US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6255

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND TALAFAR: A GOOD NEWS STORY, MOSTLY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5221 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. ANKARA 5452 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C/REL GBR, AUS) Thanks to the efforts of our colleagues 
in Iraq, Embassy Ankara was able to work effectively to blunt 
negative public and policymaker opinion regarding the 
operations in Talafar last month.  Turks are particularly 
sensitive about Talafar, a predominantly Turkmen city in 
northwest Ninewah province.  They claim a kinship bond with 
the Turkmen there, and twice brought Turkmen delegations here 
(per the Turkish MFA) to try to persuade them to cooperate 
with the ITG and CF. 
 
2. (C/REL GBR, AUS) One year ago, in September 2004, CF 
operations in Talafar brought U.S.-Turkey relations to the 
boiling point.  The Turkish press ran negative, distorted, 
and blatantly throughout the operation.  At the height of the 
operation, FonMin Gul threatened to cut off all GOT support 
for OIF (fuel shipments over Habur Gate, use of Incirlik Air 
Base).  During the most recent operation, in September 2005, 
our colleagues in Iraq (both civilian and military) provided 
us with real-time, detailed, classified-but-releasable 
information on the operation that we could pass to Turkish 
government and military contacts.  This helped us keep the 
temperature down among policymakers, and (indirectly) in the 
press. 
 
3. (C/REL GBR, AUS) Turkish press coverage of this Talafar 
operation was relatively credible.  The papers did publish 
ridiculous claims that CF were using chemical weapons, 
committing mass rape, etc.  In contrast to Sept. 2004, 
however, the papers attributed these claims to specific 
Turkmen sources, rather than just stating the claims as fact. 
 A number of stories were relatively neutral.  Some even 
quoted official U.S. sources on the operation.  It was clear 
to us that Turkish officials were prevailing upon the press 
to demonstrate some restraint. 
 
4. (C/REL GBR, AUS) While we understand FonMin Gul did raise 
Talafar briefly during his Sept. 21 meeting with the 
Secretary, the GOT maintained a much lower profile on this 
 
SIPDIS 
issue this time around.  In Ankara, no one above the MFA 
Director General level raised it with us.  Both MFA and TGS 
contacts repeatedly expressed thanks for the information we 
were able to pass them on the operation.  Additionally -- 
despite the regrettable decision by the Turkish Red Crescent 
to complain to the press (ref b) -- Turkish officials have 
characterized their delivery of humanitarian assistance to 
Talafar as a success. 
 
5. (C/REL GBR, AUS) There are too many colleagues in Iraq for 
us to be able to thank individually for assisting us in this 
effort to keep the Turks informed and thus on the 
reservation.  But we do want to single out David Alley of REO 
Mosul.  David was in Talafar for much of the operation, 
providing us with timely updates and briefings.  He was 
patient with and responsive to our frequent requests for 
information.  Our hats are off to David and to all our 
colleagues -- both uniformed and civilian -- for all you are 
doing in Iraq. 
MCELDOWNEY