US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA3116

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 003116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KNNP, PREL, CA, IN 
SUBJECT: CANADA OPEN TO "CREDIBLE" AND "DEFENSIBLE" MODUS 
VIVENDI TO ENABLE INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NSG 
 
REF: (A) STATE 190856 (B) OTTAWA 2909 (C) OTTAWA 2768 
 
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA.  REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Polmiloff delivered reftel demarche points to Terry 
Wood, Deputy Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation (IDN) at 
Foreign Affairs Canada on October 18.  Wood expressed 
appreciation for timely briefing materials in light of last 
week's discussions at the G-8 Senior Group meeting in London, 
and this week's NSG Consultative Group meeting in Vienna. 
He said that Assistant Deputy Minister Jim Wright looked 
forward to following up on U/S Joseph's invitation to consult 
in Washington prior to the November 24-25 meeting of the IAEA 
Board of Governors. 
 
2. (C) Wood said that Canada agrees with the strategic 
reasons we have articulated for engaging India.  He 
reaffirmed that his government welcomes India's new 
commitment as manifested in the Joint Statement of July 18 
(REF C), underscoring that Canada, as a NNWS, will want to 
ensure a net gain to nonproliferation objectives and no 
weakening of the nonproliferation regime(s).  For example, 
Wood said, Canada will press for India's adoption of 
"comprehensive safeguards" as a condition of supply. 
 
3. (C) The Canadian government generally agrees with the 
terms and principles for a modus vivendi at the NSG, Wood 
continued, stressing that it must, however, be "credible" and 
"defensible".  He outlined Canada's position going into the 
Consultative Group meeting, noting that the GOC wants to move 
forward in a "calibrated manner" with specific steps: 
-- India must formally adhere to NSG guidelines; 
-- India must halt fissile material production; 
-- India must sign and ratify the CTBT. 
 
4. (C) Wood emphasized that, media headlines notwithstanding, 
Canada's four-point program for potential civilian nuclear 
cooperation with India (ref B) was "fully consistent with 
existing policy"; no decision had been taken to pursue active 
civil nuclear cooperation with India at this time.  India 
will need to meet its nonproliferation obligations first, he 
said.  He speculated that a likely difficult hurdle in this 
regard would be the GOC's understanding that India is not 
prepared to put its CIRUS reactor (originally donated by 
Canada in the 1950s for peaceful nuclear pursuits) under 
safeguards.  (COMMENT:  Resumption of active nuclear 
cooperation with India would be decided at the political 
level, with the effects of such a decision on the governing 
party's domestic political standing in the run-up to national 
elections an important consideration. END COMMENT). 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS