US embassy cable - 05MANILA4905

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SCENESETTER FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

Identifier: 05MANILA4905
Wikileaks: View 05MANILA4905 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manila
Created: 2005-10-16 10:11:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PTER PREL ASEC PINS MOPS EAID KCRM RP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 004905 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR S/CT(MMILLER) AND EAP/MTS 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/T/ATA AND DS/ICI/RFJ 
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP FOR ALLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, PINS, MOPS, EAID, KCRM, RP 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON 
 
REF: A. STATE 182130 
     B. MANILA 1614 
     C. STATE 151998 
     D. MANILA 2434 
     E. MANILA 2991 
 
Classified By: (U) Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Paul Jones 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Embassy Manila's comprehensive 
counterterrorism efforts -- ranging from the 
military to humanitarian to public diplomacy 
-- are deliberately integrated to meet the 
ever-present terrorism threat in the Philippines. 
You will see all major players during your visit: 
Executive Secretary Ermita; Ambassador-at-large for 
Counterterrorism Defensor; Defense Secretary Cruz; 
Interior Secretary Reyes; Armed Force of the 
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Senga; Philippine 
National Police (PNP) Chief Lomibao; and National 
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) Director Garcia. 
You should use your meetings to push for 
interagency cooperation, institutional reform, and 
anti-terrorism legislation. You'll want to convey our 
confidence in the constitutional framework for resolving 
political differences, and our opposition to martial law, 
which would undermine the fight against terrorism. 
End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2.  (C) The terrorism threat here is real.  Porous borders, 
weak institutions, fragile government, a long-running 
Muslim insurgency, and ever-present corruption make the 
Philippines highly vulnerable.  Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists continue to elude 
government forces in Mindanao, while the Communist Party 
of the Philippines/New Peoples' Army maintains a 
country-wide presence bent on destabilization.  The Rajah 
Solaiman Movement (RSM) represents a growing worry because 
of its ties to foreign financing and the ability of its 
members -- Christian converts to Islam -- to "blend in." 
The Philippines has a recent history of terrorist attacks 
on its own territory.  The February 28, 2004, bombing of 
Superferry 14, which killed over one hundred Filipinos, 
was the second worst terrorist attack in Asia after the 
October 2002 Bali bombings, while the February 14, 2005, 
"Valentine's Day" bombs in Manila and Mindanao devastated 
crowds of shoppers and commuters. 
 
3.  (C) Amid these challenges, President Arroyo is fighting 
for her political life, as she struggles to cope with 
allegations she engaged in cheating to win the 2004 
presidential election.  The government's political woes 
have not yet had a significant impact on the AFP and the 
PNP -- our two principal counterterrorism partners, but 
could have an effect over time.  Either a declaration of 
martial law or a coup attempt would prove disastrous to 
either institution. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS: 
USAID - ECONOMY AND LIVELIHOOD 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Our counterterrorism engagement in the 
Philippines ranges from humanitarian relief and 
development to the military and public diplomacy. 
USAID's Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) program 
has reintegrated over 28,000 former Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants into productive 
society as successful farmers, and stands poised -- 
should a peace agreement be signed with the Moro Islamic 
National Liberation Front (MILF) -- to provide similar 
assistance to the MILF.  USAID's broad spectrum of 
development programs (in infrastructure, education, 
governance, health, economic growth, environment, 
and energy) in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao have 
made a positive impact in communities otherwise vulnerable 
to exploitation by bad elements. 
 
JUSMAG - TRAINING AND REFORM 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Joint US Military Assistance Group-Philippines 
(JUSMAG-P) plays a vital role in our efforts to improve 
Philippine capabilities.  The US-trained and equipped 
Light Reaction Companies (LRCs) and Light Infantry 
Battalions (LIBs) are the tip of the spear in the 
counterterrorism fight. Although the AFP failed to 
capture Janjalani during Operation Layas Pagad this 
summer, it did, as a direct result of US support and 
training, conduct sustained combat operations in the 
field for over 60 days. Over the longer term, JUSMAG-P 
support for the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program 
will prove key to the GRP's ability to stand alone 
without US assistance, capable of meeting the needs of 
the Philippine people and serving as a reliable 
coalition partner. 
 
