US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1177

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, G, DRL, S/P 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, BM 
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES: BURMA 
 
REF: A. STATE 16982 
 
     B. STATE 156961 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The promotion of democracy in Burma is this 
mission's top priority as reflected in our Mission Program 
Plan.  Our support for promoting democracy and respect for 
human rights has been long-standing and requires 
perseverence.  Although this strong support for democracy has 
severely strained our relations with the Burmese military 
regime, it has garnered us broad public support from the 
Burmese people.  Given the entrenched nature of the military 
regime, we cannot promise dramatic changes in the short-term, 
but believe we can effectively stretch the boundaries of the 
possible to give more space for civil society to develop and 
to give support and encouragement to the many supporters of 
democracy in Burma to persist in their struggle.  We run 
already successful American Center programs that can be 
expanded beyond Rangoon to the second major city of Mandalay 
if we get Department approval.  We also will receive $100,000 
in FY06 for small grants that we will use to promote 
democracy and civil society development.  We also recommend a 
diplomatic push to emphasize that a national referendum on a 
new constitution will not confer any legitimacy on the regime 
without the inclusion of representatives of all the Burmese 
people in the drafting and a free, fair and open public 
debate.  End Summary. 
 
Key Areas of Democratic Deficit 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Democratic Deficit understates the situation in 
Burma today.  The military regime retains all governing 
authority, and the country has no free press, a complete 
absence of basic human rights (including freedom of speech, 
association, and movement), no rule of law, no independent 
judiciary, highly controlled access to information, severely 
restricted political party activities, and systematically 
emasculated civil society institutions.  Religious minorities 
face increasing repression as the military tries to use 
Buddhism to give itself greater standing.  The population 
remains subject to forced labor at the whim of military 
authorities. 
 
3. (C) Progress in Burma requires a long-term effort.  Our 
overall policy reamins focused on fostering a meaningful 
political dialogue among Burma's diverse political forces, 
aiming at achieving a peaceful transition to democracy.  The 
military regime, however, has rejected all bilateral and 
multilateral efforts to promote an inclusive national 
reconcilation dialogue, the free operation of political 
parties, and the release of over 1000 political prisoners, 
including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.  Despite 
intermittent glimmers of hope that the message might be 
getting through, the military appears determined to protect 
its continued rule of the few over the many disenfranchised. 
 
4. (C) This year marks the 43rd year of authoritarian rule 
and 17 years under the current military regime, which came to 
power promising a "quick" transition to democracy.  The 
regime generals in the past years have retreated further into 
their collective shell of isolation.  This retreat is 
partially a response to international pressure, but also 
reflects renewed attention to power sharing issues with the 
country's ethnic minorities, a concern that remains 
unresolved since Burmese independence.  Although the military 
convened a National Convention in 1993 to draft a 
Constitution as part of its "roadmap to democracy," it 
hand-picked the representatives, restricted debate, detained 
and isolated the pro-democracy movement leaders, and harassed 
and repressed democratic activists.  The military has 
announced that they will reconvene the National Convention 
later this year in order to finalize a new Constitution.  Yet 
after 12 years, no one has seen any provisions in writing. 
 
5. (C) The regime's open disdain for the UN system and the 
international community has become more apparent.  The regime 
has prohibited a visit by the UNSYG's Special Envoy, Tan Sri 
Razali Ismail, since March 2004.  It has been two years since 
UN Human Rights Rapporteur Paolo Sergio Pinheiro was allowed 
to enter the country.  In the interim, world leaders and 
international organizations, inlcuding the UNSYG, the UNGA, 
the UNCHR, and the ILO, have continued to press the regime, 
unsuccessfully, for significant reform. The regime has also 
imposed increased restrictions on UN agencies and 
international NGOs operating inside Burma.  The military 
intimidates its citizens by questioning them about any 
contacts with foreigners, including the source of funds for 
programs they initiate.  Foreign missions and visitors face 
increasing delays and difficulties in obtaining routine visas 
and residence permits. 
 
Short-term Objectives 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Given the overall grim prospects for a transition to 
democracy in the near future, we propose some modest steps to 
stretch the boundaries to promote meaningful discussions 
among the Burmese people and prepare them to control their 
future.  We propose to do this by expanding our successful 
American Center programs to Mandalay and by utilizing 
$100,000 in ESF funds already appropriated to give support to 
civil society groups working inside Burma.  In addition, we 
recommend that a diplomatic effort be launched to forestall 
the adoption of a new Constitution (drafting of which may be 
concluded by the end of this year) after a sham referendum 
designed to entrench the military in power. 
 
Diplomatic and Programmatic Strategy 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Stretching the Boundaries:  In spite of regime efforts 
to paint the international community, and especially the 
United States, as "enemies of the state," there is a 
phenomenal thirst among Burma's diverse population for all 
that we have to offer.  The democratic opposition values U.S. 
mission counsel and support.  The ethnic minorities, 
distrusted by the central government, value our efforts to 
include them in our programs.  The general population eagerly 
avails itself of the abundant, accurate, and unvarnished 
information we provide.  Our American Center in Rangoon 
(which houses the best, and one of the only, libraries in the 
country) draws up to 8,000 visitors a week and has 12,000 
enrolled members.  Almost 400 Burmese, including opposition 
activists and former political prisoners, have enrolled in 
our English language and civics instruction programs. 
Participants in our public diplomacy exchange programs in the 
United States return to their NGOs and independent 
associations with new leadership and management skills to 
build a stronger civil society. 
 
8. (C) We can do more: 
 
--Increasing Outreach:  We must turn away interested students 
for our programs in Rangoon due to space limitations.  We 
should not be turning away any interested individuals seeking 
the truth.  The USG owns prime real estate in Mandalay, 
currently unoccupied, that could serve as a center for 
expanding our successful public diplomacey programs. 
Mandalay is Burma's second largest city, the cultural 
capital, and the gateway to Northern Burma and most ethnic 
areas.  China, Japan, UK, and France operate educational 
programs there and China and India have active consulates. 
We recommend expanding our successful American Center 
programs (library and classes) to Mandalay in order to reach 
many democracy activists and ethnic minorities who are 
prohibited from traveling to Rangoon.  We need to begin now 
to seek the necessary approvals from the authorities(which 
can take a very long time), while the Department coordinates 
the necessary Washington approvals, so that we can get 
Mandalay open soon. 
 
--Training:  Quick to recognize threats to its authority, the 
military has closed universities for extended periods of time 
and then dispersed them away from urban centers.  The 
military hand-picks the heads of business and professional 
associations, even the monkhood, to avoid challenges.  They 
view the private sector as easy plunder rather than a force 
for development.  They discourage the reporting of bad news 
as negatively reflecting on their rule, so data collection 
has disappeared.  They have begun moving to replace trained 
civil servants throughout the bureaucracy with military 
officers having no background or expertise in the jobs they 
assume.  As a result, leadership, decision making, and 
management skills have withered in Burma.  The regime's 
repression and intimidation of the democratic opposition has 
severely restricted the ability of political party leaders to 
develop sufficient capacity to govern.  Our American Center 
has programs in place to teach English to democracy 
activists, with an emphasis on governance and civics.  We 
have offered successful journalism training programs to 
support professional development within a growing independent 
media sector.  We have oragnized an eMBA program for 
progressive business leaders seeking the tools necessary to 
make the private sector an engine of change for political and 
economic reform.  All these, plus more, can be expanded with 
additional space and funding. 
--International Visitors/Exchanges:  The USG currently funds 
six IVs annually.  We could easily double or triple that 
figure to accommodate strong candidates from independent NGOs 
and civil society.  Burma does not currently have a Fulbright 
program, despite being one of the original Fulbright 
countries in 1947.  We should reactivate this program that 
has demonstrated its outstanding record of success of 
preparing future leaders around the world.  We should also 
consider funding non-GOB individuals to regional meetings on 
democracy-related issues and support more regional speakers 
to visit Burma for appropriate programs we could arrange here. 
 
--Independent Information.  The vast majority of Burmese 
citizens, including government and military officials, obtain 
the only available accurate information about domestic 
developments and world news via the independent short-wave 
radio broadcasts of Radio Free Asia (RFA), the VOA, the BBC, 
and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).  The distribution of 
radios inside the country would enhance broader access to 
reliable information.  We should also work with these four 
Burmese-language radio services to broaden their democracy 
and capacity-building programming and support efforts to 
boost their signal strength. 
 
--Burma Congressional Earmark:  Tens of millions of dollars 
in ESF and HA funds have been spent on Burmese refugees and 
exiles in Thailand, a tiny percentage of the 50 million 
people living inside Burma, and unlikey to return to Burma 
anytime soon.  We welcome the opportunity to use the $100,000 
identified for this Embassy to use in promoting democracy 
this fiscal year.  We are in the process of identifying 
independent homegrown NGOs working in Burma, so that we can 
show what can be done from within to promote the 
establishment of democracy and provide civil society 
opportunities to develop the skills that a democratic Burma 
will require. 
 
9.  (C) Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy:  Annual UNGA 
and UNCHR resolutions on Burma demonstrate the international 
consensus on the need for change.  The current efforts to 
engage the UN Security Council on Burma have struck a nerve 
in the military leadership.  They have launched vituperative 
attacks on the "outside forces" attempting to discredit the 
regime (amusingly, printing the criticisms that they then try 
to rebut).  The democratic opposition, ethnic groups, student 
leaders have all publicly endorsed the effort further 
enfuriating the regime.  We should continue to support 
efforts such as this to keep Burma on the international 
agenda, which serves to remind the military of their 
illegitimacy. 
 
10.  (C)  At the same time, we must launch an international 
effort to forestall a sham referendum enshrining a 
constitution tailored to order by the military (see para 4 
above).  The regime has announced plans to conclude the 
drafting by the National Convention later this year; they 
would then stage a referendum to ratify it.  With all 
opposition completely excluded from deliberations, debate 
prohibited, and nothing in writing, this hardly portends a 
free, fair and open decision by the Burmese people.  Yet many 
diplomats in Rangoon consider that it would be "good enough" 
to gain the release of ASSK and future amendments could then 
correct the flaws.  We need to work with our European, 
Australian, and Japanese partners to convince the Chinese and 
ASEAN nations in particular that a flawed constitution at 
this stage is "not good enough."  The Chinese and ASEANs have 
disagreed with many elements of our Burma policy, but they 
should not be under any illusion that the international 
community as a whole will recognize a sham.  They themselves 
recognize the many failures of the regime and their limited 
influence on the regime despite their willingness to 
"engage."  Since stability seems to be a major concern to 
them, remind them that any process that excludes a major 
portion of the population will only ensure that conflicts 
will continue and the economy will further deteriorate--thus 
fueling instability.  They should be telling the military, at 
a minimum, that they only way to conclude this process is by 
bringing in all the political players in advance to have an 
open debate--maybe this could start the national 
reconciliation so overdue in Burma. 
 
11.  (C) Humanitarian Assistance:  Finally we wish to flag an 
issue that merits Washington attention because it has an 
impact on our bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.  Based on 
our conversations with Europeans, Australian and Japanese 
diplomats here, other donors have begun searching for other 
ways that they can influence developments in Burma.  They 
have seized on Burma's serious humanitarian needs.  They 
recognize that the regime itself is largely responsible for 
causing, or at least failing to address, a host of crises. 
They also see a role for the international community to 
alleviate the  suffering of innocent people.  The military 
protects only itself, not the people.  No one wants to 
provide support that would in any way bolster the regime or 
relieve the generals of their responsibility to undertake 
fundamental reform.  Nonetheless, credible international NGOs 
make a compelling case that foreign assistance can not only 
address humanitarian needs, but it can be delivered 
independent of the government and in ways that also build 
civil society and encourage grassroots democracy.  Despite 
our demonstrated track record of generous humanitarian 
assistance around the world, many donors quietly point to us 
as the obstacles in addressing humanitarian needs in Burma. 
We should be willing to discuss with other donors their ideas 
about how to move forward in Burma to advance our own ideas, 
including exploring methods to broaden our humanitarian 
assistance in creative ways to take advantage of this 
"democracy building" space. 
 
Flexibility, Creativity, and Persistence 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The regime will strongly resist overt efforts to 
support the democratic opposition and those who seek an end 
to military rule.  The regime will equally resist efforts to 
influence directly its own government and military ranks to 
adapt or be more receptive to democratic practices.  Thus we 
have proposed a low-key approach that tries to expand the 
boundaries in which can operate and open up space for the 
Burmese people.  We do not doubt that the military knows what 
we are doing in our American Centers, yet they do not 
interfere.  Let's take advantage of that and probe where we 
can do more.  This will mean that we should not publicize our 
specific intentions.  That does not mean that we should not 
speak out critically about this regime.  Those words of 
criticism for the abuses and the need for more freedom coming 
from the President and Secretary are heard widely by the 
Burmese people through radio broadcasts and welcomed as moral 
support that they are not alone in their struggle. 
 
13. (C) We must pursue our democracy objectives in Burma with 
flexibility and creativity.  While we can be bold and firm in 
our bilateral relationship with the regime, our democracy 
programming should not provoke the generals in a way that 
would jeopardize the very people we are supporting or result 
in further restrictions that close entirely the small space 
in which we currently operate.  We need to operate in 
partnership with UN agencies and NGOs and through our 
existing American Center and traditional public diplomacy 
mechanisms.  Expansion of our efforts may also require 
"stealth" democracy programs which are carried out through 
business development, humanitarian assistance, conservation, 
and other projects that do not draw undesirable attention 
from the authorities. 
 
14. (C) The United States provides a voice and a source of 
hope to the vast majority of the Burmese population who 
oppose authoritarian rule and are inspired by core U.S. 
values of good governance and respect for the rule of law. 
They gain strength from the presence of our mission and from 
U.S. policies.  While tangible progress in achieving our 
democracy objectives in Burma will be very difficult, we must 
persist. 
Villarosa