US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK6524

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 006524 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015 
TAGS: KDEM, PREL, TH, Democracy Promotion Strategies 
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR EAP FOCUS 
COUNTRIES - THAILAND 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 169892 B) BANGKOK 006094 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L.BOYCE, reasons 1.5 (b),(d) 
 
1. (C) Summary and introduction: Thailand is the most 
democratic country in the neighborhood, with a lively press 
and fiercely competed elections.  Thailand's remarkable 
political development, after a long period of military rule, 
progressed in tandem with its impressive economic 
development, which gave its citizens greater access to 
education and mass media, reinforcing the transition to 
democracy. In 1997, Thailand adopted a new constitution, 
meant to consolidate yet further the country's democratic 
progress. 
 
2. (C)  Things have not gone quite as expected.  The 1997 
Asian financial crisis discredited the Democrat Party in 
power during the initial recovery stages, and left the 
population uncertain and eager for a strong leader. Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party took advantage 
of the opening, winning a commanding majority in the 2001 
elections and an even larger one in 2005. Thaksin is the 
strongest Prime Minister in Thai history -- the only one, in 
fact, to serve out his full term and be re-elected. One of 
the goals of the 1997 Constitution was to build a more stable 
parliamentary system and stronger political parties by making 
it more difficult for MPs to jockey for political advantage 
by changing party affiliation.  Thaksin has cleverly used 
these provisions to increase the cohesion and clout of TRT 
and expand his personal power.  Thaksin also built his 
personal stature with populist programs, like cheap credit 
and cheap medical care, that won the enthusiastic support of 
the poorer voters, especially in the rural areas. Thailand's 
opposition parties and NGOs have never come up against 
anything quite like Thaksin, and they are playing political 
catch-up. Thailand remains a democracy, but one in which the 
balance among the political and social forces is unhealthy. 
 
3.  (C) Post works on many levels to promote greater 
democracy in Thailand. We are not optimistic that major 
changes  can occur here in the 6-8 month timeframe requested 
in ref A, but we believe that post's interventions and 
programs are already having effect here and will continue to 
do so. The information below responds to the questions in ref 
A. Specific suggestions for additional resources or other 
Washington action are contained in paras  7,11,14,15,17 and 
19.  End summary and introduction. 
 
 
4.(C)  IDENTIFY THE KEY AREAS OF DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
 
--  Media Freedom.  Thailand still has some of the most 
lively and vibrant media in the region, but it is being 
constricted.  The government's use of libel suits and the 
purchase of media outlets by  'Friends of Thaksin' have 
limited the public's access to independent news.  The 
government is attempting to shut down many community radio 
stations on weak, technical pretexts. Journalists have 
questionable ethics and sensationalize stories to sell papers. 
 
-- Muslim unrest.  In the South, the government lacks a smart 
policy to combat anti-government violence, insurgency and 
separatism.  Society lacks mechanisms to promote 
reconciliation and ethnic harmony.  The security problem in 
the South is a threat to democracy around the country, as the 
government uses terrorism as an excuse for "emergency" 
regulations that could limit individual freedoms, especially 
press freedom.  Security forces are implicated in human 
rights abuses. 
 
-- Rule of law/law enforcement/transparency.  Weak corporate 
governance and transparency regulations foster money politics 
and corrupt the political system.  The poor performance by 
police, due both to lack of training and lack of motivation, 
contributes to human rights abuses. The security forces are 
hampered by poor coordination and interagency distrust.  In 
the South, the lack of access to justice is one of the key 
elements feeding anti-government feeling. 
 
-- Voter education/election monitoring.   Given the lack of 
opposition access to broadcast media, voters may have limited 
information about their choices, or about criticisms of the 
conduct of the elections.  Vote buying and, in some areas, 
voter intimidation, still occur. 
 
-- Weak institutions.  The 1997 Constitution calls for a 
range of independent institutions, starting with a 
non-partisan Senate and including agencies to combat 
corruption, oversee media, etc.  These new institutions are 
still too weak to accomplish their goals. In some cases, the 
Senate has moved too slowly to establish these agencies; in 
other cases, the government has effectively blocked the work 
of agencies that might limit its power, or co-opted them. 
The Senators are not the independent "wise men" foreseen in 
the constitution; most are partisan, with the TRT faction 
dominant. 
 
