US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK6511

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 006511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, TH, UNSC, UNGA, BURMA, Demarche 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: BRINGING BURMA BEFORE THE UNSC - THAI 
INVOKE ASEAN SOLIDARITY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 185479 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 1.(C)  Summary: Thailand is not prepared to support the 
proposal to bring Burma before the UN Security Council.  The 
Thai MFA believes that other ASEAN members also will not 
support the proposal, although none are willing to leap to 
Burma's defense with the vigor that Burma has requested. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C)  Polcouns met with director of the MFA East Asian 
Affairs Department, Damrong Kraikruan, on October 13 to 
deliver reftel points.  Damrong said that Thailand could not 
support the proposal to bring Burma before the Security 
Council.  ASEAN members were uncomfortable with the 
situation, but would have to support Burma's request that 
they oppose this proposal.  Damrong said that Burma had 
pressed the ASEAN members to assist it in a high-level 
lobbying effort at the UN, including having their Permanent 
Representatives make presentations on Burma's behalf, and 
writing letters saying that the substance of the critical 
reports was untrue.  The other ASEAN countries were not 
prepared to go along with this proposal.  They would provide 
"low-key" support to Burma, however.  Damrong believed that 
the ASEAN members would, in the end, stick together on this 
issue. 
 
3.  (C)  Damrong said that that Burmese Deputy FM OO Kyaw Thu 
had just met with the Thai MFA Permsec, and the UN issue had 
been discussed. According to Damrong, the Burmese side said 
that it would succeed in blocking the UNSC proposal; it 
claimed it already had the support of China, Japan, Brazil 
and Philippines.  Burma expected the US to win the support of 
only perhaps 7 SC members. Damrong claimed that the Thai side 
had urged Burma to do more to address international concerns, 
and warned them that "this issue will not just go away." 
 
4.  (C)  Damrong recounted the familiar reasons why Thailand 
cannot take a more aggressive stand against Burma, repeating 
that Thailand had to have cooperation with Burma on border 
security and counternarcotics efforts.  Public criticism by 
Thailand would lead to a vindictive Burmese response, 
including perhaps "incidents" at the border.  Damrong pointed 
out that, although the Thai government did not publicly 
criticize Burma, it did not prevent others in Thailand from 
doing so.  The Thai press was free to publish criticisms of 
its neighbor, and a number of anti-SPDC NGOs operated from 
Thai soil.  Those who were critical of Thailand's position 
should bear this in mind. 
 
5.  (C)  Thailand and Burma were also discussing the upcoming 
exchange of visits.  Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to visit 
in January/February, and the Burmese PM would probably pay a 
visit in Bangkok early in the year as well.  Damrong said 
that the Thai side was waiting to see the results of an SPDC 
reshuffle that they expected shortly. 
 
6 (C)  Comment: We believe that the Thai are leaning on the 
Burmese privately, as they tell us, since they recognize the 
price that ASEAN is paying on Burma's behalf.  The MFA is 
clearly uncomfortable and tired of being seen as Burma's 
defender, but the RTG does not appear to be ready yet to 
openly disrupt ASEAN solidarity.  end comment. 
BOYCE