US embassy cable - 05SANSALVADOR2811

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 002811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2030 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KCRM, SNAR, EL 
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR HOMICIDES EQUAL 2004 FIGURES/ FINGER 
POINTING AMONG JUSTICE SECTOR 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael A. Butler.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: On October 14, the Salvadoran National 
Police released its September monthly homicide report, 
reflecting that El Salvador had, through the first nine 
months of this year, nearly equaled total homicide figures 
for 2004.  The report also reflected that September was the 
second most violent month this year, with 343 homicides. 
President Saca and the GOES are clearly troubled by the 
spiraling violent crime rate in the country, and have, in the 
past few months, taken some measures to focus law enforcement 
efforts on violent crime.  These efforts have not yet borne 
fruit. One key Embassy interlocutor in the government rejects 
the GOES claim that the majority of homicides are committed 
by the "maras," and says it's an excuse for inadequacy in 
dealing with the crime problem.  Separately, serious rifts 
between the leadership in the police and Attorney General's 
office is a major impediment in effecting successful 
prosecutions and convictions, not only in homicide cases, but 
in money laundering and other serious crimes.  The GOES is 
aware that violent crime is a major issue of concern for most 
Salvadorans, but with national elections March 2006, the Saca 
administration is unlikely to carry out any major leadership 
changes which could be used by the political opposition in 
the campaign.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) On October 14, the Salvadoran National Police ( 
Policia Nacional Civil - PNC) issued its monthly homicide 
report, reflecting that, through the end of September, the 
national homicide rate was only 45 homicides less than all of 
2004.  The report also reflects that September was the second 
most violent month this year, with 343 homicides, which, when 
added to rest of year figures (through October 1), puts total 
number of homicides nationwide at 2,717.  The marked increase 
in criminality and, especially, violent crimes over the past 
few months, has put pressure on President Saca and Governance 
(Gobernacion) Minister Rene Figueroa to "do something" to 
decrease violent crime rates and give the general population 
a greater sense of security.  As such, at the end of 
September President Saca ordered a modest reshuffle in the 
police hierarchy, geared towards improving results in the 
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of violent 
criminals, especially gang ("mara") members.  Among the most 
notable changes were the appointment of Deputy Police 
Commissioner Jose Luis Tobar Prieto, renowned for his police 
work in 2000-03 to reduce kidnappings, as Deputy Director of 
Investigations.  At the same time, Governance Minister 
Figueroa announced the creation of a special anti-homicide 
strategy and of a consultative interagency council to review 
options to reduce violent crime.  For its part, the Attorney 
General's Office (Fiscalia) also announced creation of a 
homicide investigation unit, composed of 15 deputy attorneys 
general dedicated solely to this issue. 
 
3.  (C) Despite GOES plans in recent years to reduce violent 
crime, including the "Mano Dura" and "Super Mano Dura" 
strategies aimed at the "maras," and recent organizational 
changes in the Police and Fiscalia to address the homicide 
problem, most key players in the justice sector acknowledge 
that the national homicide and overall crime rates continue 
to spiral out of control.  Many of these key players, 
however, often resort to finger pointing or simply blame the 
deportation of criminal "maras" from the U.S. for the spike 
in homicides.  For instance, during a recent meeting with 
Polcouns, National Security Council Director Oscar Bonilla 
(strictly protect) rejected claims by the National Police 
that up to 90 percent of violent crimes in El Salvador are 
committed by "mara" members.  In fact, Bonilla claimed, no 
more than 30 percent of such crimes are committed by "maras," 
but the Police and some high level government officials make 
that claim to deflect criticism of the GOES performance in 
providing security to the general population.  Bonilla added 
that the majority of homicides are committed by and among 
traditional criminal organizations and are generally related 
to drug trafficking.  Bonilla was critical of the police, but 
was equally critical of the Fiscalia, which, he claimed, 
suffered from internal disorganization, lacked focus, and was 
being directed by an Attorney General who had shown few 
results in his six years on the job.  Asked if he had shared 
these views with Saca, Bonilla responded affirmatively. 
(Note: As head of the National Security Council, an agency 
directly dependent on the Executive Branch, Bonilla reports 
directly to President Saca.  Bonilla has been a trusted and 
valuable Embassy contact of the past few years.  As a 
personal friend and confidant of President Saca, Bonilla has 
open access to the President, and can, and does, bypass other 
Saca confidants, when needed.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (C) Separately, during an October 13 lunch with DCM and 
Polcouns, Attorney General Belisario Artiga (strictly 
protect) vented openly about National Police Commissioner 
Ricardo Menesses, strongly implying that Menesses is corrupt 
and has enriched himself through his position as head of the 
police.  Artiga also stated that the police moved certain 
investigations forward, or delayed them, based on political 
motivations rather than the merits of the case, and referred 
to one recent money laundering investigation in which, he 
claimed, the police leaked vital information to the press. 
Artiga prescribed changes in the police hierarchy and opined 
that Menesses, at a minimum, had to be removed.  In contrast 
to Artiga's remarks, some two weeks ago PNC Counternarcotics 
Director Godofredo Miranda (strictly protect) went on at 
length with Polcouns about the lack of cooperation on 
counternarcotics and money laundering investigations by 
Artiga and the Fiscalia.  Miranda said that his unit worked 
diligently to prepare cases, and that, in most instances the 
Fiscalia either slowed movement on those cases or outright 
refused to prosecute.  Miranda attributed the government's 
less-than-stellar record on money laundering prosecutions and 
convictions on Artiga and his lack of commitment and 
leadership, though he acknowledged that uncommitted or 
corrupt judges also shared part of the blame. 
 
5.  (C) Artiga and Bonilla have also raised resource 
problems, understaffing, and the need for legislative reform 
as additional impediments to effectively combating crime.  In 
particular, both have pointed to the absence of a rules of 
evidence code and the fact that first instance judges have 
too much leeway in deciding whether to accept or throw out 
evidence which, in many cases, the police and Fiscalia 
consider perfectly admissible.  Likewise, Artiga and Bonilla 
have also argued that law enforcement is overwhelmed with 
cases, and that both the police and the Fiscalia are 
understaffed and largely untrained, especially in areas like 
money laundering investigations, which require a higher 
degree of sophistication.  Bonilla further cites distrust and 
lack of coordination between the Fiscalia and Police as 
another determining factor. 
 
6. (C)  Comment: President Saca and Minister Figueroa (who 
aspires to the presidency in the near future) are clearly 
concerned about the spiraling violent crime rate and its 
political implications.  It does not escape Saca and Arena 
that, in most recent polls, concern over crime and safety 
issues follows job creation and the economy as the next most 
important issue for respondents.  With key national elections 
coming up March 2006, Saca and ARENA know that they have to 
come up with a workable response to this spiraling crime 
rate, lest voters send them a signal at the polls.  With 
elections so close at hand, however, Saca will be reluctant 
to effect any major personnel changes for fear of creating a 
controversy that the FMLN and other opposition parties could 
use in the campaign. 
 
Barclay