and avoid "sharp 
decisions."  The United States should understand that Tajikistan 
as an independent state is only 14 years old.  "All of these 
kinds of questions are solvable with patience," he said. 
 
7.  (C) In response to a question, Zaripov recounted President 
Rahmonov's September meeting in New York during UNGA with George 
 
 
Soros.  Zaripov said that the meeting was positive in general 
but had its sharp moments.  He recounted that Soros had asked 
Rahmonov if he has suspicions about the Open Society Institute 
in Tajikistan.  Rahmonov had responded firmly that he was highly 
suspicious and watched it closely.  So far, he had found no 
fault, but was prepared to shut down Soros immediately if any 
"irregularity" came to his attention. 
 
8.  (C) About life in Washington, Zaripov said he found it easy 
to work with the State Department and the National Security 
Council.  He praised EUR DAS Byrza's energy, intense 
involvement, and knowledge of the region.  By contrast, Zaripov 
noted that it is still difficult for him to make much progress 
on Capitol Hill where he continues to run into pre-conceived 
notions about Tajikistan.  Ambassador Hoagland commented that 
Embassy Dushanbe has worked hard to change Washington 
stereotypes about Tajikistan, but Capitol Hill seldom sees 
diplomatic reporting and relies more generally on media accounts 
and information from groups with special interests.  Both 
Ambassadors agreed that it would be useful for CoDels and 
StaffDels to visit Tajikistan so that they could gain 
first-hand, accurate information. 
 
~EXCEPT RUSSIA IS AN EVER BIGGER PROBLEM 
 
9.  (S) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador and Zaripov 
had a one-on-one pull-aside in the Embassy garden apart from 
Rajabov.  The Ambassador repeated that the latest Tajik 
diplomatic note requesting excessive information about U.S. NGOs 
in Tajikistan is ominous and disturbing.  He is seeking guidance 
from Washington before responding.  He asked for Zaripov's 
candid assessment.  Zaripov counseled go-slow caution.  He 
volunteered that President Rahmonov is subject to a drumbeat of 
anti-U.S. attacks from the Ministry of Security prodded by 
Moscow - not only from Russian mass media (ref B), but also from 
the Russian-dominated Tajik Ministry of Security.  Zaripov said 
the message from Moscow, especially via the Ministry of 
Security, is that the United States wants to overthrow Rahmonov, 
kick the Russians out of their military base, and expand U.S. 
influence from Afghanistan into Tajikistan as a link to 
"U.S.-dominated Kyrgyzstan."  The U.S. goal in this scenario is 
"a string of anti-Russia military bases from Baghram to Manas." 
 
10.  (S) Zaripov continued the anti-U.S.-NGO drive - especially 
against National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and 
InterNews - comes directly from Moscow.  Rahmonov is trying to 
maintain an uneasy balance by not registering these three NGOs, 
but also by allowing them to continue to operate.  Zaripov 
concluded that he sincerely hoped the timing of the new 
diplomatic note about U.S. NGOs - which he in fact did know 
about but did not want to discuss in front of Rajabov - was 
simply coincidental to Rahmonov's October 7-9 meetings in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg with Putin. 
 
11.  (S) Zaripov elaborated on his earlier comment about the 
danger of being involved in "big business."  He confirmed the 
AES report (ref C) that then-Tajik PermRep to the UN Rashid 
Alimov had tried strenuously to prevent the meeting in New York 
between Rahmonov and the AES CEO, arguing to Rahmonov that the 
U.S. Government is maneuvering AES to wreck Russian-Tajik 
hydropower cooperation and push Russia out of Tajikistan. 
Zaripov recounted that he had taken Rahmonov aside and had "a 
shouting match with him."  He said, "I was willing to be fired, 
or even go to prison."  But he convinced Rahmonov to hear out 
AES, and Rahmonov has now apparently accepted the idea of 
AES-RAO UES cooperation.   (COMMENT:  Although Zaripov's version 
 
 
may be somewhat self-serving, it rings true with many other 
disparate details we continue to pick up.  Russia is playing 
hardball to limit the influence of the United States in 
Tajikistan.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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