US embassy cable - 05AMMAN8166

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 008166 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/I, NEA/I, AND NEA/ARPI 
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD 
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE 
CENTCOM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT 
CJCS FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES 
OSD FOR JON FERKO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, EFIN, IR, IZ, SY, JO 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND DELEGATION MEET WITH 
JORDANIAN OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS IRAQ 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: On October 9, S/I Ambassador Jeffrey and his 
delegation met with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Farouq 
Kasrawi, Finance Minister Adel Kodah, Chairman of the 
Jordanian Armed Forces General Khalid Sarairah, and General 
Intelligence Directorate chief Samih Asfoura.  The Jordanians 
pledged to continue urging other Arabs to upgrade ties with 
Iraq. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Accompanying Senior Advisor to the Secretary and 
Coordinator for Iraq Ambassador James Jeffrey and Charge 
were: Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt (Deputy Director, Plans 
and Policy-CENTCOM), Brigadier General Michael Jones (Deputy 
Director of Politico-Military Affairs-J5), Ambassador 
Christopher Ross (Senior Advisor for NEA/I), Jon Ferko 
(Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of Defense), Andrew Liepmann (Director, Office of 
Iraq Analysis), Larry McDonald (Director for Middle East and 
North Africa, US Department of Treasury), Charles Dunne 
(Director for Iraq, National Security Council), Christine 
Sanford (Special Assistant to Ambassador Jeffrey) and Maryz 
Habib (NEA/I Desk Officer). 
 
=================================== 
FM KASRAWI SHARES HIS VIEWS ON IRAQ 
=================================== 
 
3. (C) Amb. Jeffrey explained to Foreign Minister Farouq 
Kasrawi that the delegation was in the region in order to lay 
out for our partners the USG,s strategy for moving toward a 
democratic Iraq.  The U.S. recognized the importance of 
obtaining Iraqi Sunni Arabs, support for the draft 
constitution.  Iraq,s neighbors needed to help Iraq become 
free and stable.  He also explained that the USG was 
concerned over Iranian influence in Iraq.  Jeffrey closed by 
sharing the USG,s appreciation for Jordan,s assistance, 
including the training of new Iraqi security forces in Jordan. 
 
4. (C) Kasrawi said the GOJ was urging a strong relationship 
with Iraq and planned to strengthen ties further.  Kasrawi 
reported how, during the Arab foreign ministers, meeting in 
Jeddah October 2, he had worked to impress on to the other 
FMs the Arab states, interest in a positive outcome to the 
Iraqi political process.  He believed his efforts had met 
with success, and hoped that the momentum would continue. 
 
5. (C) Kasrawi said it was time to direct the international 
media,s attention away from U.S. forces, and toward Iraqis, 
own efforts.  A careful drawdown of coalition forces from 
Iraq would help; however, he agreed with Amb. Jeffrey that 
this had to be done with realistic benchmarks keyed to 
improvements in security, and not arbitrary deadlines. 
 
6. (C) Kasrawi believed that following the October 15 
referendum on the constitution, the Arab world must help 
Iraq,s three chief communities achieve reconciliation. 
Kasrawi saw the election of a moderate parliament in the 
December elections as an essential step toward further 
engagement of the Sunni Arabs. 
 
7. (C) When Jeffrey asked for Kasrawi,s ideas on 
reconciliation, the Minister pointed out the importance of 
countering Iran's considerable presence in Iraq.  Iran worked 
carefully, at all levels of society, to strengthen it 
influence sector by sector; Syria, by contrast, exerts it 
influence through insurgent fighters but has no other levers 
in Iraq.  Jeffrey commented that AL SecGen Amre Musa and the 
whole of the Arab League needed to watch closely the levels 
of Iranian influence in Iraq when explaining Shia interest in 
a &regional option8.  Jeffrey commented that many others 
felt that the political process must guard against giving the 
Kurds rights not afforded others, &a la Quebec8.  All three 
communities, but especially the Sunni Arabs, needed 
consideration.  Kasrawi then asked Jeffrey what the USG 
wanted Jordan to do.  Jeffrey said we needed the GOJ to 
encourage other Arab states to get more involved with Iraq, 
as Jordan is, and we wanted GOJ advice on how to approach 
other Arab states. 
 
