US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1731

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RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC STILL WORRIED OVER FDLR

Identifier: 05KINSHASA1731
Wikileaks: View 05KINSHASA1731 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2005-10-17 12:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171257Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: RAMAZANI WILL NOT ATTEND TRIPARTITE MEETING; DRC 
STILL WORRIED OVER FDLR 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 1711 
 
     B. KINSHASA 1690 
 
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C) During his October 13 meeting with the Ambassador 
regarding the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention (reftel 
A), Minister of Foreign Affairs Raymond Ramazani spoke about 
the upcoming Tripartite meeting and the security situation in 
the eastern part of the country, particularly in South Kivu 
province with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR). 
 
------------------ 
TRIPARTITE MEETING 
------------------ 
 
2. (C) Ramazani said he was not planning on attending the 
upcoming Tripartite meeting scheduled for October 20-21 in 
Kampala. He added that he also gathered from Rwanda's Foreign 
Minister, Charles Murigande, that he would not be attending 
the meeting, either. The DRC delegation likely will be headed 
by Minister for Regional Cooperation Mbusa Nyamwisi. 
 
----------------------- 
ACTING AGAINST THE FDLR 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) Ramazani said he worried about the recent massacre of 
civilians in South Kivu by RASTA/FDLR forces (reftel B), 
indicating that such events reflect the continuing obstacles 
to establishing peace and security posed by FDLR elements. 
Ramazani also said that the presence and activities of the 
FDLR are the biggest difficulties in establishing normal 
relations with Rwanda. 
 
4. (C) Ramazani told Ambassador he was disappointed that the 
US and European Union proposed package of sanctions against 
the FDLR had not been enacted following the September 30 
deadline. 
 
5. (C) Ramazani further said the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) were unable to fight the 
FDLR alone. He complained that MONUC, which has troops in the 
province, is not in a hurry to resolve the situation and 
disarm the FDLR soldiers. He said that MONUC should have the 
capacity to stop FDLR activities, but as of yet has not done 
so. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador concurred that a package of measures or 
sanctions targeting FDLR leaders outside of Africa is needed 
following the September 30 deadline, and noted that efforts 
are in progress to put such measures in place. He also noted 
that MONUC's mandate and capability have limits, but that 
MONUC has been actively conducting for some time cordon and 
search operations to establish arms-free zones in South Kivu 
province. Indeed, 2,500 FARDC troops have essentially been 
trained by the MONUC brigade there to assist in these 
operations, although there is no explicit MONUC mandate for 
such training. What is missing is a capable FARDC force, such 
as the Angolan-trained Kitona Second Integrated Brigade to 
provide the needed Congolese military capacity and authority 
to go after FDLR and other destabilizing forces in the area. 
Likewise, when equipped, the Kamina Belgian/South African 
trained brigade needs to be deployed as soon as possible to 
North Kivu to provide a similar capability there. Ramazani 
acknowledged the point that the FARDC deployments are needed. 
 
7. (C) Comment: While even the integrated FARDC brigades' 
capabilities are open to question, deployment of the newly 
trained integrated brigades is essential to provide a 
national component to operations against the FDLR and other 
disruptive forces in eastern Congo. Such a component is 
needed not only for additional military capability, but as 
well for the sovereign authority that the FARDC represents. 
While various factors, including arrival and distribution of 
equipment promised by various donors, has slowed the process, 
deployments are lagging far behind schedule, we suspect to a 
significant degree due to foot-dragging or outright 
opposition within the senior FARDC officer corps. With 
proposals on the table for far-reaching reforms regarding 
FARDC pay, support and general administration, vested 
interests of these officers are being threatened. Deployments 
to active operational areas of the integrated brigades 
focuses even more attention on these issues. These 
deployments are high on the agenda for the next meetings of 
the CIAT with the Espace Presidentiel, and the Security 
Sector Mixed Commission, and we will continue to press the 
issue bilaterally as well. End Comment. 
MEECE 

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