US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6251

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ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN TURKEY'S PARLIAMENT

Identifier: 05ANKARA6251
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA6251 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-10-14 12:50:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL TU CY Avian Influenza Virus
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, CY, Avian Influenza Virus 
SUBJECT: ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN 
TURKEY'S PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6229 
 
     B. 2003 ANKARA 6303 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Although EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn 
recently urged Turkey to ratify the Ankara Agreement 
extension protcol as soon as possible (ref A), the GOT still 
has made no decision on when to send the protocol to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).  The GOT, initially 
intent on sending Turkey's declaration of non-recognition of 
the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) for ratification with the 
protocol, now appears to be re-thinking that strategy. 
Regardless, the protocol faces a tough TGNA fight.  No one is 
yet predicting defeat, but the battle lines are still not 
fully drawn, and at least some of PM Erdogan's ruling AK 
party MPs will defect and vote against it.  Erdogan can 
minimize defections by insisting on an open TGNA vote.  End 
Summary. 
 
GOT Undecided About When to Submit Protocol 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Despite Rehn's strong urgings to PM Erdogan and FM 
Gul, the GOT has not yet decided when to submit the Ankara 
Agreement extension protocol (extending the Customs Union to 
all 25 members, including the ROC) to the TGNA for 
ratification.  FM Gul told reporters on October 11 that 
ratification of the protocol is not "an urgent issue."  Asked 
about ratification October 13, Chief EU negotiator Babacan 
told reporters, "necessary steps will be taken when the time 
comes."  Main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) Vice 
Chair for Foreign Relations Onur Oymen tells us his party 
favors delaying ratification because the Turkish public is 
currently angry over EU Cyprus-related demands on Turkey; 
Oymen says delay will calm the debate. 
 
3.  (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman told 
visiting EUR/SE Director on October 12 that Gul's statement 
reflects the difficult position the GOT is in on the 
protocol.  Asked whether the GOT will await European 
Parliament (EP) approval before submitting it to the TGNA, 
Bilman said the "idea has surfaced."  He added that the GOT 
faces a "chicken and egg" problem, since the EP is awaiting 
word from Turkey on whether Turkey's declaration of 
non-recognition of Cyprus will be submitted for ratification 
together with the protocol. 
 
Will Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration Be Submitted? 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  (C) When we had spoken to him on October 7, Bilman had 
assumed without question that the non-recognition declaration 
would be submitted with the protocol for TGNA ratification, 
adding that otherwise the protocol would not pass.  MFA DDG 
for economic relations with the EU Yenel told EUR/SE Director 
the same thing October 11, though he acknowledged the EU did 
not want the non-recognition declaration attached.  However, 
the GOT may be changing its approach.  Asked the same 
question in his October 12 meeting with EUR/SE Director, 
Bilman (the MFA's Cyprus authority) said the GOT is now 
examining "all options." 
 
5.  (C) Bilman speculated the TGNA could add its own 
declaration.  CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Oymen told us he 
proposes that the TGNA add its own reservation specifying 
that the protocol would not be implemented as to Cyprus until 
there is an overall settlement. 
 
Worries About Defections Among Ruling Party MPs 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (U) Ratification of the protocol requires a majority of 
MPs present during the vote.  Of 550 MPs, Erdogan and Gul's 
ruling AK party has 355; main opposition CHP 155; Motherland 
Party (ANAP) 21; other parties and independents 15; four 
seats are vacant. 
 
7.  (C) Bilman, a frequent participant in high-level Cyprus 
meetings, has told us privately for weeks that PM Erdogan and 
FM Gul are deeply worried about defections among their own 
AKP MPs when the protocol comes up for ratification.   Bilman 
reiterated those concerns October 12. 
 
8.  (C) According to Bilman, Gul returned from an October 2 
meeting with all AKP MPs "a changed man," wondering whether 
he could push the protocol through without "breaking the 
party."  According to Bilman, Gul received a "warning" from 
AKP MPs that further Turkish concessions on Cyprus without 
any move from the Greek Cypriots risks a split in AKP. 
Publicly, in an October 7 television interview, Gul predicted 
the extension protocol would pass -- but refused to give a 
"guarantee." 
 
No One Predicting Defeat -- Yet 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) MPs from AKP's different factions, as well as MPs 
from other parties, academics and journalists have given us 
mixed predictions about how tough a fight the protocol will 
face in the TGNA.  None of our interlocutors, even those 
opposed to the protocol, has yet predicted the protocol will 
be defeated, but the real battle lines will be drawn only 
after the MFA submits the protocol to the TGNA.  All expect 
tough debate, spurred by main opposition CHP.  An 
extra-parliamentary so-called Cyprus "National Experts 
Group," which includes former PM Ecevit and Rauf Denktash, 
has already turned up the heat with an October 9 letter to 
all MPs urging a "no" vote on the protocol. 
 
10.  (C) Everyone expects defections among AKP MPs, 
particularly nationalist MPs, but estimates vary.  Some MPs 
and other contacts predict easy ratification, with fewer than 
a dozen defections; others anticipate significant defections; 
some go so far as to predict the vote could provoke an AK 
party split.  Submitting the protocol for ratification 
without also submitting Turkey's declaration on 
non-recognition of Cyprus, contacts stress, will increase the 
number of defections. 
 
11.  (C) A small group of dissident CHP MPs -- five to 10 -- 
will probably defy party leader Baykal and vote yes.  The 
newly-formed ANAP parliamentary group (septel) has not 
announced its position; we expect at least some of its 21 MPs 
will vote in favor. 
 
12.  (C) Some AK MPs and others with whom we spoke understand 
that rejection of the protocol would deal a near-fatal blow 
to Turkey's EU aspirations.  The AKP Vice Chair of the TGNA 
Foreign Affairs Committee told us that despite his misgivings 
about the protocol, he is loathe to vote against it and end 
Turkey's EU aspirations.  CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair 
Oymen is a notable exception; he thinks Turkey's EU candidacy 
can survive TGNA rejection of the protocol -- unless, in his 
words, the EU is seeking an "excuse" to exclude Turkey. 
 
Watch How the TGNA Vote is Taken 
-------------------------------- 
 
13.  (U) The manner in which the TGNA vote is conducted will 
influence the number of AKP defections.  TGNA ratification 
votes are normally open; however, if more than half the MPs 
present agree, the vote can be secret.  The March 2003 vote 
that defeated a motion to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey 
en route to Iraq was a secret vote, allowing MPs to defy 
AKP's stated support for the measure with impunity. 
 
14.  (C) AKP leaders must also have to decide whether or not 
to make a parliamentary "group decision" to impose party 
discipline and require AK MPs to vote yes.  AKP did not take 
a group decision in the March 2003 vote.  AKP is still 
undecided on a group decision on the protocol vote. 
 
15.  (C) Erdogan, who avoids group decisions because of his 
professed support for internal party democracy, could 
accomplish the same objective by making his wishes known and 
having an open vote.  Defiant AKP MPs would face Erdogan's 
wrath.  Erdogan employed this tactic in the October 2003 TGNA 
vote over sending Turkish troops to Iraq (reftel), which 
resulted in overwhelming approval. 
 
16.  (C) Comment:  Debate on the extension protocol is not 
yet fully joined, and intervening events in the EU and on 
Cyprus could affect the outcome.  In any event, PM Erdogan 
will have to expend significant domestic political capital to 
gain TGNA approval.  Given how crucial the EU accession 
process is to Erdogan's government, and how crucial the 
protocol is to the EU, he will do so.  However, his price 
will be upping the ante with the EU on future Cyprus-related 
issues.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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