US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8010

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, CE, IN, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: MEA FORMULATING "MORE ACTIVE ROLE" IN SRI LANKAN 
PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 178108 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The MEA's Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka 
Anupam Ray told us that New Delhi is concerned about the 
deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka, and has decided the 
"time has come" for India to start "taking a higher profile 
in Sri Lanka."  The GOI does not, however, wish for a 
facilitation or mediation role in the conflict, nor does it 
want to join the Sri Lankan Co-Chairs Group, but it feels 
pressure from Sri Lankan political parties to look for other 
ways to make its presence felt.  In contrast, non-GOI Sri 
Lanka analysts in Delhi were doubtful that India would or 
should become more involved.  The MEA is reacting to a 
perceived need to step up its engagement in response to 
political challenges in Sri Lanka, but has not yet clearly 
formulated what kind of role it will take.  We will follow up 
as Indian thinking evolves.  End Summary. 
 
India Looking for a Higher Profile in Peace Process 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2.  (C) In a recent meeting to further explore Lakhdar 
Brahimi's statement (reftel) that India was seeking "a more 
active role" in Sri Lanka, MEA Deputy Secretary Anupam Ray 
was open about the Foreign Secretary's vision to take a 
higher profile in the peace process.  Noting that his country 
shares a two thousand year history with Sri Lanka, Ray 
lamented that India's Tamil population and close proximity to 
the conflict means that it can never disengage.  "Ever since 
India withdrew its peacekeeping force from Sri Lanka in 
1990," he reflected, "political parties there have been 
demanding for India to provide a guarantee its commitment to 
the peace process"  Ray opined that the peace process has 
deteriorated, LTTE leader Prabhakaran is more unpredictable 
than ever, and Norway has outlived its utility; thus the 
"time has come" for India to reengage.  India would prefer to 
wait until there is a "Sinhalese consensus about the outline 
of a solution," but the GOI "can't wait forever because 
Prabhakaran wants Tamil Eelam in his lifetime." 
 
3.  (C) Regarding India' future role, Ray was most clear that 
New Delhi "does not want to mediate or facilitate, just make 
it presence known."  India does not want to officially join 
the Co-chairs, but will take a more active role in the 
Donor's group.  When asked how the GOI planned to make its 
presence felt, given its already close defense cooperation 
with Sri Lanka, Ray predicted that India would begin by 
making clearer statements against LTTE violence and the need 
for a consensus on the peace process in the south.  Revealing 
what may be the true inspiration behind the change in policy, 
Ray worried that "if the GOI doesn't get its act together 
now, it will eventually be dragged into the process when 
things get worse." 
 
Sri Lanka Watchers Don't See Room for Greater GOI Role 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
4.  (U) New Delhi's non-GOI analysts of Sri Lanka uniformly 
believe that the GOI should not get more involved in the 
peace process.   P. Sahadevan, an Associate Professor 
covering Sri Lanka at Jawaharlal Nehru University commented 
that India's current approach, which he generally described 
as  supporting Sri Lankan sovereignty and minority rights 
while allowing military cooperation with the GSL, has paid 
off with enhanced relations with Colombo.  In his opinion, 
the "increasingly pragmatic" GOI won't want to risk these 
relations by taking any sort of lead in this "mess." 
Acknowledging that Sinhalese groups such as the SLFP, JVP and 
UNP view the GOI as anti-LTTE and call for a greater Indian 
role, Sahadevan does not see any Indian leader who has the 
political will or capability to involve the government in 
this conflict.  He also warned against increasing military 
cooperation with the GSL, which he feared could lead to 
greater "chauvinism within the GSL" and further scuttle the 
peace process. 
 
5.  (U) Prabhakaran biographer and Indo-Asian News Service 
journalist M.R. Narayan Swamy also questioned an Indian role 
in the peace process.  He explained that political parties in 
Sri Lanka claim that India has a "moral duty" to be part of a 
solution in light of its past military involvement in the 
1980s, and that obligation has grown stronger "in the last 
two years, as people in both countries realize the Cease Fire 
Agreement is not the end of the problem."  He speculated that 
FM Kadirgamar's assassination has "woken up the sleeping 
elephant," and India is unsure how to respond.  He commented 
that India's clear stand against the LTTE since Rajiv 
Gandhi's assassination precludes it from ever taking a 
mediator's role.  "If India assumes that its involvement will 
necessarily facilitate a solution, then it is wrong," Narayan 
Swamy concluded emphatically. 
 
6.  (U) Mohan Tikku, a Senior Fellow studying Sri Lanka at 
the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, also does not foresee 
a greater role for India in the peace process.  As a result 
of India's negative experience with the Indian Peacekeeping 
Force (IPKF) and the LTTE's assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi, 
the GOI is not an unbiased actor in Sri Lanka.  Therefore, 
Tikku noted, India has no leverage with the LTTE and should 
not strive for any type of diplomatic role.  The SLFP, UNP 
and JVP may want India to become more involved, but Tamil 
parties are "deeply suspect" of New Delhi's intentions. 
Tamil politics in South India, which have thus far prevented 
the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Sri 
Lanka, would make it even more difficult for the GOI to go in 
on the GSL's side in the conflict.  Tikku worried that any 
Indian role would be overtly biased against the LTTE, and 
would give the GSL greater confidence to return to 
hostilities. 
 
Norwegians in Delhi Weigh in on India's Involvement 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7.  (C) Norwegian Charge Lasse Bjorn Johannessen emphasized 
that India's recent actions have indicated that it does not 
look to play a more active role in Sri Lanka.  Lasse 
indicated that there was no formal response to a Norwegian 
demarche earlier this summer requesting the GOI to "take on 
more constructive involvement" in the conflict.  After being 
invited to the Co-Chairs meeting along the sidelines of UNGA, 
India never showed up.  As further proof, he described the 
difficulties the Norwegian government faced trying to get the 
GOI on the phone after the Kadirgamar assassination.  He 
wearily commented that Norway welcomes a greater Indian role, 
but thus far have seen no indications to this effect. 
 
Comment:  The Will, But Not The Way 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Sri Lanka has reappeared on the GOI list of regional 
priorities, but the MEA is still in the initial stages of 
formulating a policy to deal with a strained peace process. 
India's Free Trade Agreement, defense cooperation and its 
tsunami assistance to Sri Lanka have yielded its best 
 
SIPDIS 
regional relationship with Colombo.  While some of India's 
neighbors prefer that New Delhi mind its own business in 
South Asia, the GOI perceives a genuine need and desire from 
Sri Lanka for it to become more involved.  As India 
contemplates its role in Sri Lanka, it must take into 
consideration the difficulties presented by New Delhi 
analysts and decide how it can be most helpful to its 
southern neighbor.  We will closely follow Indian thinking as 
it evolves. 
 
9.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE