US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7937

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, ECON, PTER, EG, IZ 
SUBJECT: HELPING REBUILD EGYPTIAN-IRAQI POLITICAL RELATIONS 
 
REF: CAIRO 07725 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) In recent discussions with the Ambassador, senior GOE 
and GOI interlocutors have expressed a willingness to engage 
more robustly and productively with their Iraqi counterparts 
in a number of specific areas.  Post strongly endorses taking 
prompt advantage of this opening to help repair fractured 
GOE-GOI political relations, badly shaken as a result of the 
kidnapping and murder of Egypt's Ambassador to Baghdad 
earlier this year.  These initiatives include inviting Iraqi 
National Security Advisor Mowafaq al Rubaie to meet with 
Egyptian Intelligence Chief Soliman, Iraqi Interior Minister 
Jabr to meet his GOE counterpart, and articulate Iraqi 
religious figures to meet with Egyptian religious leaders. 
The primary goals of such exchanges would be to prime the 
pump for further constructive dialogue with Egyptian and Arab 
League interlocutors -- admittedly influential among Iraq's 
Sunni community.  A robust public diplomacy component must 
also be encapsulated in such visits, in order to begin 
chipping away at the prejudices and latent hostilities among 
Egyptian opinion shapers toward Iraq and especially Iraqi 
Shia.  End summary. 
 
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Bridging Egypt-Iraq Differences 
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2.  (C) To assist in making our Arab outreach strategy a 
success (reftel), we need to help Egypt and Iraq (as well as 
the Arab League and Iraq) bridge their significant 
differences and overcome respective prejudices and 
hostilities.  In separate meetings with us here in Cairo, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Iraqi Deputy Foreign 
Minister Hamid Bayati, Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar 
Soliman, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and 
Egyptian Interior Minister Al-Adly all shared their interest 
in patching-up relations and their willingness to engage more 
actively.  Nevertheless, both sides are reluctant to take the 
appropriate first steps.  Our role should be that of 
facilitator, working with our British and other Coalition 
partners to get the momentum started. 
 
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Training:  Egypt Still Willing 
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3.  (C) The Foreign Minister and other senior GOE officials 
told visiting Iraq Policy Coordinator Jeffrey October 1-2 
that Egypt remained prepared to train Iraqis in any field, 
including military training - but only in Egypt.  So far, the 
GOE has trained 146 Iraqi soldiers, two dozen diplomats, a 
handful of judges, and other civil servants.  Egyptian 
Minister of Interior Adly told Ambassador Jeffrey that he 
would welcome a visit by his Iraqi counterpart to further 
explore security training issues.  Minister of Defense 
Tantawi also told us that Egypt wanted to do the military 
training for Iraqis and would cover "all the costs" involved 
in this effort. 
 
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Iraqi National Security Advisor Visit 
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4.  (C) During the October 1-2 visit of Ambassador Jeffrey, 
we were told by Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman that 
he would be willing to host Iraqi National Security Advisor 
Mowafaq al Rubaie in Cairo to discuss Iraq's security 
challenges and related regional issues.  This would be our 
top priority, as al Rubaie is viewed by the GOE as less 
controversial than other Iraqi officials and since 
intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Iraq remains 
ongoing.  Soliman is also crucial to GOE policy toward Iraq 
and other key regional hot spots.  Also, it would be useful 
to facilitate more Egyptian contacts with Shia Iraqi leaders. 
 We would be prepared to press Soliman to host this visit as 
soon as possible should the GOI be amenable. 
 
