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| Identifier: | 05ADANA185 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ADANA185 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Adana |
| Created: | 2005-10-17 13:24:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | PREL PTER PKK ADANA EU Accession |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ADANA 000185 SIPDIS SENSITIVE NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PTER, PKK, ADANA, EU Accession SUBJECT: PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST STEPS 1. (SBU) The number of incidents of PKK-related violence in the southeast has shown no sign of decreasing since the October 3 milestone beginning discussions on Turkey's EU accession. At the same time, it does not appear that the GOT has made any changes in its approach of using security forces as the primary means of dealing with the Kurdish issue in the region. Indeed, the recently-launched large-scale operations against 350 PKK members whom, according to the press, the GOT alleges slipped into Tunceli province from Iraq , combined with a visible increase in the number of road checks and security forces activities throughout the region, indicates that numbers of violent incidents are not abating and could yet increase before winter. (Note: Tunceli province has no international borders and is over 200 kilometers from the Iraqi border. How PKK terror forces could "slip" into Tunceli in such numbers is unclear. Doing so would mean eluding deployed GoT forces at the Iraqi border and in multiple other provinces. While some smaller PKK terror units may well have originated outside Turkey, the cited number raises questions about the the credibility of the routine GoT claim that PKK forces do not have domestic bases of operation and can only come from outside Turkey. End Note.) 2.(SBU) On October 6, the PKK announced that it ended its unilateral ceasefire declared on August 20. The press reported that the PKK terrorist group claimed that 43 of its members were killed during the 43-day ceasefire, and that the GOT had ended its initiative for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue by responding with violence. (Comment: It bears serious consideration that PKK terror units initiated multiple improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and raids on Turkish security force positions in southeast Turkey throughout the so-called "ceasefire" period. The ceasefire seemed more a rhetorical device or public relations gambit than an operational limitation. End Comment.) 3. (U) Between October 3 and 13, a rough count from press reports showed that in the area encompassing Tunceli, Bingol, Van, Hakkari, Sirnak, Mardin and Diyarbakir provinces, at least nine explosions and 12 clashes occurred involving the PKK terrorist group and government security forces. In those incidents, there were at least 14 people killed, 12 wounded and one kidnapped, according to press reports. Over this 10-day period, at least four, violent, pro-Ocalan demonstrations took place in the region, wherein demonstrators clashed with security forces. 4. (U) According to multiple press accounts, PKK forces, posing as Turkish security forces, set up a roadblock on a highly-traveled eastern Mardin road, taking hostage a Turkish security officer whom they encountered. In reaction, a wide-ranging Turkish sweep operation to punish the PKK and locate the security officer is under way in Mardin province. Together with two July/August hostage takings against official Turks in Bingol, this could mark the return of roadblock use by the PKK, a tactic used in the 1990's to assert control of territory, even if short-lived in nature. 5. (SBU) Some or our contacts have told us that people in the region believe the GOT missed an opportunity after PM R. Tayyip Erdogan's August 12 speech in Diyarbakir by not following up quickly with concrete, democratic measures to address the Kurdish issue. Fears that the security forces have stepped in to fill the gap left by government inaction have ratcheted up the level of anxiety about the prospect of increased violence in the region. 6. (SBU) Comment: Although many may hoped the October 3 opening of EU talks would provide an opportunity for the violence to subside, reports of continued numerous violent PKK-security forces clashes in the region over the past 10 days indicate that such hopes may have been drowned out by hardliners on both sides bent on confronting each other. End Comment. 7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
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