US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1469

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001469 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EZ 
SUBJECT: TSA ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR GRANT VISITS PRAGUE TO 
EXAMINE CZECH PREPAREDNESS FOR A TERRORIST ATTACK 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  TSA Assistant Administrator Nicholas 
Grant recently visited Prague to discuss the lessons learned 
in the simulated terrorist attack on Prague's public 
transportation system on September 22. Grant found a 
sophisticated and competent emergency response system, but 
identified some jurisdictional issues that need to be worked 
out between GOCR authorities and the City of Prague.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U) In the wake of the July terrorist attacks in London, 
Czech Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek ordered a complete 
simulation of a similar attack in Prague in order to assess 
and improve Czech capabilities to respond to such an attack. 
The simulation took place on September 22 and featured three 
nearly simultaneous challenges: a subway bombing, a train 
bombing between stations on the outskirts of Prague, and a 
suspicious package containing a bomb at a train station in 
the city. The simulation took place overnight to minimize 
disruption to the city. 
 
3.  (SBU) On October 3, TSA Assistant Administrator Grant met 
with a national official from the Fire & Rescue Service of 
the Czech Ministry of Interior to discuss the simulation. 
Deputy Fire Service Director Vaclav Muchna described the 
three attack scenarios. The largest was an explosion in a 
subway car 41 meters underground. Two hundred passengers were 
present, with 15 dead and 39 seriously wounded. All wounds 
were graphically depicted using techniques similar to those 
used in the motion picture industry. Wounded passengers were 
played by medical students to ensure symptoms were simulated 
accurately. In the midst of the response to this scenario, 
the next attack was announced: authorities learned that a 
suspicious package had been found at a train station, forcing 
responders to manage an evacuation and a bomb disposal 
operation while responding to the initial subway attack. Just 
as the national integrated emergency response system brought 
extra assets from surrounding regions into the city to 
assist, the exercise managers announced the third attack: a 
train had exploded in one of the areas just depleted of 
responders. Those arriving on the scene found a train car 
(which had actually been blown up for the exercise) filled 
with 22 "dead" passengers and many more wounded. 
 
4.  (SBU) Assistant Administrator Grant also met with a city 
official, Prague Assistant Mayor Michal Kopecky, to discuss 
the city's participation in the exercise. Kopecky said that 
City Hall officials felt the simulation was not sufficiently 
realistic because it did not include much of the 
decision-making the city would be responsible for in a real 
crisis. He explained that Prague has an emergency response 
operations center, which is integrated into several CCTV 
systems across the city. In a real crisis, Kopecky claimed, 
the city would be in charge, and would be directing the large 
scale efforts to engage the public and minimize the impact of 
the attacks. (Comment: Fire Service personnel had 
acknowledged that these areas were not part of the exercise 
plan, but cited the Prime Minister's short three-week 
planning cycle for the exercise as the primary reason for 
this omission. They indicated that the normal planning cycle 
was six months. End comment). 
 
5.  (SBU) Lessons learned. The Czech emergency integrated 
response system performed well, even when faced with 
challenges deliberately designed to undermine it. Fire 
Service, Police, and Ambulance units are accustomed to 
working together on a daily basis, and the increased tempo of 
the exercise did not expose weaknesses in this area. The 
national emergency communications system allowed the 
emergency services to draw units from regions around Prague 
to cover the third train explosion, allowing units that had 
been sent into the center of Prague to concentrate all of 
their efforts on the task they had been given. The Czech 
standard operating procedure for an explosion is to do an 
initial sweep for chemical or nuclear material before 
allowing medical personnel to enter the area. In each case, 
this sweep was completed in about six minutes. The only major 
unpredicted outcome was the inability of rescue services to 
restart subway station escalators on battery power after 
electric power was cut by the explosion. As a result, 
rescuers had to carry the wounded to the surface by hand, and 
a firefighter suffered a non-fatal heart attack after his 
second trip with a stretcher. Assistant Administrator Grant 
was impressed with the detailed planning, realism, and 
complexity of the exercise, as well as the selection of 
problematic mass transit target scenarios. Although the 
response was considered a success, the exercise identified a 
lack of understanding between national and city officials as 
to who would control the response effort in the event of an 
actual terror attack in Prague. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Assistant Administrator Grant believes the lessons 
learned from this exercise, as well as similar exercises in 
other countries, are useful for improving and developing U.S. 
homeland preparedness, response programs, and exercises. 
Assistant Administrator Grant is available to discuss his 
findings from this visit. He can be contacted by phone at 
703-601-3101; or by e-mail at nicholas.grant@tsa.dhs.sgov.gov 
(classified), or Nick.Grant@dhs.gov (unclassified). Director 
Grant has cleared this cable. 
CABANISS