US embassy cable - 02ANKARA8079

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TURKEY: CHP ELECTION POSTMORTEM

Identifier: 02ANKARA8079
Wikileaks: View 02ANKARA8079 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2002-11-08 12:25:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR TU POLITICAL PARTIES
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, TU, POLITICAL PARTIES 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHP ELECTION POSTMORTEM 
 
REF: ANKARA 7766 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass.  Reason: 1.5(b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Nov. 3 Parliamentary elections were a 
major defeat for CHP at the hands of AK.  Although CHP joins 
AK as one of only two parties in Parliament, CHP officials 
and activists are deeply disappointed by their distant 
second-place finish.  Much of the blame has been placed on 
CHP leader Baykal, who failed to overcome a reputation for 
"factionalist" divisiveness, and star CHP candidate Kemal 
Dervis.  The CHP suffered from its image as a party of an 
elite Establishment out of touch with the average, more 
conservative Turkish voter.  A chastened CHP in Parliament 
will have a chance to demonstrate its willingness to 
refashion the party along more social democratic and less 
overtly Kemalist lines.  End Summary. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Failure Disguised as Success 
---------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Deniz Baykal's effort to emphasize the successful 
return of his Republican Peoples' Party (CHP) to Parliament 
on Nov. 3 belies what is widely acknowledged to be CHP's 
trouncing at the hands of the Islam-influenced Justice and 
Development (AK) Party (reftel).  After three years in the 
political wilderness, CHP returned to the legislature with 
19.3% of the vote, 178 seats, and as the sole opposition 
party.  Nevertheless, the election results were met with 
shock, disbelief, and disappointment at CHP headquarters, 
where many had expected the party to capture the 25%-30% of 
the vote traditionally apportioned to left-of center parties 
in Turkey.  CHP blew some significant advantages.  Turkish 
observers point out that although the party had long been 
preparing for elections, was not tainted with the previous 
Parliament's perceived failings, had no center-left 
challengers to its position as champion of the Establishment 
and "alternative" to AK, it fell short of the 20% mark. 
 
 
3. (C) Much of the blame has been directed at Baykal and 
former state minister Kemal Dervis, CHP's star candidate. 
Offering a representative views, Former Deputy Speaker of 
Parliament and Democratic Left Party (DSP) Izmir deputy 
Atilla Mutman acknowledged to poloff that while voters had 
lost faith in P.M. Ecevit's DSP, they stayed home on election 
day rather than vote for a Baykal widely regarded as 
quarrelsome and "factionalist."  Former Independent (earlier 
DSP) Ankara deputy Uluc Gurkan also pointed to Baykal's 
unpopularity, as well as to CHP's generally weak candidate 
list.  Gurkan marveled that CHP's vote barely surpassed AK by 
even 1.4% in Ankara's First District, a normally center-left 
stronghold.  On Nov 8. a former staffer at the Turkish NSC, 
now with a Istanbul-based think tank, echoed to us comments 
from numerous observers that Dervis' candidacy had played 
poorly in the rural Anatolian heartland, and was in his view 
the key reason for CHP's defeat. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Comment: The New Face of Fundamentalism? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) Though CHP finished first in only 12 of Turkey's 81 
provinces, the leadership appears baffled by Turkish voters' 
decision to opt for AK over the party of Ataturk.  Where in 
other countries the left prides itself on its role as 
champions of the oppressed or the have-nots, the 
"respectable" left in Turkey has largely become the 
standard-bearer of the elite widely regarded as out of touch 
with, and in some cases even hostile to, ordinary Turks. 
(When invited to an Ramazan iftar (fast-breaking) dinner in 
honor of departing poloff, newly elected CHP Ankara deputy 
Yilmaz Ates declined, noting that he does not fast and so in 
principle does not attend "these kinds of events.") 
 
 
5. (C) Despite its failings, CHP is in Parliament, and thus 
has a chance to demonstrate its willingness to refashion 
itself along more social democratic and less Kemalist lines. 
For now, Baykal is promising to work constructively with the 
next (AK) government.  After meeting with President Sezer on 
Nov. 7 Baykal declared that CHP will support amending the 
constitution's Art. 76 -- which could pave the way for the 
restoration of Erdogan's political rights.  Meanwhile, the 
Kemalist "Cumhuriyet" daily, CHP's de facto mouthpiece, 
sought to reassure Establishment voters through Nov. 7 
headlines trumpeting the reactivation of the "West Working 
Group" -- which was in the forefront of the "February 28 
Process" under which the Islamist-led government of Prime 
Minister Erbakan was ousted in 1997.  The key question is 
whether Baykal, aware of the voters' desire for change, will 
allow his pragmatic streak to prevail over the combative 
traits and Establishment pressures that, over time, may 
encourage him to sharpen differences between a "secularist" 
CHP and the "Islamic" AK. 
PEARSON 

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