US embassy cable - 05PARIS7104

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MFA RESPONSE ON URGING PA PRESIDENT ABBAS TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF GAZA DISENGAGEMENT

Identifier: 05PARIS7104
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS7104 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-10-17 17:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER KPAL IS FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, IS, FR 
SUBJECT: MFA RESPONSE ON URGING PA PRESIDENT ABBAS TO SEIZE 
OPPORTUNITY OF GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: STATE 189905 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  We discussed reftel points encouraging the GoF to 
urge PA President Abbas to seize the opportunity on Gaza 
disengagement with Herve Besancenot, MFA DAS-equivalent for 
Levant/Israeli-Palestinian issues, and Christophe Guilhou, 
Cabinet Advisor to FM Douste-Blazy on Middle East issues, on 
October 17.  (Note: President Abbas is in Paris October 
17-18, and met with President Chirac October 17; an October 
18 meeting with FM Douste-Blazy was canceled due to 
scheduling problems on the French side.  End note.) 
Besancenot confirmed that the GoF had and would continue to 
urge Abbas to seize the opportunity offered by Gaza 
withdrawal and implement key reforms. 
 
2.  (C) On the question of the role of armed groups, however, 
Besancenot, offered a differing interpretation of the 
consensus reached at the September 20 Quartet ministerial. 
According to Besancenot, the key word in the SYG Annan's 
September 20 statement was "ultimately" -- i.e., the Quartet 
had agreed that there was an incompatibility between armed 
group/militia activities and democratic institutions, but the 
Palestinians were still in a state of political transition 
and did not yet have a full democracy.  Accordingly, the GoF 
position (and that of the EU, he implied) would be to support 
Abbas as he sought to politically integrate Hamas, which 
could ultimately lead to Hamas' disarmament and renunciation 
of violence.  In the GoF view, Hamas participation in January 
legislative elections would put Abbas in a better position 
post-elections to push Hamas toward renunciation of violence 
and acceptance of negotiations with Israel -- opposition to 
which had been Hamas' earlier basis for boycotting PA 
elections.  Besancenot added that PM Sharon's public warning 
that he would prevent Hamas participation in January PA 
elections had been highly counter-productive, a view which he 
said was shared by other EU members. 
 
3. (C) In a separate discussion with us, Cabinet Middle East 
advisor Guilhou echoed Besancenot's points and described the 
French approach on the issue of Hamas participation in 
Palestinian elections as similar to the GoF approach on 
Hizballah.  In other words, the GoF views a gradual political 
integration as the key to eventual disarmament of violent 
terrorist groups, and wants to keep such groups inside rather 
than outside political processes. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON 

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