5. (C) IDENTIFY THE 3-5 MOST IMPORTANT DESIRED OUTCOMES OVER 
THE NEXT 6-8 MONTHS 
 
-- Media.  Desired outcome:  Journalists/civil society better 
able to resist efforts by government and political  interests 
in limiting press freedom.  Longer term goals:  fewer threats 
to independent media. 
 
-- Justice/South.  Desired outcome: International interest 
and raised RTG awareness lead to a decrease in security force 
abuses in the South; government officials recognize that 
overreaction only fuels insurgent, anti-government feeling. 
Improved access to justice for Southern Muslims.   Longer 
term goals:  improved administration of justice, improvements 
in police and peaceful resolution of the conflict in the 
South. Greater public confidence in the probity of government 
institutions. 
 
-- Rule of Law/Law enforcement. Desired outcome:  we cannot 
expect to have any measurable impact in 6-8 months.  In the 
longer term, current embassy programs should contribute to 
improved professional ethics by judges and lawyers.  The most 
important, and hardest, outcome to achieve is improved 
performance by police and other security forces, both in 
terms of competence and in terms of respect for human rights. 
Making progress in this area would require a significant 
increase in USG resources addressed towards the basic police 
training academies and refresher training for working 
officers. 
 
-- Elections. Desired outcome:  effective engagement by civil 
society on voter education and election monitoring, leading 
to a free and fair election for the Senate in April/May 2006. 
 
 
 
SIX MONTH DIPLOMATIC AND PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
MEDIA 
----- 
 
6. (SBU)  Post has a range of programs already in place to 
support free and objective media 
 
-- We are about to begin a $500,000 project to expand and 
improve objective media coverage of social and political 
development throughout Thailand, with particular attention to 
broader, accurate coverage of minority concerns, regional 
developments and social conflict. 
 
-- Post regularly sends journalists on IV programs and 
includes them in other PAO outreach activities. 
 
7. (SBU)  Post has several pending requests that would 
contribute to strengthening independent media: 
 
-- Post has requested funding to support English-language 
education for journalists.  This is the fastest way to get 
journalists access to a variety of viewpoints on political 
issues. 
 
-- For journalism support particularly relevant to the 
problems in the South, please see paras 10 and 12 below. 
 
8. (C) Other measures to achieve desired outcomes: 
 
-- Post has highlighted the encroachments on press freedom in 
our human rights report, and in conversations with Thai 
officials. 
 
-- The Senate finally named the new National Broadcasting 
Commission (NBC) just last week.   PAO and POL intend to work 
together to encourage the new NBC to act fairly and 
objectively as it makes decisions on spectrum allocation. In 
particular, we will emphasize the importance of a workable 
system to permit community radio, one of the most promising 
avenues to getting independent, relevant news to the voters. 
 
MUSLIM UNREST/THE SOUTH 
----------------------- 
 
9. (C) The situation in the South is one of post's top 
priorities. Security concerns make travel and programming in 
the South difficult, but post has so far been able to 
maintain a regular travel program.  Post frequently raises 
the problem of the South with Thai officials and civil 
society at all levels. Widespread distrust of the US by 
southern Muslims is one of the biggest obstacles post faces 
in its outreach efforts. 
 
-- Post sends officers to the South regularly to meet with a 
wide range of residents -- officials, religious leaders, NGOs 
and others from both Muslim and Buddhist communities. 
 
-- Post is monitoring the trial of police implicated in the 
disappearance of a prominent Muslim lawyer. Post is 
cooperating with a range of NGOs to follow the trial 
proceedings and to underscore international concerns 
regarding the case of this well-known Muslim leader and the 
alleged role of police in his disappearance and presumed 
death. 
 
-- Post maintains close contact with the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), the organization set up by 
the government to prepare recommendations to end violence and 
resolve the problems in the region. The NRC enjoys 
considerable respect and credibility, and post underscores in 
discussions at all levels the importance of taking the NRC 
recommendations into account in setting government policy to 
respond to the unrest in the area. 
 