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Iraqi Interior Minister Visit 
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5.  (C) Should the military training proposal gain speed, we 
assume that Iraqi interior minister Baqir Jabr would be 
critical to this effort, as would Iraqi Defense Ministry 
counterparts and CENTCOM personnel.  While we understand that 
Jabr has much to keep him busy with inside Iraq, and that 
training outside Iraq is perhaps a sensitive subject 
domestically, a visit to Cairo shortly after the October 15 
referendum would be timely in order to brief the Egyptians on 
the security situation, and to further explore the training 
issue. 
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Public Diplomacy Critical to Outreach to Arabs 
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6.  (C) Another important component of a Jabr visit would be 
to pursue our interest in establishing better, and more 
frequent, interactions between Egyptians and Iraq's Shia 
community.  As happened over time with Iraq's Kurds (who now 
have much closer relations with Egyptians), the aim would be 
to tear down distrust and prejudice toward Iraq's Shia 
population.  The general, albeit mistaken, Egyptian viewpoint 
toward Iraq's Shia is that they are simply a tool of Tehran. 
We need to help the Iraqis to highlight as publicly and as 
articulately as possible that the vast majority of Iraq's 
Shia are Arab, nationalist, and not predisposed to doing 
Iran's bidding.  The Egyptians need to hear this loudly and 
clearly, before they and their Arab neighbors succeed in 
pushing Iraq's Shia closer to Iran.  Egypt and the Arab 
League also need to express clearly to the Iraqis their 
rejection of Zarqawi and Al Qaida's call to attack Shias. 
This is something we can help set up here in Cairo, but the 
Iraqis will have to come prepared with these objectives in 
mind. 
 
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Inter-Faith Iraqi Delegation to Cairo 
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7.  (C) Egyptian officials reflect their public's tremendous 
prejudice toward Shia Islam in general and toward Iraq's 
Shias in particular.  These views have long been stoked by 
the Sunni orthodox bastion Al Azhar, but also by Cairo's 
tortuous relations with Iran.  While the challenge is 
formidable, we hope to encourage a dialogue between prominent 
Egyptian religious figures and credible, articulate Iraqi 
counterparts, especially Shias.  A visit by Interior Minister 
Jabr or others could offer the opportunity for a publicized 
meeting with the Sheikh of Al Azhar Tantawi and other 
notables such as the Grand Mufti.  When we saw Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Zebari here in Cairo for an Arab League ministerial 
last month, he expressed enthusiasm for this idea, mentioning 
that a similar and fruitful dialogue had taken place between 
Al Azhar and Iraqi Shia leaders from Najaf during the 1950's. 
 
8.  (C) Another idea along these same lines would be to 
prompt a visit to Cairo by a delegation of Iraqi religious 
figures comprised of Shia, Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish 
(and/or others), to meet with the leaders of Al Azhar, the 
Shia community, the Grand Mufti, and Pope Shenouda of the 
Coptic Church.  Such an event would attract considerable 
media attention, we believe, and should be geared toward 
facilitating additional exchanges and dialogue between the 
respective groups.  Again, a key focus would be to de-bunk 
the prevalent anti-Shia prejudice so rife here. 
 
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Ambassadors, Reciprocal Diplomatic Representation 
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9.  (C) We have spent a lot of energy trying to sort out 
whose court the respective ball is in with respect to the 
question of Iraq's Ambassador to Cairo.  Ambassador Jeffrey 
was told that Egypt had no problem with accepting an Iraqi 
nominee.  But, unspoken at the time was Egypt's apparent 
disdain for the prospective nominee - Ms. Safia al-Soheil - 
who we continue to hear from Zebari, Bayati, and others is 
unacceptable to the GOE for less-than-certain reasons.  We 
also heard through Iraqi contacts locally that Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit told Zebari in Jeddah October 2 that al 
Soheil was "unacceptable" to the GOE and that the Iraqis 
should put forward another name.  In September, Zebari 
speculated to us that the Egyptians feared she would be "too 
outspoken" and "might embarrass them."  Zebari indicated at 
that time that he was considering other potential candidates. 
 We do not see Egypt changing its mind on Soheil, despite her 
numerous strengths and accolades.  We also don't believe 
Egypt is prepared to send another Ambassador (or even its 
diplomats) to Baghdad before the December elections. 
 
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Arab League Engagement 
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10.  (C) Despite an armed attack October 10 on an Arab League 
delegation convoy in Baghdad, the Arab League remains 
committed to engaging on Iraq in various ways (reftel). 
Secretary General Moussa plans to visit Baghdad in 
 
SIPDIS 
mid-to-late October (possibly October 20-21) to address 
political reconciliation and establishing an AL 
representative office there.  He has indicated a willingness 
to support Sunni political participation and support for the 
constitution, once changes to the draft constitution are made 
on a number of sensitive issues. 
11.  (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Baghdad. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE