US embassy cable - 05VIENNA3402

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 003402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015 
 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, EAID, PGOV, BO, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA EAGER FOR CLOSE COORDINATION ON BELARUS, 
 
 
LOOKS TOWARD EU PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: STATE 188900 
 
Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips.  Reaso 
 
ns:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Austria welcomes the U.S. approach to 
 
promote democracy in Belarus, and looks forward to close 
 
coordination during its EU Presidency in the first half of 
 
2006.  It will be necessary to identify the targets for 
 
outreach, with a focus on opinion-leading elites.  An 
 
approach to the economy could take account of the impact of 
 
Russian WTO accession.  The views of Russia and of Belarus' 
 
neighbors would be important to the implementation of our 
 
strategy.  Continued dialogue with Belarus in certain fora 
 
would help, but pressure would be key.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U) EconPolCouns delivered reftel points on October 19 to 
 
Hanns Porias, the Austrian MFA's Assistant Secretary-level 
 
Director for East and Southeast Europe. 
 
3.  (C) Porias strongly welcomed the U.S. initiative.  He 
 
said Belarus has been a point of focus in Brussels, and the 
 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) would 
 
likely address Belarus soon.  Porias said he had participated 
 
in a troika meeting in London on Belarus, a meeting in which 
 
Ukraine also participated.  Belarus would be a very important 
 
issue during Austria's EU Presidency during the first half of 
 
2006. 
 
4.  (C) Porias applauded the strategy of expanding outreach 
 
to Belarusian society.  He noted that a key question would be 
 
whom to target.  Now, for the first time, there was a single 
 
candidate to symbolize the opposition, in the person of 
 
Aleksandr Milinkevich.  But the issue remained of how to 
 
reach the right circles in Belarus.  Porias argued that it 
 
was important to reach influential elites in Belarusian 
 
society -- not the top layer, but those just below them, who 
 
were important opinion leaders.  Porias expressed skepticism 
 
about the degree to which Belarusian NGOs could contribute to 
 
the process of outreach.  The fact that NGO leaders could 
 
travel freely was a cause of suspicion -- "either they're 
 
coopted or they're infiltrated," he said. 
 
5.  (C) The economy was another area of focus.  Porias said 
 
that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had been 
 
relatively successful in buying a certain level of popular 
 
support by propping up the economy.  In this connection, 
 
Porias said he was interested in discussing the consequences 
 
of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization for the 
 
Belarusian economic situation. 
 
6.  (C) The views of Belarus' neighbors was important, and 
 
Porias agreed with the U.S. approach in this regard.  He said 
 
Russia's interest was primarily in stability, and he was 
 
starting to hear talk among Russian policy makers that 
 
Lukashenko may not, after all, be the only hope for stability 
 
in Belarus.  It would be important to maintain a close 
 
dialogue with the Russians, he said.  Porias noted that the 
 
personal relationship between Lukashenko and Russian 
 
President Vladimir Putin was not terribly good -- in fact, 
 
Lukashenko had a much better personal relationship with 
 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko.  Porias agreed with 
 
our view of the need to engage with countries which neighbor 
 
Belarus and which have gone through a transition to 
 
democracy, such as Ukraine and Poland. 
 
7.  (C) Porias argued for the Austrian position that it is 
 
important not to isolate Belarus, which would only give 
 
Lukashenko free rein to continue his anti-democratic policies 
 
inside the country.  Instead, if was important to maintain a 
 
process of dialogue.  Porias pointed to the Central European 
 
Initiative, of which Belarus is a member, as a possible forum 
 
for such dialogue.  That said, Porias was no Pollyanna on 
 
Lukashenko -- he agreed that the main thrust of a Belarus 
 
strategy had to be pressure for a democratic transition. 
 
van Voorst