10. (C) Post has a vigorous outreach program in the South, 
including three American corners at universities in the 
region which have hosted DVCs and speaker programs.  Through 
the "Shared Futures" initiative, PAO has partnered with a 
local Muslim organization to distribute "branded" backpack 
kits to schoolchildren, and will work with a local vocational 
institution to distribute 1,200 sewing machines to Muslim 
villagers; this is aimed at empowering Muslim women 
heads-of-household through micro-enterprise development. 
Post involves members of the Muslim minority in the full 
range of PAO programs, including IVs, and programs to promote 
English-language study. 
 
-- Post also distributes information in the local Malay 
dialect as well as Thai language, and has worked with the 
broadcast media on programming, most recently supporting a TV 
COOP project for a series of broadcasts on the American 
Muslim community which will be airing over the next several 
months.  PAO is also using TV COOP programming from 
Indonesia, which is has dubbed into local languages and is 
currently being broadcast. 
 
11. (SBU) We believe that several small steps could improve 
Post's ability to reach out to this key community.  First, we 
could use publications geared to less-educated readers.  Even 
when translated, many Department publications are geared at 
too high a level for these readers.  Second, the local TV 
stations in the Muslim area are hungry for additional 
programming and we could place far more Department provided 
broadcast programming if we had the English-language scripts 
to facilitate translation. 
 
12. (SBU) USAID is administering a $500,000 program for the 
South implemented through Asia Foundation to help build 
citizen engagement in and commitment to moderate democratic 
values and institutions.  The program, which is just getting 
underway, focuses on efforts in three key areas --local 
government, universities and Islamic schools.  This 
represents a major increase in USG resources directed toward 
the problems in the South. 
 
13. (C) Post has provided Department with a list of priority 
projects for funding from the FY05 Supplemental  Peacekeeping 
Operations Allocations to Support the Global War on Terrorism 
(ref B).  One of post's top priorities for this funding is a 
project to provide non-lethal weapons and civil disturbance 
training for Thai military units deploying to the South.  The 
Thai military specifically requested this assistance, a sign 
that its leaders are aware of the high cost of military 
mistakes in responding to civil disturbances.  Since late 
2004, post has been cooperating with the Defense Institute of 
International Legal Studies (DIILS) so that training through 
the Joint Combined Exchanges and Training (JCET), Counterdrug 
(Baker) and IMET  programs include more comprehensive human 
rights training for military forces before they deploy to the 
South. 
14. (C) If more resources were available:  Post has also 
requested support for conflict resolution and Muslim outreach 
programs from the FY05 Supplemental PKO Allocations to 
support the GWOT.  We do not anticipate that all of these 
projects can be funded with the available resources, but 
believe that they all merit USG support (further details on 
programs in ref B).  These projects include: 
 
-- a program to study populist anti-terrorism movements and 
to share other countries' approaches with Southern leaders 
(cost:  $29k) 
 
-- a program to promote journalistic responsibility and 
investigative journalism in the South, in partnership with 
the Association of Yala Journalists (cost: $25k) 
 
-- a program to support training for  community radio 
operators, in partnership with the Campaign for Popular Media 
Reform  (cost: $25k) 
 
-- a grant to a nascent NGO, "Friends of Thai Muslim Women," 
to help it establish itself and work to with Muslim women to 
counter political extremism through development (cost: $7k) 
 
15. (C) In addition, there are many Thai organizations 
working to improve the administration of justice in the 
South.  Post would welcome the opportunity, for example, to 
support the work of the legal aid alliance formed by the NRC, 
the National Human Rights Commission and the Law Society, 
which have set up legal aid centers in the South to provide 
residents there with access to legal representation.  There 
would be many opportunities to work on projects like this 
with good partners if additional funding were available. 
 
RULE OF LAW/LAW ENFORCEMENT/TRANSPARENCY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
16. (SBU)  INL through the Narcotics Assistance Section (NAS) 
takes the lead in these areas. 
 
-- NAS funds a ABA/CEELI  program on judicial ethics; over 
the next 8 months, this American Bar Association-conducted 
program will hold seminars and training on Legal Ethics, 
Judicial Ethics, and Prosecutor Ethics  as well as a seminar 
for the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC).  It 
will provide expertise for professional ethics curriculum 
development, and support other public awareness/outreach 
activities. 
 
-- INL supports a resident legal advisor from the Department 
of Justice, who works on issues of legal and procedural 
reform and anti-corruption measures. 
 
-- In designing upcoming police training through the 
International Law Enforcement Academy  (ILEA), NAS will 
strengthen the human rights and professional responsibility 
elements in its courses. 
 
-- For law enforcement training specifically oriented to the 
situation in the South, please see para 13, above. 
 
17.  (C) If additional resources were available:  Post 
believes that increased resources for police training, 
correctly used, could have an impact over the medium-to-long 
term.  INL currently restricts the training of provincial 
police, in response to a series of extra-judicial killings 
connected to an anti-drug campaign conducted in 2003. 
Historically, the provincial police have had a poor record, 
with cases of corruption, human rights abuses and ineffective 
policing too common.   Other elements of the security forces, 
including National Police, have a somewhat better record, 
although the lack of accountability is a pervasive problem 
affecting all the security forces.  There are officials 
within the National Police who understand the need to 
professionalize the force and who would work seriously with 
us toward that goal. As an interim measure, post will review 
the range of USG-sponsored training for security forces and 
counter-terrorism, and look for ways to use existing programs 
to also promote more responsible and accountable policing. 
Following this review, post may advocate for a 
carefully-considered expansion of USG police training, 
perhaps along the model of ICITAP's Indonesia program. 
 
 
VOTER EDUCATION/ELECTION MONITORING 
------------------------------------ 
 
18. (SBU) Post will monitor upcoming by-elections and the 
Senate elections early next year. 
-- Post has regular contact with representatives of all the 
main political parties and closely follows allegations of 
unfair practices by the government to restrict their 
activities, raising issues with RTG officials as appropriate. 
 
-- Post meets regularly with the main voter education and 
monitoring organization, Pollwatch. 
 
19.  (C) If additional resources were available:  Pollwatch 
is underfunded and would benefit from additional support 
through grants or collaboration with an appropriate US NGO, 
such as NDI or IFES.   Post will encourage Pollwatch to apply 
for PAO-sponsored grants through the Democracy 
Commission/small grants program, if funding for these is 
available this year. 
 
INSTITUTION BUILDING 
-------------------- 
 
20. (C) Post cannot expect to make much impact over the next 
6-8 months on the building of stronger institutions.  Many of 
the agencies established in the 1997 Constitution to 
safeguard civil liberties are appointed by the Senate, whose 
term will end in March.  Incumbents cannot run for 
re-election, so all 200  seats will be open when the 
elections are held in April or May 2006. Once we see the 
composition of the new Senate, post will evaluate the 
efficacy of  possible programs, such as IV or speakers, that 
might assist reformers. Given budget constraints, we will 
probably be unable to do much programming with the new Senate 
before the new fiscal year, but can begin outreach to the new 
members immediately after the elections. 
 
MAJOR NEEDS/MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
21. (C) Thailand is still significantly ahead of its 
neighbors in its democratic development, and therefore it is 
appropriate that the lion's share of democracy-building 
resources are used elsewhere.  Nonetheless, our strategy 
outlined above shows that some additional resources could be 
well-used to promote our democracy goals here. 
 
SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCES 
----------------------- 
 
22. (C) The most significant influences contributing to 
democratization here is Thailand's own civil society. 
Thailand has a wealth of NGOs and advocacy groups, with 
relatively few limits on their activities.  Public awareness 
of civil/human rights issues has grown with increased access 
to media and education.  Human rights NGOs maintain contacts 
with international partners.  Political parties campaign 
vigorously.   The push for more progress on democracy can and 
must come from the Thai people.  The US can provide support 
by targeted diplomatic interventions and programs of the kind 
outlined above. 
 
CONSEQUENCES 
------------ 
 
23. (C) The US and Thailand enjoy an excellent relationship. 
We have long and close ties to most sectors in Thai society, 
from the political leaders of all parties, through the 
military and up to the royal family.  Thais and Americans are 
connected by family ties, alumni associations, business 
interests: we do not believe that there will be long-term 
negative consequences to our efforts to support democracy 
here.  In the short term, we must recognize that the current 
Prime Minister is famously sensitive to criticism and quick 
to use nationalist and populist messages to build support for 
his positions.   Even though his soaring popularity has 
sagged somewhat recently, he remains genuinely popular and 
effective at using his office to rally support.  Efforts 
based on confrontation and direct public criticism of the PM 
and his policies are unlikely, in our view, to be as 
effective as those that build on the genuine progress 
Thailand's other institutions have steadily built in recent 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOYCE