US embassy cable - 05ISLAMABAD15463

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 015463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, MASS, PK 
SUBJECT: POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM DISASTER RESPONSE 
 
REF: ISLAMABAD 15316 
 
Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, d 
 
1. (C) Summary: The GOP and the Pakistan military have faced 
substantial media and public criticism, much of it 
unjustified, for their perceived ineffectiveness in 
earthquake response.  Musharraf's public address on October 
12, a damage control exercise, was overshadowed by continued 
media images, interviews, and commentary on victims who are 
still without meaningful assistance.  The opposition parties, 
sensing a vulnerability, have joined the attacks and sought 
to portray themselves as constructive players in national 
relief efforts.  With damage concentrated in Azad Kashmir and 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP), there is a near term 
possibility that resentment at the central government may 
fuel the Kashmiri independence movement and Pashtun 
nationalist calls for increased provincial autonomy.  Over 
the medium-term, however, if reconstruction efforts are 
adequately funded and executed in these areas, government 
authority and credibility may be enhanced.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) International aid agencies and NGOs believe that the 
GOP and the Pakistan military have conducted a largely 
credible relief operation despite significant logistical 
challenges and infrastructure limitations.  This assessment 
is not widely shared in the Pakistani public or media. 
Images and stories of victims in dire need continue to flood 
the pages and television screens of an increasingly skeptical 
public.  Reported verbal abuse of Pakistani military and 
government personnel arriving in affected villages, coupled 
with stories and images of desparate survivors looting relief 
convoys and distribution points, adds to the perception of 
government paralysis.  The media has been demonstrating that 
it is completely free, but less than fully responsible.  For 
example, local journalists stationed at Chaklala Airbase in 
Islamabad report a chaotic scene, with the Pakistani military 
unable to prioritize assistance missions for timely delivery 
of aid and no visible decisionmaking chain-of-command.  In 
fact, the whole operation at Chaklala is running well, as the 
international media seems to be portraying today.  The 
absence of an effective media/public relations strategy 
within the GOP, coupled with the military's long-standing 
reluctance to provide operational information to journalists, 
plays into the hands of critics.  The Ambassador joined the 
Pakistan Army's air chief at Chaklala this morning for a 
Pakistan TV interview to set the record straight. 
 
3. (C) To blunt criticism of GOP relief operations, President 
Musharraf addressed the nation on October 13.  While the 
speech contained some detail on military relief operations 
and praised international donor assistance, most commentators 
remained unmoved.  Media analysts charged that Musharraf came 
across as defensive when he articulated logistical challenges 
in aid delivery and appeared to open the military to 
additional criticism when he stated that 72-hours had been 
necessary to arrange for full mobilization. 
 
4. (C) Nevertheless, Musharraf himself has been generally 
viewed in a favorable light during the crisis.  He continues 
to project an aura of leadership in meetings with foreign 
officials and relief workers and during well-publicized tours 
of the earthquake zone.  His astute political decision to 
create, in relatively short order, military and civilian 
relief cells that answer to others in the GOP, may allow him 
to shift future blame to other institutions, particularly the 
Prime Minister's Office and the military command. 
 
5. (C) Prime Minister Aziz's image has suffered, despite 
tours of the earthquake zone and significant personal 
monetary donations.  Aziz lacks the leadership persona of 
Musharraf and has frequently seemed overwhelmed.  The Prime 
Minister is not helped by a bureaucracy that has done little 
other than designing numerous organigrams for relief 
operations and establishing multiple cabinet-level relief 
committees, few of which have delivered results.  The public 
perception has been of a Prime Minister (and government) 
involved in endless meetings while victims suffer.  Aziz, who 
has faced opposition within his party and government almost 
from the day he assumed office, may well end up as the 
government's scapegoat. 
 
6. (C) The public welcomed the decision to appoint the 
military as lead agency for disaster response, but had 
unrealistic expectations of its capabilities.  (Note:  The 
military has always enjoyed a much higher level of trust than 
the civilian bureaucracy.)  The slow pace of relief delivery, 
an inevitable result of the scope of the disaster and the 
inaccessability of the terrain, undermined confidence. 
Military personnel in the disaster zone have been verbally 
abused, and commanders are under constant media scrutiny. 
General Farooq, the military's Disaster Relief Coordinator 
has explained publicly and privately that the area of 
devestation coincided with the area of the army's deployment 
in Kashmir leading to significant military casualties that 
hindered its rapid response capability. 
 
7. (C) The media has carried positive stories of the 
opposition (both secular and Islamist) dispatching relief 
supplies and assistance teams to the affected areas.  The 
decision to conduct relief efforts independently through the 
parties' existing charitable foundations arguably sacrifices 
efficiency in an effort to gain political advantage.  In 
contrast, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League's decision to 
focus its efforts on the President's Relief Fund has 
inextricably linked its efforts with the GOP.  The 
opposition's decision to refrain from vocal criticism of GOP 
efforts has allowed its leadership to appear constructive 
players.  NWFP Chief Minister Durrani's decision to attend, 
for the first time, the National Security Council meeting on 
October 12 to discuss earthquake relief allowed parties to 
seem above partisan squabbling. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  The most severely earthquake-impacted areas, 
Kashmir and the NWFP, viewed themselves as isolated from the 
central government prior to this tragedy.  The GOP has 
steadfastly maintained the fiction of an autonomous Azad 
Kashmir government and in the NWFP calls for increased 
political autonomy are a well-established tradition.  In the 
near-term, public unhappiness over the relief effort could 
fuel both Pashtun and Kashmiri nationalist movements and give 
additional platforms to their principal advocates the Awami 
National Party (ANP), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman, 
and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front.  However, over the 
medium term, if reconstruction efforts are adequately funded 
and executed, the GOP is likely to weather the storm and may 
come out ahead.  Indeed, a massive, GOP-led reconstruction 
effort could ultimately help bind both regions more tightly 
to Pakistan.  End Comment. 
CROCKER