US embassy cable - 05SANAA2997

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PARM, SA, IZ, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON YEMEN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM 
COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. SANAA 2848 
     B. SANAA 2365 
     C. STATE 163140 
     D. SANAA 2806 
     E. SANAA 2822 
     F. SANAA 2945 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (S) Summary.  In July, Ambassador presented President 
Saleh with a white paper assessing the Republic of Yemen 
Government's (ROYG) level of counter-terrorism (CT) 
cooperation.  The Ambassador shared USG concerns that Yemen's 
efforts to combat terrorism have been neither consistent nor 
aggressive.  The paper identified specific steps the ROYG 
could take to strengthen cooperation ahead of Saleh's 
November 2005 bi-lateral with President Bush and other 
members of DOS, DOD, and the intelligence community.  Since 
delivering the assessment, the Ambassador has met frequently 
with high-level Yemeni officials, encouraging them to 
demonstrate the political will necessary to broaden and 
deepen CT cooperation.  Despite an overall increase in CT 
cooperation at the beginning of the year, the ROYG has made 
minimal progress on the desired action items.  End Summary. 
 
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Evaluation of Progress on Desired Action Items 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (S) The following is an evaluation of ROYG progress on 
the specific steps identified in the white paper: 
 
Access to Detainees/Information sharing 
 
3.  (S) Desired actions: Yemeni officials grant unrestricted 
access to detainees to be connected to terrorist groups. 
Yemeni officials to allow the U.S. full advance vetting of 
potential Ramadan releases.  Yemeni authorities should 
provide fingerprints and photographs of all terrorist-related 
detainees and render dual Yemen/U.S. citizen Jaber Elbaneh to 
the United States for trial for terrorist-related crimes. 
 
4.  (S) ROYG Action:  Provision of counter-terrorism 
intelligence to U.S. officials markedly increased during the 
first half of 2005. The Yemeni government, however, has not 
provided sustained access to any detainees connected to 
terrorist groups.  Despite a formal request, Embassy has yet 
to receive advance notice of Ramadan releases.  On September 
26, Saleh publicly announced he would pardon and release 
imprisoned supporters of radical cleric Hussein Al-Houthi 
(ref A).  Supporters have not yet been released.  Yemeni 
authorities did not provide fingerprints and photographs of 
all terrorist-related detainees.  Dual Yemen/U.S. citizen 
Jaber Elbaneh remains in Yemeni custody. 
 
 
Stemming Flow from Yemen to Iraq 
 
5.  (S) Desired actions: The Yemeni government publicly 
discourages Yemenis from traveling to Iraq, highlighting the 
insurgency's continued killing of Iraqis, and criminalizes 
participating in the insurgency.  Yemeni government shares 
with U.S. officials information (names/DPOBs, passport 
number, etc.) on Yemenis attempting to travel to Iraq, 
foreigners traveling through Yemen suspected of intending to 
reach Iraq, and cooperation with regional governments to stem 
the flow.  Yemeni government invites the Saudi Mabahith to 
station a representative in Sanaa to coordinate Yemen-Saudi 
efforts to track and stem Iraq-bound extremists (this is a 
key desired action). 
 
6.  (S) ROYG Action:  Yemeni security services took a number 
of steps to stem the flow of foreign fighters after 
discovering in late 2004/early 2005 that returning foreign 
fighters were plotting to attack ROYG officials and western 
embassies.  Security services have quietly started to monitor 
and arrest local foreign fighter facilitators.  The Yemeni 
government, however, has yet to publicly discourage travel to 
Iraq or provide increased information on travelers to U.S. 
officials.  Yemeni officials have informed Embassy that they 
are cooperating closely with Saudi Arabia on CT issues, but 
have not provided any specifics of that coordination. 
 
Detention of Former Iraqi Regime Elements (FREs) 
 
7.  (S) Desired Actions: Based on an ORCA-developed list, 
Yemeni government provides detailed information on efforts to 
monitor, detain, or arrest FREs in country, as well as Yemeni 
returnees from jihad in Iraq. 
 
8.  (S) ROYG Action: While not providing a comprehensive 
review of FREs, Yemeni authorities did pass information on 
the whereabouts of Umar Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti.  In 
September, Embassy requested Yemen,s support for Sabawi,s 
detention and extradition to Iraq.  Yemeni authorities did 
not detain Sabawi or coordinate with Iraqi services on his 
extradition.  No streamlined custodial transfers have been 
established. 
 
