US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7963

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, ASEC, EG, IZ, Arab League 
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE'S MOUSSA TO BAGHDAD;  SEEKING USG 
BACKING FOR HOLDING IRAQI NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 7725 
 
     B. JEDDAH 3953 (NOTAL) 
     C. STATE 189909 
 
Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1.  (U) This message contains an action request.  See 
paragraph five. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
2.  (C) During an October 15 meeting with the Ambassador to 
discuss Iraq's constitution referendum, Arab League Secretary 
General Moussa outlined plans for a visit to Iraq, October 
20-21 (protect dates).  In Iraq, Moussa intends to seek 
buy-in for League plans to host a national gathering of Iraqi 
political groups (excluding terror groups, venue and date to 
be determined).  Moussa sought USG political support for Arab 
League engagement on Iraq's political process, limited MNF-I 
technical support for the visit (paragraph seven), and USG 
"understanding" for what he saw as his need to entertain 
discussion in general terms of the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
("though not a specific timeline") from Iraq, as a means to 
draw more Sunnis away from the insurgency and into the 
political process.  To the Ambassador's call to comment 
favorably on Iraq's referendum and ongoing political process 
(ref C), Moussa committed to making helpful public remarks 
once referendum results are announced, as well as during his 
Iraq visit.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Arab League Secretary General to Baghdad 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Meeting late on October 15 with the Ambassador and 
poloff (notetaker), Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa 
and his Chief of Staff Hesham Youssef detailed plans for an 
October 20-21 League mission to Iraq, as agreed by AL 
ministers in Jeddah October 2 (ref B).  Moussa said he would 
lead a delegation of 8 AL officials, 11 AL security 
personnel, and a group of 10 journalists to Iraq October 
20-21.  Moussa will fly from Cairo to Baghdad on a Bahraini 
charter jet, overnight at either the Mugamma al Wuzarah 
(beside the Green Zone) or at the home of FM Zebari, and 
return to Cairo after a visit to meet Kurdish leader Barzani 
in Irbil.  Moussa requested that we keep details of his trip, 
including dates, very close-hold for security reasons. 
 
4.  (C) Despite what he described as strong pressure by 
professional and personal contacts to cancel the trip, Moussa 
said he was committed to the visit.  The armed attack on 
Moussa's Arab League advance team in Baghdad raised concerns, 
Moussa said, but would not deter him from executing the 
decision by Arab League ministers in Jeddah October 2 for the 
visit and for sponsoring a national Iraqi conference. 
 
5.  (C) Action Request:  Moussa shared his request for 
general political support for his mission but not loud public 
praise that might feed Sunni Arab perceptions that he was 
travelling at U.S. bidding.  Moussa also welcomed limited and 
discreet USG and Coalition technical support both to ensure 
his safety and to facilitate travel within Iraq. 
Specifically, he would welcome any advice or assistance to 
ensure proper flight clearances and other required details 
for the Bahraini charter flight that will take Moussa from 
Cairo to Baghdad and from Irbil to Cairo.  Moussa also 
intends to contact the UN senior representative in Iraq to 
request similar assistance, most likely in terms of transport 
between Baghdad and Najaf.  He is reluctant to accept MNF-I 
helicopter lift but might be willing to do so if in some way 
such airlift is clearly provided under Iraqi government 
auspices, or possibly U.N. aircraft.  Embassy Cairo Political 
officer Chris Hegadorn can be reached via classified e-mail 
(HegadornCS@state.sgov.gov) or Open Net e-mail 
(HegadornCS@state.gov) for operational liaison with the 
League.  End action request. 
 
6.  (C) Moussa detailed his intention to meet with key Iraqi 
government figures, including President Talabani, Prime 
Minister Jafari, senior ministers, and key regional and 
religious leaders such as al Hakim, Barzani, Adnan Duleimi, 
al Dhari, and others.  He was pleased to hear that Ambassador 
Khalilzad had agreed to meet him (per Ricciardone-Khalilzad 
e-mails), and had asked FM Zebari to make arrangements with 
U.S. Embassy Bagdad.  Following meetings in Baghdad and 
Najaf, Moussa intends to fly to Irbil to meet Barzani before 
returning directly to Cairo.  He will follow up his Iraq 
visit, he added, with regional consultations and visits to 
Iran, Turkey, and Syria among others. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Rationale for Arab League Involvement 
------------------------------------- 
7.  (C) Mousa said his trip was intended to bring the AL in 
to "support the intensive political process certain to occur 
between the referendum and the December elections."  He 
recognized that the Iraqis would be less interested, if at 
all, in a "national dialogue" conference in Cairo or anywhere 
outside Iraq, than in one held in Iraq itself.  This might be 
the ideal, if security eventually permitted; but perhaps a 
"prep-con" at AL headquarters could be helpful.  The 
important objective, he stressed, was for the AL to "engage" 
with both the Iraqis and the U.S./Coalition.  "The Arabs have 
to understand that there is no alternative to this process." 
He specifically rejected the Arab critics' contention that 
democracy in Iraq was "ir-receivable from the Americans" -- 
in other words, unacceptable if created by the U.S. 
 
