US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6181

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

LAUNCHING A STRUCTURED STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY

Identifier: 05ANKARA6181
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA6181 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-10-12 14:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER TU US
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

121428Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006181 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, TU, US 
SUBJECT: LAUNCHING A STRUCTURED STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH 
TURKEY 
 
REF: ANKARA 5825 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) With the October 3 EU decision on Turkey's accession 
negotiations behind us, it is time to turn toward 
consolidation of recent gains made in our bilateral 
relationship and to expand regional cooperation with Ankara. 
One way to do this is to establish a more structured policy 
dialogue that would allow us to forge a common frame of 
reference on shared challenges and opportunities for joint 
action.  For too long, our dialogue with Turkey has been 
reactive and focused on issues of the day.  This approach 
worked when the two sides had a common understanding of the 
issues, their relevance to national interests, and the 
appropriate responses, such as during the Cold War when the 
threats were clear and Turkey was led by Western-oriented 
elites.  Now, however, it is clear that we must invest more 
in the relationship if we are to repair past fissures and 
create a basis for genuine collaboration.  A structured and 
regularly scheduled dialogue could help ensure a common 
understanding of issues, interests and responses, as well as 
foster the trust necessary to prevent downturns in the 
relationship like those experienced over Iraq in recent 
years.  While such a dialogue is likely to require 
considerable commitment of time and attention, the potential 
benefits are significant.  There are a number of ways that 
this dialogue could be structured; what follows is one 
possibility for consideration and debate. 
 
2. (C) We propose an annual meeting of a Structured Strategic 
dialogue (SSD), rotating between capitals, with working 
groups meeting between plenaries and reporting thereto.  To 
be successful, the SSD would need to be senior enough to have 
meaningful dialogue across the spectrum of issues on which we 
desire Turkey's cooperation -- counter terrorism, Iraq, 
BMENAI, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.  We recommend that 
the SSD be chaired by under secretaries, namely, the US Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs and the MFA Undersecretary. 
 
SIPDIS 
The focus of these conversations would be conceptual rather 
than operational, with the intent of reaching a common 
understanding of long term goals and broad purposes. 
 
3. (C) SSD working groups would be more functionally 
oriented, with each side wielding sufficient clout within 
their own government to be able to effect the cooperation and 
collaboration that would be the focus of their discussions. 
This requires that they be chaired by senior officials.  Many 
issues require interagency coordination; to ensure the Turks 
bring the right people to the discussion, our delegations 
would also need to be multi-agency when appropriate.  The SSD 
could create or disband working groups as appropriate, but 
initially we recommend the following groups be established: 
 
-- Iraq: Led by S/I and GOT Iraq Coordinator Amb Koruturk, 
this group would examine support for the political process in 
Iraq and other Turkish support for the effort there. 
 
-- Middle East: Led by NEA and MFA DU/S Uzumcu, this forum 
would discuss Turkey's support for BMENAI and the Road Map. 
It would also be a venue to encourage a tougher Turkish line 
against Syria and Iran. 
 
-- Counterterrorism: Led by S/CT and DU/S Sensoy (or Deputy 
S/CT and DG Guven), this body should include law enforcement 
officials (thereby responding to PM Erdogan's suggestion to 
APNSA Hadley that the Interior Ministry be involved in SSD) 
as well as representatives of the intelligence community and 
perhaps Treasury.  It would need to focus on actions against 
the PKK in Europe and elsewhere, but should also address 
trans-national terrorist threats and ways to disrupt them. 
 
-- Nonproliferation: Led by an ISN DAS and DG Bayer, this 
working group would focus on nonproliferation cooperation, 
such as efforts to break up the A.Q.Khan network, to make PSI 
more effective, and to develop competent export control 
capabilities in other countries (e.g., Central Asia, Iraq, 
etc.).  Defense, customs and intelligence officials might be 
included in this working group. 
 
-- Eurasia: Led by EUR and DU/S Apakan, the two sides could 
address Turkey-EU, Caucasus (unless the HLDG's Caucasus 
Working Group is expanded to include political issues, as 
proposed by EUR DAS Bryza), Central Asia, Black Sea and 
Cyprus.  In the Turkey-EU context, democratization and human 
rights in Turkey could also be addressed.  If the Department 
shifts Central Asia to SA, then a separate working group on 
that region, to include Afghanistan, might be advisable. 
MCELDOWNEY 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04