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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI8140 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI8140 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-10-20 08:27:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | NONE Earthquake |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 008140 SIPDIS AIDAC AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR DCHA/FFP, LAUREN LANDIS ANE BUREAU FOR ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR JIM KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD, INDIA DESK OFFICER, EBONY BOSTIC, SUPERVISORY PROGRAM OFFICER, REBECCA COHN BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: NONE, Earthquake SUBJECT: JAMMU AND KASHMIR EARTHQUAKE DISASTER AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT (CORRECTED COPY) THIS CABLE REPLACES NEW DELHI 00008122 ------- Summary ------- 1. Following a 7.4 earthquake that struck the Kashmir region on October 8, a Regional Advisor from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and a Disaster Management Specialist from USAID/Delhi deployed to the affected region in northern India October 12-16 to conduct a rapid needs assessment. Preliminary findings indicate access is the main constraint to providing critical relief, and is directly correlated to complex security and logistical challenges. Shelter is of utmost priority, and with tents in short supply, alternative housing using existing debris and locally available material must be actively explored. Road closures due to inclement weather have already occurred en route to villages situated at higher elevations, indicating winter has arrived in parts of Jammu-Kashmir. Time is, therefore, of the essence to distribute aid in the region's scattered, remote villages. Army forces are taking the lead in facilitating relief efforts; however, security remains a paramount concern. 2. USAID/OFDA provided an initial $100,000 to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund and Save the Children's Fund-UK (SCF) for emergency needs, including blankets, children's jackets and food. An additional $500,000 will go toward relief efforts, and be channeled through reputable NGOs with presence on the ground and knowledge of the culture and operational context. These funds will be programmed once submitted proposals undergo technical review. Programming will focus on immediate and interim shelter, blankets, winter clothing, emergency health and psychological-social care. Modest cash-for-work programs, such as clearance of debris or shelter construction, will also be implemented. Activities will be largely guided through community participation, and carried out in close coordination with USAID/Delhi, local and national government authorities, and the humanitarian relief community. USAID/OFDA Regional Advisors will closely monitor programmatic opportunities and their development. 3. Additional support from the U.S. Government including U.S. Military should be considered. Support is needed to transport supplies and services to very isolated regions of Kashmir and to provide winterized tents. Mission is working with host government authorities to ensure the GOI requests such support no action should be taken by the US military until such a request is formally received. These contributions would greatly help alleviate suffering and also build goodwill among the people of Kashmir. ----------------- Current Situation ----------------- 4. On October 8, 2005, an earthquake of a 7.4 magnitude jolted Kashmir, with more than 50 subsequent tremors recorded in the affected region. According to recent Government of India figures, casualties now surpass 1,400, and more than 6,000 are believed to be injured. In addition, 32,000 homes are reportedly damaged or destroyed, and officially 160,000 people affected. In many affected villages, it is believed that more than 90% of the homes have been damaged. Within the humanitarian community, these figures are believed to be low estimates. No significant migration down from remote areas has been reported at this time, however it was reported that the army has established 4 camps in Uri. In days to come more assessment data will be compiled, however the situation remains highly fluid and needs are ever changing in this region of steep terrain, harsh winter climate and political tension. 5. A USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor and a Disaster Management Specialist from USAID/India traveled to Srinagar, Jammu- Kashmir from October 12-16 to ascertain the current emergency needs in Baraulla and Kupwara, the two most affected districts. The team accompanied SCF to the village of Bandi, in the hills outside the border town of Uri, where USAID/OFDA-funded relief was distributed among its 22 families. Blankets, food, and winter clothing were provided. Locals were eager to show the extent of damage in their village from the earthquake; not one building the assessment team viewed was fully intact. Back in Srinagar the team established contact with local authorities, relief organizations and community leaders. They also took part in the first NGO coordination meeting on the October 15; other than ECHO which had a previously established presence in Kashmir, USAID was the first and only bilateral donor on the ground. However, other donors have mobilized assessment teams over the past week. -------------- Priority Needs -------------- 6. The priorities at this time include winterized tents, shelter and building supplies, blankets, medical care, warm clothing, and psycho-social counseling. Transport of supplies and services is also a significant constraint with isolated villages, damaged roads and mountainous terrain. ----------------------- Complexities of Shelter ----------------------- 7. With more than 32,000 buildings or homes believed to be damaged, there are not enough tents to support the requirement. India's 3-4 primary vendors have increased production from a combined 350 tents/day to approximately 1,000 tents/day. Even with increased production, orders are back-logged. 8. Lack of winterized tents will be problematic. The more inaccessible disaster victims would not likely get tents as quickly as those closer to easy distribution routes. In Bandi, where villagers as of October 13 had not yet received any assistance, there was clear evidence of home owners taking initiative in sorting debris for future use. The NGO community will need to capitalize on this initiative and continue to explore ways to quickly find alternative solutions for winterized shelter. Modest inputs, such as tin roofing, tarpaulin, and wood framing material, may be enough to prepare villagers for the first heavy snowfall. USAID/OFDA will be encouraging NGOs to deploy mobile technical teams comprised of carpenters and masons to circulate among the more remote villages. Cash- for-work opportunities will also be explored. 9. There remains a concern that shelter damage has been significantly underestimated. Many assessments have relied upon visual sightings of rooftops still in existence, concluding homes were sound. Aerial or distant perspectives of the extent of damage can be deceiving, because even though wood frames and corrugated tin roofs are in place, cement or adobe foundations and interior rock walls are often cracked and damaged. 10. The Government of India (GOI) has announced it will be providing each family 100,000 rupees ($2200) for damaged homes and would provide an initial 40,000 rupees installment. This compensation raises considerable questions in terms of accurate targeting; it is not unusual for family size to be 7-10 people, or for more than one family to reside in the same home. In one case CARE interviewed a member of one household that was sheltering 6 families-more than 50 people; 100,000 rupees is inadequate in these cases. --------------------------- Poor Distribution Practices --------------------------- 11. There are a multitude of varied perspectives circulating among the media and government officials with respect to emergency needs, based on visual images and extrapolations. Uri, one of the more severely hit towns on the border, is situated along a major road that is far more readily accessible to reporters and truck convoys than the villages located hours away. This has resulted in misinformation. For example, it has been reported that there are adequate blankets in place to meet needs and that the houses on the hillside "appear" to be fine. The reality is quite different; blankets are piled up due to poor distribution capacity and flawed procedures that fail to distribute supplies equitably. Some organizations were reportedly "dumping" goods en route to Uri to avoid angry crowds and time-consuming checkpoint delays. ------------- Mental Health ------------- 12. All reports indicate the loss of lives is widespread throughout Baramulla, Kupwara and Poonch. According to Save the Children, 16 orphaned children are currently registered with the Government of India, but it is clear that hundreds more have lost members of their immediate family, relatives, neighbors, and friends. Similar to the trauma counseling that followed the tsunami, many NGOs and local volunteers are poised to address the special needs of children and youth and will do so through recreational activities and the resumption of schools. Such activities simultaneously address child and youth protection issues by ensuring these vulnerable groups are accounted for, engaged in activities and, where possible, given opportunities for income generation in community-focused programs. ---------------- Additional Needs ---------------- 13. While food has not been widely reported as a pressing requirement, there are certainly areas in need. The army has established free food kitchens known as "langhars" in the Uri area and has air-dropped commodities, however, given the lack of data on village conditions, it is imperative that continued assessments be done to determine evolving and site-specific needs. Many villages, for example, are road accessible and therefore in a much better position to access markets than the villagers who rely on mule or transportation by foot to higher elevations. Some farmers have already stored their summer harvest, while others have yet to clear their fields. Corn and rice, among other items, are typically placed inside containers in the house for the winter months, so locals have suggested that much of this stock will be salvageable once the debris is cleared away. Nonetheless, relief organizations have distributed food, such as rice, lentils, sugar and oil, to both meet emergency needs and ease the burden of recovery. 14. While there are no major concerns regarding health or water and sanitation at this time, the situation needs to be closely monitored. The national armed forces have been addressing the more serious injuries and providing medicine, with six medical and three surgical teams deployed. State authorities have 21 medical teams on the ground with 15 ambulances, medicine, and IV fluids. NGOs are assisting these efforts. Catholic Relief Services, for example, deployed 50 medical teams to conduct initial assessments and render basic health care. The full extent of health needs is not yet known. Nonetheless, in an effort to avoid serious public health risks, hygiene kits have been incorporated into many of the distributions, and public health training for communities is planned to ensure basic health services are available. In terms of water and sanitation, water purification tablets are being distributed and there is much discussion regarding how to best approach latrine needs. Many among the affected populations had latrines in their homes, while others traditionally use designated sites on hillsides. Needs in these sectors will vary from village to village. --------------------- Impact on Livelihoods --------------------- 15. Many have lost their means to generate income. For example there are numerous reports of loss of cattle. Similar to the aftermath of the tsunami, villagers will need time to rebuild their homes and lives. Furthermore, Baramulla and Kupwara are characterized by widespread rural poverty, which often translates into few savings or assets. Cash-for-work programs are being explored to offer income opportunities that will address an immediate need for income, which in turn may be spent on the tailored needs of each family. ------------ Coordination ------------ 16. The complex nature of this disaster will require close coordination among the humanitarian community, military, government officials, and community leaders. The first coordination meeting among NGOs was held on Saturday, October 15, and was led by ActionAid. Representatives from local and international NGOs were present, as was UNICEF. The meeting was a good opportunity for newcomers to better understand the context of the disaster from the viewpoint of long-standing NGOs, such as SCF-UK and OXFAM. Further meetings are scheduled to ensure continued information sharing and collaboration, and will be led by UNDP. USAID/OFDA-funded grantees will be strongly encouraged to attend. UNDP is also coordinating donor meetings in New Delhi. -------------------------------------- Major Constraints to Relief Operations --------------------------------------- 17. Security: Those NGOs with regional experience are hesitant to assume that humanitarian access will endure through the winter months. There is also concern among some NGOs about affiliation with armed forces. However, some NGOs are working with the military forces to provide the necessary relief. Those NGOs with longstanding presence in the area may elect to maintain their neutrality by not working directly with the military.. 18. Access: Restricted access is directly correlated to the security situation. Army checkpoints and registration requirements have delayed the movement of commodities. In addition, steep terrain and road blockages from landslides are compounding the problem of accessibility. In many cases villages are so remote they can only be reached by foot. This issue has also resulted in a dearth of accurate assessment information to guide relief operations. While assessments are still underway by the Army and humanitarian community, many areas have yet to be visited by any outside party, and it is believed needs are great throughout the Tangdhar and Uri areas. 19. Logistics: The aforementioned constraints have a direct impact on the ability to transport much needed relief to affected populations. The Army appears to be in the best position to facilitate relief efforts under the circumstances; since the onset of the disaster it has been providing helicopter and truck support for aid distribution. Many NGOs are reliant on their own vehicle transport, and there are some that are providing relief on foot. While necessary, security measures at checkpoints have been the cause of delays in the provision of emergency relief. 20. Time: Efforts to assist those in need are further aggravated by the need to move quickly with harsh winter weather on its way. According to locals, much of the region becomes impassable in winter, and traditionally communities prepare to be isolated for months at a time during this season. Already the main road to Tangdhar was closed temporarily due to snowy conditions. There may be a short window of opportunity for intervention to many isolated areas. By early December, winter will arrive in full force. ---------- Conclusion ---------- 21. USAID/OFDA and USAID/Delhi are in close contact with the relief community and government officials, and will continue to monitor the situation. Five proposals are under collaborative technical review provided by USAID/OFDA's Regional Advisor, USAID/OFDA's Response Management Team, and the USAID/Delhi team. There is an opportunity to alleviate the suffering in Kashmir and to further strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between India and the United States through prompt and coordinated action on the ground. Additional logistical support provided by the U.S. military would be a welcome complement to USAID/OFDA assistance, but such support should not be sent until we receive an official GOI request which post is seeking. BLAKE
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