US embassy cable - 05AMMAN8259

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, JO, IR, SY 
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S AMMAN 
MEETINGS WITH IRAQI POLITICAL AND TRIBAL FIGURES 
 
REF: AMMAN 2796 
 
Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 
 
Summary 
--------- 
 
1.   (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad pursued Iraqi 
Sunni outreach in Amman October 3 through a series of 
meetings with Iraqi political and tribal figures, including a 
small group of prominent ex-Ba'athists presented to him by 
former Prime Minister Allawi; Sheikh Dari al-Fassal, an Iraqi 
tribal leader from Mosul who is the brother-in-law of Saudi 
King Abdullah; and with Hassib al-Aref, a Sunni Arab member 
of the Constitution Drafting Committee who heads a small 
non-sectarian movement.  Khalilzad stressed recent efforts to 
deal with Sunni Arab concerns over the draft Constitution. 
He asked for help in encouraging Sunnis to support the 
Constitution, participate in the December election, and back 
moderate, nationalist, and non-sectarian candidates and 
coalitions.  All interlocutors agreed that the December 
election is crucial, and agreed to encourage widespread Sunni 
turnout.  Sheikh Dari and the former Ba'athist group also 
indicated a willingness to publicly support the new 
Constitution, though Dari later qualified this by insisting 
that a statement declaring that "Iraq is a member of the Arab 
world" be added to the text.  Dari also agreed to cooperate 
with Ambassador Khalilzad in organizing a meeting of key 
Sheikhs.  End Summary. 
 
Ex-Ba,athists Ready to Accept the Constitution 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) At the suggestion of former Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met on 
October 3 in Allawi,s Amman office with a small group of 
veteran former Ba,athist leaders, including Farouk Awni, 
Khalid Tabra, and Mahmud Bashi.  Allawi described them as 
trusted "old friends."  Speaking for the group, Awni read a 
long prepared statement to the effect that most ex-Ba,athis 
are not associated with Saddam,s crimes and are educated, 
patriotic Iraqis who accept democracy and want only to live 
normal lives.  Ironically, he claimed, mass dismissals of 
Ba'athist rank and file from government jobs, and similar 
ongoing "persecution" has brought ex-Baathist party members 
closer together than they ever were when they ruled the 
country.  He deplored continued persecution of ex-Ba,athis 
who have not committed crimes.  He also noted their concern 
that Iraq remains unified, and that Iranian infiltration end. 
 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Khalilzad observed that Iraq is passing 
through a very difficult transition.  The new Iraq needs to 
be inclusive, pursue good relations with its neighbors, and 
reject all forms of extremism and terrorism.  Khalilzad, 
stressing the need for an "accountability and reconciliation" 
process, stated that there should be no problem with full 
re-integration of ex-Ba,athist party members not guilty of 
serious crimes, or were not senior members of the party, into 
Iraqi society.  He provided the group with copies of recent 
proposed revisions to the new Constitution.  The revisions 
clarify that "former members of the Ba,ath party who were 
not senior leaders and who did not commit crimes" shall enjoy 
equality and protection,  including full political rights. 
 
4.  (C) Farouk and the group lauded the new constitutional 
language on the rights of ex-Ba,athis, and agreed that the 
December election is crucial.  They also stressed that they 
want good relations with the U.S. and an end to 
confrontation.  Allawi,s staff subsequently passed word to 
Khalilzad that  the group has decided to issue a public 
statement supporting the new Constitution as an acceptable 
stepping-stone to the crucial December elections. 
Bolstering Tribal Contacts 
---------------- 
 
5.  (C) Khalilzad also called on Sheikh Dari al Fassal al 
Jarba from Mosul, a leader of the Shammar tribe in Iraq who 
has been living in Amman over the past year.  Note: Dari is 
the brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia,s King Abdullah and the 
uncle of Prince Mish,al.  He has a wide network of tribal 
and clerical contacts throughout Iraq, and has been working 
assiduously with Talal al-Gaaod and others since late 2004 on 
defeating extremism and returning stability to Iraq.  In 
recent months he has worked closely with (Jordan) King 
Abdullah,s tribal affairs advisor, and as an informal 
conduit between the Jordanian and Saudi rulers.  Dari also 
attended Ambassador Khalilzad,s September roundtable with 
Sunni tribal leaders in Amman (ref b).  End note. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Khalilzad outlined to Dari his recent trip 
to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., and explained that he is 
currently focusing on key tasks: obtaining additional 
revisions to the draft Constitution to address Sunni 
concerns, encouraging Sunni participation in the December 
election, and promoting an alliance between moderate 
nationalist leaders and movements that will work toward a 
unified, stable, and prosperous Iraq.  Khalilzad enumerated 
the recent proposed revisions to the Constitution dealing 
with federalism, de-Ba,athification, right of citizenship, 
and Iraq,s Arab identity, and asked if Dari would be 
prepared to come to Baghdad on October 10 for a meeting of 
inter-ethnic leaders who will endorse the Constitution. 
 
