US embassy cable - 05ADANA185

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PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST STEPS

Identifier: 05ADANA185
Wikileaks: View 05ADANA185 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Adana
Created: 2005-10-17 13:24:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PREL PTER PKK ADANA EU Accession
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS ADANA 000185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PKK, ADANA, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: PKK VIOLENCE IN SE TURKEY CONTINUES DESPITE TURKEY, EU FIRST 
STEPS 
 
 
1. (SBU) The number of incidents of PKK-related violence in the 
southeast has shown no sign of decreasing since the October 3 
milestone beginning discussions on Turkey's EU accession.  At 
the same time, it does not appear that the GOT has made any 
changes in its approach of using security forces as the primary 
means of dealing with the Kurdish issue in the region. Indeed, 
the recently-launched large-scale operations against 350 PKK 
members whom, according to the press, the GOT alleges slipped 
into Tunceli province from Iraq , combined with a visible 
increase in the number of road checks and security forces 
activities throughout the region, indicates that numbers of 
violent incidents are not abating and could yet increase before 
winter.  (Note: Tunceli province has no international borders 
and is over 200 kilometers from the Iraqi border.  How PKK 
terror forces could "slip" into Tunceli in such numbers is 
unclear.  Doing so would mean eluding deployed GoT forces at the 
Iraqi border and in multiple other provinces.  While some 
smaller PKK terror units may well have originated outside 
Turkey, the cited number raises questions about the the 
credibility of the routine GoT claim that PKK forces do not have 
domestic bases of operation and can only come from outside 
Turkey.  End Note.) 
 
2.(SBU)  On October 6, the PKK announced that it ended its 
unilateral ceasefire declared on August 20.  The press reported 
that the PKK terrorist group claimed that 43 of its members were 
killed during the 43-day ceasefire, and that the GOT had ended 
its initiative for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue by 
responding with violence.  (Comment:  It bears serious 
consideration that PKK terror units initiated multiple 
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and raids on Turkish 
security force positions in southeast Turkey throughout the 
so-called "ceasefire" period.  The ceasefire seemed more a 
rhetorical device or public relations gambit than an operational 
limitation.  End Comment.) 
 
3. (U) Between October 3 and 13, a rough count from press 
reports showed that in the area encompassing Tunceli, Bingol, 
Van, Hakkari, Sirnak, Mardin and Diyarbakir provinces, at least 
nine explosions and 12 clashes occurred involving the PKK 
terrorist group and government security forces.  In those 
incidents, there were at least 14 people killed, 12 wounded and 
one kidnapped, according to press reports.  Over this 10-day 
period, at least four, violent, pro-Ocalan demonstrations took 
place in the region, wherein demonstrators clashed with security 
forces. 
 
4. (U) According to multiple press accounts, PKK forces, posing 
as Turkish security forces, set up a roadblock on a 
highly-traveled eastern Mardin road, taking hostage a Turkish 
security officer whom they encountered.  In reaction, a 
wide-ranging Turkish sweep operation to punish the PKK and 
locate the security officer is under way in Mardin province. 
Together with two July/August hostage takings against official 
Turks in Bingol, this could mark the return of roadblock use by 
the PKK, a tactic used in the 1990's to assert control of 
territory, even if short-lived in nature. 
 
5. (SBU) Some or our contacts have told us that people in the 
region believe the GOT missed an opportunity after PM R. Tayyip 
Erdogan's August 12 speech in Diyarbakir by not following up 
quickly with concrete, democratic measures to address the 
Kurdish issue.  Fears that the security forces have stepped in 
to fill the gap left by government inaction have ratcheted up 
the level of anxiety about the prospect of increased violence in 
the region. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  Although many may hoped the October 3 opening 
of EU talks would provide an opportunity for the violence to 
subside, reports of continued numerous violent PKK-security 
forces clashes in the region over the past 10 days indicate that 
such hopes may have been drowned out by hardliners on both sides 
bent on confronting each other.  End Comment. 
 
7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 

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