8. (C) Kasrawi raised the issue of Jordan's Ambassador to 
Iraq.  The GOJ felt it was high time General Ahmad al-Lozi 
presented his credentials in Iraq, but security was a 
problem.  Perhaps he could present credentials and return to 
Jordan until a secure residence was found.  He said the GOJ 
would continue its outreach to Iraq, and continue to 
encourage others in the Arab World to do the same. 
 
9. (C) Turning again to Iran, Kasrawi said a way needed to be 
found to use &Arab Shi,a8 to counter "Persian Shi,a" 
inroads in Iraq.  Many in the Shi,a communities in states 
neighboring Iran "receive their instructions from Tehran." 
It would be better for Arab countries to create ties with as 
many of the Shi,a leaders as possible, and with Arab Shi,a 
tribal elements, to influence them into accepting a united 
Iraq.  This means finding Shi,a leaders who either reject 
Iranian-style theology, or who are "genuine Iraqis."  He 
mentioned Muqtada al-Sadr as a "wild card," but "attention 
should be paid to him and he should be brought into the 
process."  Kasrawi noted Jordan,s excellent embryonic 
relationship with Sistani.  He and his staff stressed the 
need to avoid ignoring other marja, leaders in the Iraqi 
Shi,a community. However, when his staffer seemed to suggest 
that this could go so far as to find &alternatives to 
Sistani8 (Comment: a theme seen in the past with Ayad 
Allawi, a frequent and respected visitor to Amman.  End 
Comment.) Jeffrey warned his interlocutors to be very careful 
about any effort in this direction. 
 
10. (C) Brigadier General Michael Jones expressed 
appreciation for Jordan,s support for the effort in Iraq, 
and briefed Kasrawi on the President,s October 6 message 
concerning the USG,s continued commitment in Iraq.  The USG 
is committed to staying the course in Iraq.  The transfer to 
Iraqi forces of full responsibility for security will 
continue deliberately; there will be no unrealistic 
deadlines.  The coalition transfer to Iraqi forces of sole 
responsibility for security, region by region, will be based 
on four factors: 1. the capability of local Iraqi units, 2. 
&enemy condition,8 meaning the Iraqis, ability to mount 
and organize concerted attacks against local insurgents, 3. 
the ability of the Iraqi government to provide basic services 
to the public, and 4. the capability of coalition forces to 
return to an area in an emergency.  Kasrawi concurred that 
artificial deadlines would be counterproductive.  BG Jones 
thanked the GOJ on behalf of the U.S. military for all of 
their efforts in fighting the war on terrorism, not just 
regarding Iraq. 
 
================================= 
KING REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON AL-SADR 
================================= 
 
11. (S) Amb. Jeffrey told Jordan's King Abdullah that the 
President had sent this delegation to six key Arab states to 
build support for Iraq, and to urge others to follow Jordan's 
lead.  It was necessary to signal to the Sunni Arabs in Iraq 
that the only way to bring Iraq together was on a democratic 
political basis.  Asked about Iraqi Sunni Arab attitudes to 
the USG, the King stressed that one of the first ways to 
increase confidence was to share with the Iraqi Sunni Arab 
leaders a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. It doesn't matter if 
that schedule is strictly adhered to, as long as the leaders 
can show their constituents that there is a plan for 
withdrawal. 
 
12. (S) The King questioned whether it was possible to 
rehabilitate Muqtada al-Sadr and draw him into the political 
mainstream as a counterweight to Iranian influence.  Before 
testing the waters further with al-Sadr )- a Sadr envoy had 
recently visited Amman and sent out significant feelers of a 
desire to work with moderate forces )- the King wanted a 
green light from the U.S.  Amb. Jeffrey was basically 
positive, with caveats.  He stated that it was key for Jordan 
and the U.S. to consult with one another regarding Al-Sadr. 
The USG has also reached out to al-Sadr's people, but one had 
to be very careful.  When al-Sadr wanted to be helpful, he 
was, but he could also cause trouble and was suspected of 
receiving Iranian monetary support.  The King and Amb. 
Jeffrey agreed that Jordan should continue to seek broad 
support against the insurgency, but exercise caution with 
specific individuals whose motives were not clear. 
 
13. (S) Asked about Syria, the King said that much depends on 
the Mehlis report.  The results could be damaging to 
President Asad.  Amb. Ross cautioned that the report might 
not finger Asad's closest family members, as had been 
speculated.  In turn, the King cautioned the delegation that 
the Syrians might attempt to appeal to Arab solidarity to 
resist pressure in response to the report.  He felt that he 
had already seen some wavering in Egypt and Saudi Arabia on 
this point.  It was agreed that the USG and GOJ should 
consult on this matter further, depending on the outcome of 
the report. 
 
=========================== 
SARAIRAH'S OPINIONS ON IRAQ 
=========================== 
 
14. (C) Jordanian Joint Chiefs chairman General Sarairah 
reviewed for the delegation the threats facing Jordan along 
its borders.  He made a plea for additional assistance in 
order for Jordan to strengthen its own border security. 
Sarairah then turned to terrorism, and the need for all Arab 
countries to put more pressure on Iran, Syria and Hezbollah 
to convince them that their continued support for terrorism 
was a threat to the entire region.  Sarairah observed that 
Iran continues to meddle in Iraqi internal affairs. 
 
========================================= 
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL COOPERATION WITH IRAQ 
========================================= 
 
15. (C) Members of the Jeffrey delegation and Finance 
Ministry officials discussed debt relief for Iraq, and areas 
where the GOJ could lend Iraq financial policy guidance. 
Amb. Jeffrey expressed USG gratitude for Jordan's "strong 
embrace" of a new Iraq.   Finance Ministry Secretary General 
Kasasbeh responded, "We are willing to do what Iraqis ask us. 
 We see them as a partner."  Additional cooperation might 
include technical assistance on banking, IMF financing, tax 
reform, and subsidy removal.  Kasasbeh pointed to Jordan,s 
graduation from IMF financial support, and a successful 
campaign to sell oil subsidy removals to the public, as 
examples that Iraq might emulate.  NOTE: Emboffs followed up 
with MinFin, and will provide Embassy Baghdad with 
documentation related to Jordan's program of removing oil 
subsidies.  END NOTE. 
 
16. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey asked that Jordan work to resolve 
the $1.35 billion debt Iraq owes Jordan in a manner that is 
consistent with the plan agreed between Iraq and the Paris 
Club, and make its effort known publicly.  SecGen Kasasbeh 
pledged cooperation, and Treasury representative Larry 
McDonald offered to check on whether repayment in-kind with 
Iraqi oil of 20% of the debt would violate Paris Club 
conditions.  COMMENT: While the Secretary General seemed 
willing to consider a debt reconciliation program, he does 
not speak authoritatively, and the proposal would have to 
overcome the objections of other stakeholders, all at a time 
of worsening macroeconomic conditions in Jordan.  The debt 
itself is held by the Central Bank of Jordan and includes 
some commercial claims.  In the face of declining aid and 
increasing oil prices, Jordan's own public debt may exceed 
the legally mandated cap of eighty percent of GDP currently 
projected for 2006.  END COMMENT. 
 
========================================== 
ASFOURA: SUNNIS MUST BE POLITICALLY ENGAGED 
========================================== 
 
17. (C) Samih Asfoura, Director of the General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID), said that the GID's work to engage the 
Sunnis in the upcoming elections had now shifted to preparing 
for the conference that the GOJ would host in November for 
influential Iraqis of all communities to discuss the outcome 
and next steps.  The GID frequently talked with persons from 
the three chief communities to convince them of the benefits 
of working together.  While all agreed that the Kurds were 
unique and should maintain regional autonomy, the Sunnis are 
against federalism for fear of being left out in the cold. 
 
18. (C) Once Iraq became more secure, Asfoura feared, the 
terrorists would leave Iraq and find another country to 
target.  Syria must be pressed to realign itself with the 
Arab world rather than with Iran and its anti-U.S. agenda. 
The USG needed to confront Syria directly in order to get its 
point across.  Any failure of the political process in Iraq 
would impact Syria domestically.  "If there is no peace in 
Iraq, we are all in danger.  Terrorism is as much our battle 
as it is yours, maybe more because when the U.S. leaves, we 
are still their neighbors." 
19. (C) COMMENT: The GOJ,s ideas on Iraq were generally 
consistent with our own.  Jordan is on board with increasing 
outreach, seeking more involvement on the part of other Arab 
governments, and in establishing a political system in Iraq 
that is moderate, democratic and pluralistic to reflect the 
tapestry that is Iraq. 
 
20. Ambassador Jeffrey cleared this cable. 
HALE