 
Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) 
 
9.  (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government passes legislation 
necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW except by the Yemeni 
Ministry of Defense.  Yemeni government enforces the 
restrictions and reports violations (publicly and to U.S. 
officials).  Yemeni government takes steps to stem the flow 
of weapons out of Yemen and into the Horn of Africa and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
10.  (S) ROYG Action: The Yemeni government has not passed 
legislation necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW.  In 
September, Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman admitted 
that the Yemeni government shipped 5,000 Kalashnikovs to 
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in July following a personal request 
from Yusuf to President Saleh during the June OIC conference 
in Sanaa (ref B).  Despite Saleh's March promise to suspend 
all third-party End User Certificates (EUC), information 
indicates Yemeni arms brokers are still negotiating the 
purchase of SA/LW on behalf of the Ministry of Defense (ref 
C). 
 
 
Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
 
 
11. (S) Desired actions: Offices to be closed, 
representatives deported or banned from conducting activities 
on behalf of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and 
U.S. officials notified of Yemeni government actions.  Second 
best outcome: Representatives are placed under surveillance 
and investigation and information collected by the Yemeni 
government is shared with U.S. officials. 
 
12.  (S) ROYG Action: Hamas and PIJ offices have not been 
closed and no representatives have been deported. 
Information gathered through surveillance has not been 
shared. 
 
 
Sheikh Zindani 
 
13.  (S) Desired actions: Zindani,s assets frozen and his 
passport revoked.  Information from Zindani,s financial 
flows shared with U.S. officials.  Yemeni government takes a 
strong public stance against terrorist financing. 
 
14.  (S) ROYG Action: Zindani,s assets have yet to be frozen 
nor his passport revoked.  No information on his assets has 
been shared.  In September, the Yemeni government requested 
detailed evidence on Zindani's financial support to 
terrorists groups (ref D).  If proof could not be provided, 
Yemen requested assistance removing his name from the UN 
terrorist-financing list. 
 
 
Yemen/Saudi border 
 
15.  (S) Desired actions: Yemeni and Saudi governments 
explore additional measures to monitor and control the 
border; Yemeni government dedicates additional resources to 
arms smuggling interdiction on the Saudi border. Yemen 
provides data required for the USG to move forward with an 
update of the TIP/PISCES program in Yemen. 
 
16.  (S) ROYG Action:  Yemeni officials have not informed the 
Embassy of any joint measures with Saudi Arabia to monitor 
and control the border.  No additional resources have been 
dedicated to arms smuggling interdiction.  The Embassy has 
received the data requested to move forward with the 
TIP/PISCES program. 
 
 
Cash Couriers 
 
17.  (S) Desired actions: Yemen adopts legal restrictions in 
line with its Arabian Peninsula neighbors and the FATF 
recommendations, begins aggressive enforcement, and 
provides the USG with data on seized cash and couriers. 
Consistent with FATF Special Recommendation IX, Yemen should 
adopt measures to detect the physical cross-border 
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, 
including a declaration system or other disclosure 
obligation.  Yemen should ensure that it has competent 
authorities who have the legal authority to stop or restrain 
currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected 
to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or 
that are falsely declared or disclosed.  Moreover, Yemen 
should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false 
declaration(s) or disclosure(s). 
 
18.  (S) ROYG Action:  No action has been taken on cash 
couriers. 
 
 
Public Diplomacy/Hearts and Minds 
 
19.  (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government launches an 
anti-extremism public awareness campaign, discouraging 
support to the Iraqi insurgency, highlighting the 
un-Islamic-ness of terrorist acts, and explaining the global 
effort to combat terrorism. 
 
20.  (S) ROYG Action:  The Yemeni government has not launched 
an anti-extremism public awareness campaign. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Comment: Why the Lack of Movement? 
----------------------------------- 
 
21.  (S) Despite receiving a clear message on the importance 
of sustained progress on CT issues, including during a recent 
visit by CT Advisor Fran Townsend, the ROYG continues to 
delay implementing the desired actions.  When discussing 
Saleh's visit, ROYG officials tend to steer the conversation 
towards possible USG deliverables, rather than discussing the 
specifics of CT cooperation. While willing to publicly 
declare support for the GWOT in a signed "Memorandum of 
Intention" (ref E), the ROYG is less enthusiastic about 
demonstrating support by granting access to detainees, 
combating terrorist financing, or stopping the flow of SA/LW. 
 
22.  (S) Post 9/11, Saleh has played a delicate balancing act 
between competing interests.  He clearly recognizes the 
threat terrorist elements pose to regime stability and is 
appreciative of USG support to strengthen the security 
forces.  On the other hand, many powerful political players, 
like Zindani and arms dealers, have a clear interest in 
maintaining the status quo.  Saleh maintains power through a 
complex network of deals and alliances and is therefore 
frequently unwilling to act unilaterally on CT issues.  This 
balancing act is becoming increasingly more important ahead 
of the 2006 Presidential elections, especially considering 
Saleh appears ready to rescind his pledge not to seek 
re-election (ref F). 
Krajeski