US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6245

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, TU, PHUM 
SUBJECT: SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY ACTIVIST ON PKK AND GOT'S 
POLICY TOWARD KURDS 
 
 
(U) Classified by Embassy Ankara A/DCM Thomas Goldberger, 
E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This message is from Consulate Adana. 
 
2. (C)  Summary:  Diyarbakir Human Rights Association 
President Selahattin Demirtas reflects the views of many 
Consulate regional contacts regarding recent increased PKK 
activities in the Southeast.  He believes that both the PKK 
and the military are carrying on against each other in a 
&calculated manner,8 and that hatred against the Kurds is 
increasing in Turkey, but denies any broad nationwide support 
for the PKK.  He supports the rise of a pro-Kurdish political 
party, but believes that the newly organized DSM is not up to 
the task due to their members, closeness to the PKK, coupled 
with a lack of experience.  Demirtas believes that, due to 
miscalculations within the PM,s inner circle, the military 
was allowed to scuttle the PM,s Kurdish initiative, leaving 
people in the Southeast with little expectation of follow 
through on the PM,s August 12 speech.  He fears the GoT,s 
use of maximalist interpretations of the criminal code to 
intimidate regional political players, such as DEHAP leaders 
in Adana, Van and Cizre.  Demirtas would like to see a longer 
PKK cease-fire with more democratization and better GOT 
preparation for some kind of conditional or partial amnesty 
for PKK cadres.  Comment:  We find Demirtas, approach to the 
problems besetting the region to be among the most thoughtful 
and well-reasoned of the many that we heard during our 
multiple visits to southeast Turkey over the past month.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
3. (C) During a September 27 meeting with ConOffs, attorney 
and Diyarbakir Human Rights Association President Selahattin 
Demirtas echoed the views of other Consulate contacts in the 
region regarding recent increased PKK activities in southeast 
Turkey.  Demirtas said that although their aim was not to 
start a broad conflict as in the 1990,s, both the PKK and 
the military are carrying on against each other in a 
8calculated manner,8 even while the social and political 
effects of their actions are more effective than they were 
during the 1990,s.  Citing the surge of nationalism 
nationwide, increasing MHP activity and recent incidents 
involving the Turkish flag, Demirtas said that hatred against 
the Kurds is increasing in the country, creating more ethnic 
separation than ever.  He added that those who are supporting 
the PKK are having a significant effect among Kurdish 
politicians, especially DEHAP and now DSM circles. 
 
4. (C) The central dilemma, as Demirtas sees it, is that the 
Kurds are fed up with violence and oppressive GoT policies, 
yet there was little chance that the GoT would abandon its 
"assimilation policies," since it has too much at stake in 
maintaining the status quo.  Demirtas outlined for ConOffs a 
twisted common cause of work between the Army and the PKK 
wherein if the PKK were to give up its weapons the military 
would lose power.  In this way, said Demirtas, both sides 
justified their dangerous activities to their respective 
internal audiences as &reasonable vices.8 
 
5. (C) Demirtas doubts that there is broad nationwide support 
for the PKK, saying &only 20-30 percent of Kurds support the 
PKK, but roughly 50 percent of Kurds in the southeastern 
Turkey support them.8  For this reason, Demirtas supports 
the rise of a political party to keep the Kurdish, 
southeastern Turkey agenda on the national stage.  Still he 
underlined that the DSM was not that party.  He added that 
the DSM,s members are ill-experienced and too close to the 
PKK to be constructive political players. 
 
6. (C) Demirtas laid out for ConOffs a recent dynamic that 
illustrated the confusion regarding GoT policy toward the 
Kurds:  The PM told a foreign reporter in a recent interview 
that he had had discussions within his own circles regarding 
the Kurdish initiative and thought he had gotten the Turkish 
General Staff,s &green light,8 but the PM miscalculated by 
raising the political aspects of the new initiative first, as 
opposed to the military's preference for social-economic 
development first and the political approach later.  As a 
result, TGS CHOD General Ozkok made speeches warning against 
&ethnic nationalism8 and calling for  &societal 
solidarity8 in Van, Diyarbakir and Adana in mid-September, 
wherein he undercut the PM,s proposals.  Dialogue on the 
issue then returned back to Ankara for further internal GOT 
deliberations, where it appears to be stalled.  Demirtas 
emphasized that people in southeastern Turkey now see little 
likelihood of follow through on the PM,s August 12 speech. 
 
7. (C) Furthermore, Demirtas sees GoT Justice officials using 
maximalist interpretations of the criminal code to try to 
intimidate regional political players, pointing to regionwide 
arrests of former DEHAP leaders in Adana, Nusaybin, Van and 
Mardin.  He recalled that the TGS had called for more tools 
to combat the PKK after passage of a new criminal law, 
leading to a quick drafting of new anti-terror legislation. 
The Justice Minister then had re-directed this legislation by 
exhorting prosecutors to use existing criminal code authority 
in a maximalist fashion; hence the DEHAP arrests in which 
even the display of a PKK flag, use of the name &Apo8 or 
&Ocalan,8 or display of Ocalan,s picture is defined as 
incitement to violence punishable by five years of 
imprisonment. 
 
8. (C) When asked what he thought would happen next, Demirtas 
exclaimed that &sadly, now that we are seeing an increase in 
the number of corpses and funerals associated with the 
(GoT,s) battle with the PKK, a new, multi-year cooling off 
period may be necessary to bring greater calm.  Emotions and 
ill-will have been raised to high levels again.8  &We need 
a long cease-fire now, with more democratization and real GOT 
preparation for some sort of conditional, partial amnesty,8 
said Demirtas. 
 
9. (C) What would an amnesty look like?  Demirtas said that 
it would be &something like a surrender to Turkish 
authorities.  Then judges would start a formal legal process 
under which former PKK cadres would be found subject to the 
law and placed under a probationary process wherein for a 
certain number of years he or she would be prohibited from 
participating in politics, and could not enjoy certain public 
services and must lead a peaceful life.8  Demirtas thought 
that such an amnesty should last &maybe five years,8 but 
the opportunity for using this type of amnesty as a 
reconciliation tool has been postponed by renewed violence. 
&Public opinion is too stirred up now,8 said Demirtas.  He 
also cautioned that the terminology used in any new amnesty 
would be very important, recalling how the PKK leadership had 
been alienated by the last &return home8 law,s use of 
&repentance,8 which GoT prosecutors considered an essential 
element to generate Turkish public support for the law to 
gain popular legitimacy, but PKK leaders considered this a 
requirement for potential former cadres to deny the 
&validity of their struggle.8  This philosophical 
divergence of perception married with &extremist use of 
required public statements of confession in some Southeast 
provinces undermined the prospects of the last amnesty-like 
efforts,8 said Demirtas. 
 
10. (C) Bio note:  Demirtas, a Zaza speaker and former U.S. 
international visitor program participant,  has a one-year 
old daughter; his wife is a teacher in rural Diyarbakir.  He 
may serve his required military service this year. 
MCELDOWNEY