7.  (C) Dari praised the recent revisions and expressed 
willingness to come to the Baghdad meeting and bring other 
Iraqi tribal figures with him.  Note: He subsequently made 
this agreement dependent on insertion of language stating, 
"Iraq is a member of the Arab world." End Note.  Dari also 
promised to promote emergence of a moderate, non-sectarian 
leadership and encourage a large Sunni voter turnout in the 
December election.  Dari noted that, working with Talal 
al-Gaaod and others, he has already scored significant 
success behind the scenes in strengthening the moderate Sunni 
Waqf against the Islamic Scholars Council and its 
confrontational leader, Harith al-Dhari. 
 
Stabilizing Tal Afar 
--------------- 
 
8.  (C) Dari praised Khalilzad,s efforts to move Iraq 
forward and expressed appreciation for Khalilzad,s 
understanding of Iraq,s tribal nature and of the Iraqi 
mentality.  He cited the Tal Afar episode as a typical 
example of a problem that arose out of misunderstanding and 
manipulation of U.S. forces by outsiders tied to SCIRI. 
Note: Dari spent two weeks in the Tal Afar area visiting with 
tribal leaders in early July.  End Note. 
 
9.  (C) Dari asked Ambassador Khalilzad to attend a notional 
meeting that Sheikh Dari will set up with Tal Afar area 
tribal leaders, and asked that Khalilzad bring key U.S. 
regional military figures with him.  Dari said that he wants 
Khalilzad to explain how the insurgency facilitates Iran,s 
agenda, and works against the people - "tell them that 
Zarqawi gives money, but will go away, while the U.S. and 
Iraq will stay."  He also stressed the importance of dealing 
with hunger and offering employment and other legitimate 
sources of money to the impoverished Tal Afar people. 
Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that the U.S. had made some 
"mistakes" in understanding the background of the Tal Afar 
situation, welcomed Dari,s offer, and agreed to attend the 
notional meeting. 
 
Meeting with Hassib al-Obeidi 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Khalilzad,s final outreach meeting was with Sunni 
Constitution drafter (and a former Saddam Hussein 
international relations advisor) Hassib Aref al-Obeidi 
(ex-Prime Minister Allawi was also present).  Note: Hassib is 
a Sunni Arab from Kirkuk who heads a small political movement 
with a moderate, democratic, and Iraqi nationalist platform. 
According to Talal al-Gaaod, he has recently worked closely 
with Saleh Mutlak and Sa'ad al-Janabi.  End Note.  Hassib 
told Ambassador Khalilzad that the draft Constitution was 
acceptable with minor changes, one of which, a clarification 
that rules on citizenship will be regulated by law, the 
Ambassador said he has already agreed to support.  Hassib 
also wanted a statement that Iraq is part of the Arab world, 
and elimination of specific references to "Saddamite" 
Ba,athists. 
 
11.  (C) Hassib asserted that the Constitution is going to be 
ratified in any event, and said that his main focus is on the 
December election.  In that respect he asked that the U.S. 
pay close attention to issues of voting logistics and 
"fairness."  Khalilzad assured him that we are very conscious 
of this need.  Hassib said that Allawi will be the next Prime 
Minister, and promised to support him, but not necessarily to 
join his pre-election coalition.  He claimed to have recently 
met with the Syrian Prime Minister, and opined that U.S. 
suspicions of active Syrian support for Zarqawi are 
"exaggerated."  He asserted that Iran, not Syria, is the 
"Silk Road of al-Qaeda."  Hassib warned against launching 
large-scale military operations in the run-up before the 
referendum, claiming that some Sunnis will see this as 
referendum-related intimidation.  Khalilzad assured Hassib 
that any operations held prior to the referendum will be 
limited, highly focused in scope, and carried out with the 
active cooperation and support of local people. 
RUBINSTEIN