8.  (C) Moussa rehearsed with the Ambassador arguments for AL 
engagement in Iraq, the expected Baghdad visit, the national 
conference proposal, and his consultations with USG/Coalition 
representatives.  The League's recent decision to become more 
engaged on Iraq, he said, reflected a shift by key Arab 
powers that was crucial in helping to overcome the ongoing 
crisis in Iraq.  The decision was not intended to supplant 
UNSCR 1546, Moussa argued, but reflected Arab neighbors' 
belief that the current political process in Iraq did not 
fully capture a national consensus on how best to move 
forward.  Without the League's efforts in this regard, Moussa 
predicted continued strong domestic Iraqi and regional 
resistance to American and Coalition efforts.  The principal 
focus of the League was a national conference to help 
overcome such internal and regional differences, he said. 
 
9.  (C) Moussa explained that he was not wedded to the word 
"reconciliation (Arabic, mu-Sal-e-hah)" to which Iraqis had 
objected, to describe the proposed AL-backed national 
conference, and would seek Iraqis' agreement on appropriate 
terminology.  The wording, whether national "accord (Arabic, 
wifaq)," or national "discussion (Arabic, hiwar)," was far 
less important than the substance of any such gathering.  The 
Ambassador cautioned that some Iraqis might perceive the 
title "Wifaq al Watani (National Accord)" as AL support for 
former PM Allawi's political party of the same name.  Moussa 
noted that participation in the event would not be permitted 
to terror groups such as Zarqawi's or others involved in 
terror attacks. 
 
10.  (C) Moussa stressed the historic nature of such a 
negotiating effort by the Arab League itself, as opposed to 
key members of the League, and argued that his having 
personal responsibility for the success or failure of the 
conference would streamline negotiations over planning and 
other technical details.  The fact of the visit alone, he 
added, should contribute significantly to silencing local 
pessimism and negativity over Iraq.  "Just making the trip at 
all will be 50 percent of its success."  Still, he noted, 
"completely fabricated" press reports suggesting that he 
would seek a meeting with Saddam Hussein highlighted the 
level of disinformation surrounding his and Arab League 
intentions.  "We can't deal with the Iraq crisis by 
complaining about it," he continued, "we have to become part 
and parcel of the process.  And, we Arabs must speak with the 
United States about Iraq - we can not stand aside." 
 
-------------------------------- 
Coalition "Withdrawal" on Agenda 
-------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Repeating the argument he used with visiting Iraq 
Policy Coordinator Jeffrey and delegation (ref A), Moussa 
emphasized his need to "talk about talking about" the topic 
of MNF withdrawal -- which he insisted had already been 
broached within UNSCR 1546.  "We're not trying to corner you" 
with a time-line commitment, he added, but he recognized the 
crucial importance to Iraqi resistance elements of this 
topic.  If Moussa can include this topic on the agenda for 
the national dialogue, the League would be better able to 
draw political opposition groups now outside the process to 
participate constructively.  The Ambassador cautioned Moussa 
not to be drawn into discussion of specific timelines for 
withdrawal of Coalition forces, nor to mistake foreign 
withdrawal as the definition of success for Iraq.  The USG, 
the Ambassador said, was commmitted to supporting the Iraqi 
government until it had established a free nation capable of 
governing and defending itself. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Demarche on Support for Constitution 
------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of public AL 
support for the October 15 referendum, especially in 
recognizing the ongoing and successful implementation to date 
of UNSCR 1546.  Drawing from ref C demarche talking points, 
the Ambassador noted that the Iraqi government and Washington 
alike had been disappointed by the relative silence from the 
League on the constitution process.  Moussa listed earlier 
significant help he said the League offered the Iraqi 
government and pledged to comment favorably to the media once 
referendum results were announced.  The constitution 
negotiations, he noted, had achieved positive results.  He 
would certainly comment favorably on the process during his 
Iraq trip.  Moussa also told the Ambassador that he had 
telephoned Iraqi Islamic Party leader Tareq al Hashimi ahead 
of the referendum, only half-jokingly "taking credit" for the 
former's decision to announce his support for the last-minute 
crucial amendments brokered by Embassy Baghdad. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (C) We see Moussa's trip as a sign of constructive Arab 
engagement on Iraq.  Notwithstanding the official "cover" of 
the Jedda/AL Ministerial of October 2, Moussa appears well 
out in front of Arab and AL opinion.  He is showing both 
personal and political courage in making the trip, and wants 
at least tacit USG and allied support.  He also wants at 
least our tolerance for whatever he evidently fears he might 
be constrained to say about "withdrawal of foreign forces" to 
play up to the Iraqi and broader Arab rejectionists.  The 
naievete of some of Moussa's notions about dealing with 
Iraqis indicates just how much he (and through him, the AL) 
stands to learn from direct exposure to the complicated 
ground truth in Iraq.  We welcome Embassy Baghdad's 
suggestions on what we can do to work with the League to 
facilitate their visit.  End comment. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE