US embassy cable - 05CAIRO8009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 008009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2015 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, CASC, EG, Sinai 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE SINAI 
 
REF: CAIRO 6986 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Three armed militants were killed and a fourth 
captured alive in late September, following several weeks of 
standoff in Jebel Halal, a remote region south of Al Arish, 
on Sinai's Mediterranean coast.  The incident seemed to be a 
significant breakthrough for the GOE, but does not 
necessarily spell an end to security concerns in the Sinai. 
Israeli references to an Al-Qaida "base" in the Sinai are 
overblown - we have no evidence that the Sinai fugitives are 
numerous, particularly well-equipped, or directly connected 
to international terror networks.  Many argue convincingly 
that recent security problems are homegrown and directly 
traceable to the GOE's Sinai development policies, which have 
neglected the indigenous population.  Many, apparently even 
Prime Minister Nazif, believe that the GOE's employment of 
mass arrests after the October 2004 Taba bombings may have 
exacerbated tensions and set off a cycle of revenge and 
retaliation.  End summary. 
 
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Stalemate Broken(?) 
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2. (C) A stalemate between a small band of armed bedouin 
fugitives and Egyptian security forces may have been broken 
with the September 27 killing of Mousa Mohamed Badran, Khalid 
Mus'ad Salim, and Talib al-Murdhi, and the capture of a 
fourth, Yunis Mohammed.  The four were part of an 
undetermined number of armed "outcasts" who had taken refuge 
in the Jabal Halal region south of Al-Arish.  Members of 
Interior Minister Adly's staff told poloff that the September 
27 killings and capture were an important step forward, but 
conceded that they did not necessarily mean the Jebel Halal 
area standoff was at a definitive end.  Security forces are 
still deployed in the area and conduct regular patrols in 
pursuit of additional armed fugitives.  Among those still at 
large, named in the Egyptian media, is Salim Shalloub, a 
bedouin thought to be active in Sinai's smuggling and 
criminal networks. 
 
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Links to Taba, Sharm 
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3. (C) Although the GOE claimed to have captured or killed 
what it described as the nine principal conspirators of the 
Taba and Nuweiba terrorist attacks in October 2004, the GOE 
has since been conducting continuous search operations in the 
Sinai desert in pursuit of auxiliary suspects.  Operations 
increased significantly in tempo following the July 23 
bombings at Sharm el-Sheikh, in which more than 75 Egyptians 
and foreign tourists were killed.  Unnamed security sources 
cited in the Egyptian media described one of those killed on 
September 27, Khalid Mus'ad Salim, a dentist by training, as 
"the principal planner and explosives technician" for the 
July 23 Sharm attacks.  Minister of Tourism Ahmed Maghrabi 
also told the Ambassador that "the dentist" was the 
mastermind.  (Comment: GOE announcements that a suspect has 
been killed or captured are often accompanied by claims that 
the suspect in question was the "mastermind" of a given 
terrorist cell or operation.  End comment.)  Other media 
reports have said that Shalloub, still at large, is the 
leader. 
 
4. (C) The September 27 incident was the first sign of 
tangible progress for the GOE since its operations hit a 
punishing speed bump in late August.  As discussed reftel, 
GOE forces in August zeroed in on a group of suspect armed 
bedouins hiding in Jebel Halal - a complex network of rock 
faces, wadis and caves about 50 km south of al-Arish. 
However, police were clearly unprepared for the stiff 
resistance they encountered from the hideouts - two high 
ranking police officers were killed and nine others were 
wounded when they wandered into an ambush.  The GOE responded 
by laying siege to Jebel Halal, and an apparent stalemate 
ensued until the killings and capture of militants on 
September 27.  Lower tempo police patrols and sweeping 
operations are continuing. 
 
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Al-Qaida Connection 
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5. (C) The Israeli government issued a travel warning on 
October 1 advising its citizens of intelligence reports 
indicating plans to abduct tourists in the Sinai.  A 
subsequent statement of the Israeli Military Intelligence 
Chief, General Zeevi Farkash, warned that Al-Qaida has 
assumed control of some parts of the Sinai.  (Note: 
Farkash's comments may have been inspired in part by a 
message posted in late September on an Al-Qaida website 
encouraging "mujahadeen" of the Sinai to rise up against the 
GOE. End note.)  In any case, Farkash's statement prompted 
indignant denials by (unidentified) Egyptian security 
officials in the local and international media.  The Israeli, 
who was likely making reference to Jebel Halal standoff, was 
correct in citing the situation as evidence of a genuine 
security threat in at least part of the Sinai, but his 
implication that Al-Qaida had established an enclave in the 
peninsula overstated the case. 
 
6. (C) The GOE, both in its public statements and in private 
discussions with us, has maintained that the fugitives in 
Jebel Halal played supporting roles in the 2004 and 2005 
attacks in Taba and Sharm and has characterized the group as 
"Bedouin outcasts" who had started off as petty criminals 
and, influenced by radical Islamic ideologies, had morphed 
into terrorists.  However, the GOE has repeatedly insisted 
that its investigations turned up no evidence of links 
between the group and any international terror networks. 
(Comment: Some skeptics note that the GOE has a vested 
interest in downplaying links between the Taba and Sharm 
attacks and Al-Qaida or related international terror 
networks.  The skeptics also argue that the operations were 
too sophisticated and effective to have been implemented 
without outside expertise and assistance.  End comment.) 
 
7. (C) Interior Minister Adly told Ambassador Jeffrey and 
delegation during their September 29 meeting that information 
obtained from Yunis Mohammed (captured on Jebel Halal on 
September 27) was consistent with the GOE's assertion that 
the group had no active links to outside groups.  Adly 
allowed, however, that those responsible for the Sharm and 
Taba attacks shared a general ideological orientation with 
Al-Qaida and may have drawn inspiration from Qaida's actions 
and messages. 
 
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Sinai Security Now 
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8. (C) Sinai has been quiet since the September 27 incident. 
Poloff, driving across the peninsula in early October, noted 
a tightening of security procedures, including mandatory 
police escorts for several remote stretches of road, but 
otherwise detected nothing out of the ordinary.  Consul 
General, who visited Sharm El-Sheikh in early October, 
reported that physical security around tourist facilities had 
been greatly enhanced.  Virtually every establishment had 
installed bollards, gates, and other protective devices.  In 
addition, roads and desert tracks leading to the city were 
all controlled by police. 
 
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Roots of Unrest 
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9. (C) A number of our contacts, and commentators in the 
Egyptian media, have argued convincingly that the recent 
emergence of security problems in the Sinai is directly 
traceable to the GOE's long-flawed governance of the 
peninsula.  The GOE has offered little in the way of social 
services to the indigenous Bedouin, who have also seen little 
gain from the massive development of the tourist industry in 
the past two decades.  The growth of the tourism sector in 
Sinai has been accompanied by an influx of Nile Valley 
Egyptians to staff the jobs created -- ranging from senior 
hotel management positions to grounds keeping and unskilled 
labor.  As hotels and other tourist establishments have 
proliferated, so have land disputes and resource-sharing 
conflicts between indigenous bedouins and incoming Nile 
Valley developers, rarely if ever settled in the locals' 
favor. 
 
10. (C) Many observers believe long standing grievances 
boiled over after the GOE responded to the 2004 Taba attacks 
with mass arrests of indigenous Sinai inhabitants, 
particularly in Al-Arish, where up to 2400 persons were 
detained without charge for months.  Some believe the GOE has 
repeated this mistake with more mass arrests following the 
Sinai attacks, albeit on a lower scale, and argue that the 
GOE is setting itself up for a cycle of revenge and reprisal. 
As noted reftel, Prime Minister Nazif himself alluded to the 
possibility that the July Sharm attack was in reprisal for 
early mass arrests during a late August media interview, 
subsequently issuing a clarification that he had full 
confidence in the way Egyptian security authorities had been 
handling the matter.  The Sharm attacks have in fact been 
interpreted by some observers as a direct response to the 
post-Taba mass arrests, noting that while the Taba attacks 
appeared specifically targeted at Israeli tourists, the Sharm 
attacks, a series of explosions in the heart of Sharm's 
premier open-air entertainment district, was a more 
indiscriminate attack apparently directed at Egypt's tourist 
industry rather than at any particular national group. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) While we do not share the GOE's absolute confidence 
that the Jebel Halal militants, and perpetrators of the Taba 
and Sharm attacks, had no connections to Al-Qaida or other 
affiliated terror networks, neither are we in possession of 
any evidence to the contrary.  Clearly, references to 
Al-Qaida's establishment of a base of operations in Sinai are 
overblown.  In the short term, given ongoing GOE security 
operations, we cannot rule out further attacks from this 
group of alienated and armed bedouin "outcasts."  In the long 
run, the GOE will have to address the marginalization and 
grievances of the Sinai's indigenous population in order to 
construct a sustainable formula for security and economic 
development.  End comment. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE