US embassy cable - 05DOHA1744

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QATAR: AMBASSADOR UNTERMEYER'S 14 OCTOBER 2005 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMAD BIN JASSIM AL-THANI.

Identifier: 05DOHA1744
Wikileaks: View 05DOHA1744 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Doha
Created: 2005-10-17 14:08:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PTER KPAO QA IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARPI FOR STHORNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2010 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAO, QA, IZ 
SUBJECT: QATAR: AMBASSADOR UNTERMEYER'S 14 OCTOBER 2005 
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMAD BIN JASSIM AL-THANI. 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 
1.4 (A) and (B) 
 
1. (U) The Ambassador met with Qatar's First Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamad bin 
Jassim al-Thani (HBJ) at Wajbah Palace during the evening of 
Friday, 14 October. 
 
---------------------- 
Iraq Referendum 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S)  HBJ said he had been called the day before by Vice 
President Cheney, who asked him to use his influence with 
Harith al-Dari, head of the Muslim Ulema Council of Iraq, to 
curb violence during the referendum and to support the 
political process. HBJ said he wants to bring al-Dari's son 
to Doha sometime during Ramadan. (The father, he said, would 
not come, probably "for security reasons".) The younger 
al-Dari has already been to Doha two or three times and "can 
deliver". But HBJ said it was important for Amb Khalilzad to 
be in Doha at the same time, as (he said) the VP had offered. 
The two would not have to meet face-to-face. HBJ said: "We 
can pressure them (MUC), but I have to give them some hope 
the Americans are ready to listen." He said their dialogue, 
whether in-person or through him, should have "no conditions". 
 
3. (C) Ambassador asked HBJ to make a statement supporting 
the referendum and urging Sunni participation. Time was late, 
Ambassador noted, but suggested that the GOQ could get 
something on Al Jazeera in time for many Iraqis to hear it 
before the polls closed. HBJ replied that "I do statements at 
airports and when we do other things," then turned to ask his 
assistant to give him a plan for a more immediate statement. 
In any event, HBJ promised a statement after the referendum. 
 
----------------- 
Al-Jazeera 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) In his meeting with Sec Rice, HBJ pledged to work with 
the Ambassador on the "one or two" major problems the USG 
still has with Al Jazeera. Last night he reminded the 
Ambassador of this, saying, "I need to know what remains." 
Ambassador replied that these would be the two issues raised 
every month by the FBIS and DIA monitors: The use of 
insurgent-provided videos and of anti-American interviewees. 
Ambassador informed HBJ that an interagency working group on 
Al Jazeera is developing a response that will be provided to 
him soon. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador informed HBJ that the latest DIA 
monitoring report showed an increase in negative comment for 
the first time since our bilateral engagement on AJ began in 
February. (Hostile reportage rose from an low of 7% in August 
to 11% in September.)  This backsliding, Ambassador pointed 
out, will be noted negatively in Washington.  The Ambassador 
offered to provide a copy of the report so he (and Al 
Jazeera) can see what produced the worsened rating. Perhaps 
to show that he is sensitive to anti-American content, HBJ 
noted that after Liz Cheney complained to Amb al-Khalifa 
about a particularly virulent essay on AJ's website, he had 
it removed. 
 
6. (C) HBJ then voluntarily said that Karen Hughes needs to 
have a better interview on AJ than the one she had while in 
Cairo. The interviewer that day, he said, "asked the wrong 
questions." He offered her another opportunity to go on the 
air but this time to be interviewed by "the right people". He 
said, "It is important that we know what she wants so we can 
have the right result." 
 
--------------------------- 
Embassy Comment 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (C) HBJ characterized his 23 September meeting in 
Washington with Sec Rice as "not bad, not excellent". He 
hopes to see the Secretary at the Forum for the Future in 
Bahrain in November and would like her to visit Qatar while 
in the area. (Note: Sec Rice spent a night in Doha on her 
return from Iraq in mid-May, at which time she called Heir 
Apparent Sheikh Tamim and promised she would come back for a 
formal visit sometime.)  Starting with his meeting with 
SecState, HBJ has shown an enhanced desire to remove Al 
Jazeera as the principal blockage in bilateral relations. We 
should therefore produce the non-paper on further changes at 
the channel right away to take advantage of this apparent 
earnestness. We should also notify Karen Hughes of his offer 
for her to return to the Al Jazeera airwaves and to notify 
Sec Rice's staff of the invitation (which I support) for her 
to come to Qatar. 
UNTERMEYER 

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