US embassy cable - 05LILONGWE914

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

PARLIAMENT ADOPTS IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURES

Identifier: 05LILONGWE914
Wikileaks: View 05LILONGWE914 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Lilongwe
Created: 2005-10-19 15:31:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KDEM PREL PGOV MI Political Issues
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LILONGWE 000914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S MELINDA TABLER-STONE 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
PARIS FOR D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2010 
TAGS: KDEM, PREL, PGOV, MI, Political Issues 
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT ADOPTS IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURES 
 
REF: A. LILONGWE 634 
 
     B. LILONGWE 614 
 
Classified By: PolOff Tyler Sparks for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On October 18, Malawi,s Parliament adopted 
procedures which provide the framework for the possible 
impeachment of President Mutharika. The opposition's next 
step will be to propose a constitutional amendment to 
establish a National Governing Council, which would make a 
major change in the succession scenario should the 
impeachment attempt be successful.  That would require a 2/3 
majority in parliament and the first true test of the 
opposition's strength on the impeachment issue.  The 
impeachment attempt seems likely to continue to distract 
Parliament, even as Malawi moves towards the worst hunger 
crisis in the last ten years. Heads of mission discussed a 
possible strategy for a quiet effort to encourage the 
Malawian parties to reconcile (see para 6).  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The adopted impeachment procedures put in place the 
framework for impeaching any sitting President or 
Vice-President, and only required a simple majority to pass. 
From here, however, the task becomes more difficult for the 
two opposition parties, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and 
United Democratic Front (UDF).  While the UDF is the main 
driver of the impeachment attempt, the MCP is insisting that 
a National Governing Council follow any impeachment.  In 
their minds, this would pave the way for MCP president and 
leader of the opposition John Tembo to take over as 
President, instead of the Vice-President Cassim Chilumpha, a 
member of the UDF.  (Note: According to the current 
constitutional provisions for impeachment, the vice-president 
would serve out the remainder of the term, in this case until 
2009. End note.) 
 
3. (C) However, a constitutional amendment establishing a 
National Governing Council (NGC) will require a 2/3 majority, 
which will not be easy. The MCP has 59 seats and the UDF 
roughly 45 seats in the 187 member parliament, which still 
puts them over 20 votes short of 2/3. The NGC vote will be 
the first real test of the MCP and UDF's combined strength. 
An MCP parliamentarian told PolOff that he doesn't think they 
will have enough votes to pass the NGC or an impeachment 
motion. 
 
4. (SBU) The impeachment motion has been intensely debated in 
the press in recent weeks, and civil society organizations 
have begun to speak out strongly on the issue.  All sides 
seem to agree that impeachment procedures should be put in 
place as called for by the constitution.  However, the Malawi 
Law Commission and some civil society organizations have come 
out against the procedures adopted by Parliament.  They favor 
the establishment of an independent tribunal to judge the 
merit of charges put forward by Parliament, rather than 
Parliament acting as both prosecutor (in bringing an 
indictment by a two-thirds vote) and the ultimate "judge" of 
an impeachment trial.  The opposition has so far ignored 
outside advice and has pressed ahead to put in place 
procedures that would allow the impeachment of Mutharika 
before the end of the year. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  There are a good many things wrong with this 
picture.  First, the political class here has lost sight of 
whatever misdeeds Mutharika might have committed, if any, to 
deserve impeachment.  Thus this discussion is to this point 
entirely theoretical and political.  Second, the National 
Governing Council proposal makes a major change in the 
constitutional schema, which at present is an orderly 
succession to a single elected official.  Should the NGC 
proposal be adopted, it would guarantee a succession to an 
interim governing body, negotiated behind closed doors 
without public debate and  composed of a coalition of 
opposition figures who are unlikely to be able to govern 
effectively, a thoroughly bad idea.  Third, it would open the 
door to an unbudgeted and expensive election within the 
current fiscal year and within the current food crisis, 
something that neither we nor the IMF should be excited 
about.  Finally, we are about to see Malawi politics get as 
nasty as we have seen it in the eleven years and some months 
since the departure of the Banda dictatorship. 
 
6. (C)  Donor heads of mission discussed a possible joint 
intervention in their regular monthly meeting October 19.  It 
was agreed that the UK mission would draft a set of points 
with an eye to issuing a statement of concern about the 
impact of this fight on Malawi, and the investment the donors 
have made in the country in recent years.  Prior to issuing 
such a statement, however, the donors would deploy it in 
draft to key leaders (the government, Tembo, Muluzi, others) 
to attempt to get the effect without necessarily intervening 
publicly in the debate.  The group agreed that it would be 
far preferable to encourage a  Malawian reconciliation effort 
to emerge, noting that the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) 
which has played this role in the past, has taken itself out 
of the running for mediator in this current crisis.  The 
South African High Commissioner agreed to raise the question 
in the AU group here whether the AU might consider a 
political mission or statement of concern, and the European 
and US heads of mission urged her to re-visit whether South 
Africa might find itself able to urge restraint, reflection, 
and reconciliation on the Malawian poltical actors. 
 
7. (C)  The saving grace is that while it might be close, it 
will be difficult for the opposition parties to get the 2/3 
majority they need for either the NGC or impeachment.  It 
would take surprise defections from the dwindling government 
camp to enable a two-thirds majority.  And a combined effort 
on their part was not enough to get a 2/3 majority on a 
separate issue this past July (reftel B).  However, while 
Parliament focuses on the push for impeachment they 
effectively ignore other pressing business, such as the 
looming food crisis (in any sense other than slamming the 
government for nonfeasance) or a long-delayed anti-money 
laundering bill.  For its part, government seems to have 
little strategy other than to stall the impeachment process 
as long as possible.  Their hope is that the momentum behind 
impeachment will fade with time, and they are very mindful 
that Parliament,s current session only has another week and 
a half to run.  Unfortunately, they were unable to stall the 
procedures voted yesterday, and even stalling takes the 
government,s full time and effort, to the detriment of other 
pressing business. 
 
EASTHAM 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04