JSOTF - INTELLIGENCE FUSION AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
6.  (C) In addition to helping the AFP fuse intelligence 
with operations in the hunt for wanted terrorists, Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has 
broadened its scope to include civil-military operations 
in Mindanao.  This approach, coupled with USAID's 
longer-term programs, attacks the environment in which the 
terrorists thrive.  JSOTF-P's efforts in support of the AFP 
will initially focus on the island of Jolo in the Sulu 
Archipelago, an established ASG stronghold, with the goal 
of changing perceptions of the AFP and Philippine 
government among the citizens of Mindanao. 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY - GETTING THE STORY OUT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The Philippines is an exuberant media 
environment.  Much of our effort ends up devoted 
to ensuring that journalists get their facts 
straight.  However, we also take every opportunity 
to get our side of the story out.  Initiatives, 
such as our recently published "Muslim Life 
in the Philippines," have found a ready audience, and we 
have in the works a film chronicling the successful joint 
US-AFP effort to defeat the ASG on Basilan.  PAS works 
hand-in-glove with both USAID and JSOTF-P to ensure that 
perceptions of our efforts on every front are positive. 
 
REWARDS PROGRAMS - SYNERGIES 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (S) Our rewards effort builds upon the synergies 
between the State and DoD programs to attack the web of 
social, religious, and cultural ties upon which the 
terrorists have relied for their safety and freedom. 
The promise of a reward encouraged individuals to step 
forward to help the AFP get ASG leader Hamsiraji Sali, 
JI operative Zaki, and the USG has paid out rewards for 
numerous other terrorists.  We anticipate the recently 
announced reward of $10 million under Rewards for 
Justice for Dulmatin will help bring him to justice. 
 
RMAS - CRITICAL SUPPORT 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (S/NF) RMAS support and direction of the PNP's 
Intelligence Group (IG), Task Force Sanglahi, and the 
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(ISAFP) has proven critical to the capture of a number of 
terrorists and the disruption of operations directed against 
US interests. 
 
THEMES: 
ENGAGEMENT WITH 
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE 
AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM TASK FORCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) S/CT's Counterterrorism Engagement Funds are 
helping us address critical deficiencies in the Philippine 
corrections system -- one of the principal recommendations 
of the June 20-July 7 RP-US assessment of the Philippine 
National Police (PNP).  Engagement Funds and Global War on 
Terrorism Partnership Funds can also help respond to other 
critical needs identified in the assessment, such as 
improving cooperation between prosecutors and police and 
supporting the PNP's fledgling reform efforts. S/CT and 
the Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) are 
currently evaluating Post's proposal for sustained 
engagement with the interagency Anti-Terrorism Task 
Force (ATTF) that would create a dedicated 
team of police investigators, analysts, and prosecutors, 
who would serve as GRP's national-level response unit 
for terrorist attacks.  In your meetings with Executive 
Secretary Ermita, Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism 
 
SIPDIS 
Benjamin Defensor, Interior Secretary Reyes, Defense 
Secretary Cruz, AFP Chief of Staff Senga, and PNP Chief 
 
SIPDIS 
Lomibao you should stress our support for effective 
interagency counterterrorism cooperation and police reform. 
 
PUSHING ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The Philippine House has consolidated its 
efforts behind one anti-terrorism bill, which is now out of 
Committee for consideration by the full House.  However, 
there are five different bills pending in the Senate, 
three of them filed by the Opposition.  Nominally 
pro-Arroyo Senator Manuel Villar is moving to consolidate 
these drafts into one bill.  In your interactions with all 
your interlocutors and the press you should stress the 
need to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation 
that will give law enforcement agencies the tools 
to fight and defeat terrorism. 
 
CONSISTENT MESSAGE - "RULE OF LAW, NOT MARTIAL LAW" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
12. (C) Rumors continue to abound about Government planning 
to impose emergency rule or martial law.   If there is any 
issue that would mobilize widespread opposition to Arroyo 
this is it.  Martial law would splinter the AFP and PNP, 
undermine the nascent reform efforts currently underway, 
intensify economic problems, fuel the Communist insurgency, 
and plunge the country into turmoil.  You should stress in 
each of your meetings the USG's confidence in the 
constitutional process in the Philippines, and opposition 
to any extraordinary measures. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
JONES 

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