US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4305

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, IZ, Elections 
SUBJECT: TNA MEMBER QASSIM DAOUD ON THE  REFERENDUM, 
COALITION BUILDING FOR THE ELECTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4270 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford 
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Political positioning to build 
coalitions for the December election has begun in 
earnest, and fears of significant Sunni Arab or Shia 
Islamist gains in December may have led to a thaw 
between former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and TNA 
Constitution Committee member and former ally Qassim 
Daoud.  Daoud still appears to be leaning toward an 
alliance with SCIRI, however, in the hopes that he 
would be a moderating, secular influence.  Daoud 
reported on the rumors of various alliances, and 
indicated his own campaign had started with a planned 
meeting with Sistani on October 19.  Daoud also 
pressed for an extension on the October 21 deadline 
for registering coalitions, but PolOffs cautioned that 
drawing out the election process would be difficult. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) On October 17, PolOffs met with Constitution 
Committee member Qassim Daoud to discuss the 
referendum and coalition jockeying for the December 15 
election.  Daoud stated that he was comfortable with 
either a yes or no result in the referendum: if yes, 
Iraq would have a constitution; if no, the Sunni Arabs 
will have seen that the political process works.  At 
any rate, he said, the Sunni Arabs are determined to 
participate in the election in December. 
 
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(U) An Audience with Sistani 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Daoud mentioned that he was leaving Baghdad 
tomorrow to meet with Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Najaf. 
Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha Sistani, had called 
Daoud to arrange the meeting.  The Sunni Arabs and the 
Shia in Iraq would be in conflict for the next fifteen 
years at least, Daoud claimed, and therefore Sistani 
would continue to have a significant role in Iraqi 
politics.  When pressed, Daoud claimed Sistani had 
told him before the referendum that the last time 
Sistani intervened it was on behalf of all Iraqis 
(Comment: This is likely a reference to Sistani's 
endorsement of the unified Shia list. End Comment.) 
However, such intervention was against the code of the 
marja'iyat and at great personal cost.  Sistani stated 
that he was not willing to sacrifice his honor as a 
member of the marja'iyat again. 
 
---------------------------------- 
(U) Coalition Building is Underway 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Turning to coalition building, Daoud mentioned 
that former Prime Minister and ally Ayad Allawi had 
called him recently to arrange a reconciliation dinner 
this week.  Daoud appeared happy at the prospect for 
resuming their personal relationship, but stated that 
he could never work with Allawi again: "One does not 
work with Ayad, one can only work for him and I will 
not work for him again."  He told us that he could 
never understand Allawi's reluctance to work with 
Sistani, claiming one would need "a village of 
psychologists" to understand this form of political 
suicide.  Daoud cautioned us that the failures of 
Prime Minister Ja'afari's administration would not 
bolster Allawi's standing with the public. 
 
5. (C) He reported that the most interesting recent 
rumor he had heard was Dawa's proposed alliance with 
Muqtada al-Sadr.  Daoud predicted it wouldn't last 
long, as al-Sadr was extremely unpredictable. Sadr's 
people had come to see Daoud last Thursday, and 
allegedly tried to woo him away from Sistani.  When 
asked about the possibility of the two Kurdish parties 
(the PUK and KDP) merging into one for the elections, 
Daoud shrugged and said that Talabani was negotiating 
with other parties to ensure that he would retain his 
post as President.  It would be difficult for Talabani 
to go back to Sulymaniyah after this, Daoud claimed, 
and KDP leader Masud Barzani would never willingly 
share power with PUK leader Talabani in the north. 
(Comment: REO Kirkuk reports that all parties assure 
us KDP and PUK will definitely run together in 
December, probably in alliance with Allawi.  Barzani 
will have to share power with PUK if he wants to have 
any say over the Sulaymaniyah part of Kurdistan 
Region. End Comment.) 
 
6. (C) For his part, Daoud said that Dawa, Fadilah, 
Hussein al-Sharistani, Ali al-Dabbagh, and SCIRI had 
come to him offering alliances with his moderate 
secular party.  He reiterated his intention to ally 
with SCIRI, stating that Vice-President Adil Abd al- 
Madhi was the best choice to be the next Prime 
Minister.  PolOffs questioned Daoud on how he planned 
to maintain his small party's moderate identity, and 
he claimed that SCIRI was the most moderate and 
liberal party in Iraq.  He was less upbeat, however, 
on the issue of SCIRI's relationship with Iran and 
admitted that this was a problem.  Daoud claimed not 
to have talked about specific portfolios in a 
potential alliance with SCIRI, but later disclosed 
that he wanted a pan-security oversight role, similar 
to that of the U.S. Homeland Security director, with 
oversight over the Ministries of Defense, Interior, 
National Security and Intelligence. 
 
7. (C) When PolOffs mentioned SCIRI's and Fadilah's 
scheduled participation in Allawi's conference, 
however, Daoud claimed that Nadim al-Jabiri did not 
really speak for Fadilah (see ref).  As for SCIRI, 
Daoud claimed to have an understanding with SCIRI 
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. 
 
 
------------------------ 
(U) Seeking An Extension 
------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Finally, Daoud pressed for an extension to the 
October 21 deadline for registering political parties 
and coalitions.  Claiming that there was no time to 
properly investigate coalition opportunities during 
the constitution negotiations and the referendum, 
Daoud complained that a week was not enough time to 
finalize the delicate negotiations that coalition 
building required.  PolOffs cautioned that the 
timeline would be difficult to change much.  The U.S. 
strongly supported the December 15 election date, they 
noted. 
 
----------- 
(U) Comment 
----------- 
 
9. (C) Daoud is a reliable conduit on the various 
rumors and relationships of Iraqi politics, and his 
policy of engaging with all sides gives him access to 
a wide range of information on all sides.  The 
possibility of reconciliation between Allawi and 
Daoud is an encouraging sign that the moderate 
liberals may not be hopelessly fractured.  Daoud's 
pride prevents him allying with Allawi, however, and 
he seems to have grasped onto SCIRI as a way of 
gaining a ministerial post.  It is doubtful that he 
could moderate SCIRI as he claims, and it appears that 
in his more honest moments he is truly concerned about 
being linked to a party that has such close ties to 
Iran. 
Satterfield