US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4182

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ANBAR: GOVERNOR FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF ELECTION PREPARATIONS; INTERPRETS IECI "NEGLECT" AS DELIBERATE EFFORT TO SUPPRESS SUNNI VOTE

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4182
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4182 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-10-11 07:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINS KDEM IZ Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, KDEM, IZ, Elections 
SUBJECT: ANBAR: GOVERNOR FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF ELECTION 
PREPARATIONS; INTERPRETS IECI "NEGLECT" AS DELIBERATE 
EFFORT  TO SUPPRESS SUNNI VOTE 
 
Classified By: Robert S. Ford, Political Counselor for 
reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In October 2 meeting with Second Marine 
Division ADC and Poloff, Anbar Governor Mamoon expressed his 
disappointment in the lack of follow-through by Election 
Commissioners after their August 30 outreach visit.  He said 
that if his demands for confirmation of designated polling 
locations, details regarding polling staff movements and 
training as well as permission to allow same day registration 
were not met, he would reveal to the Arab media a deliberate 
attempt to suppress the Sunni vote.  The Governor alleged 
that the Independent Elections Commission of Iraq (IECI) was 
complicit in a plot to suppress Sunni voter turnout.  PolOff 
argued that the IECI was an independent body, and its UN 
advisors were technicians who sought the highest democratic 
participation possible under difficult circumstances.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) Governor Mamoon Sami Latif al Rasheed expressed 
increasing frustration with the preparations for referendum 
elections in Anbar to the Second Marine Division ADC and 
PolOff.  Al Rasheed appeared clearly exasperated with what he 
perceived to be the level (or lack thereof) of communication 
from the IECI.  In an IECI outreach session conducted August 
30, Mamoon said he had made specific requests for IECI 
decisions on matters such as an extension of the voter 
registration period, exact locations of polling sites and the 
workplan for fielding polling workers.  Commissioner Izadin 
al-Mohhmmady, who conducted the outreach, allegedly promised 
the governor feedback on the decision of the entire 
commission.  To date, Mamoon reports there has been no 
communication from the IECI. 
 
3. (C) Governor Mamoon appeared satisfied with the decision 
of the IECI to allow detainees to vote in Abu Ghraib and Buca 
prisons, as conveyed by the ADC.  Nonetheless, he bridled at 
the delay by the IECI in confirming polling center locations 
in Ramadi and western Anbar.  He also sought clarification of 
when and how polling workers would arrive in the province, 
clearly preferring local citizens receive training to 
administer the election.  He stressed that &security is 
good8 and that the governor should have a role in 
designating polling sites near major population centers.  He 
endorsed the Second Marine Division to facilitate 29 polling 
centers in the provincial capital, Ramadi, emphasizing the 
necessity for the country to provide the opportunity for its 
citizens to vote. 
 
4. (C) The ADC informed the Governor of the next upcoming 
IECI outreach program in Falluja on October 6, and offered to 
facilitate his transportation to the event.  The Governor 
mused over the utility of continuing to press concerns vis a 
vis the IECI at this forum, but with obviously rising 
frustration, railed against the indignity of having to chase 
down the commissioners for answers to his questions. 
Breaking into English, he noted, "The time is very critical". 
  He claimed he would give the commission another week to 
respond with concrete proposals regarding polling center 
staff and locations, and if they did not respond, he would 
address the satellite media. 
 
5.  (C) Mamoon charged that the IECI was driven by a 
political agenda engineered by the Shia who, do not want the 
constitutional referendum to fail.  Mamoon claimed the 
political milieu in Anbar had changed, that citizens of the 
violent and economically disadvantaged province now sought to 
engage in reconstruction and the political process.   Mamoon 
had also requested the IECI to permit voter registration and 
voting in mosques.  He appeared resigned to the IECI,s 
refusal to allow religious sites for this purpose, but 
clearly did not buy their argument.  He also requested same 
day registration for Anbar alone. 
 
6. (C) Mamoon described the elections as two teams playing, 
where the referee would be the ballots.  He reiterated lack 
of planning was due to a deliberate plot to suppress Sunni 
turnout.  PolOff argued the IECI was an independent body, and 
its UN advisors were technicians who sought the highest 
democratic participation possible in difficult circumstances. 
 Nonetheless, both PolOff and the ADC promised to pass his 
concerns to commission staff.  PolOff recommended Mamoon also 
continue to press his concerns with Baghdad officials to 
hasten election preparations in Anbar.  The governor 
concluded that given Iraqis, experience with past forms of 
government, democracy was the only solution.  He emphasized, 
however, that the people must be confident in the results of 
the ballot boxes. 
 
7. (C)  Comment: Unfortunately, the initially successful 
outreach conducted by Commissioner Izadin set local 
government officials expectations high.  Pleased by the show 
of interest from Baghdad, delays in supposedly promised 
details have had the opposite effect.  At present the 
Governor (and Deputy Governor) are disillusioned with the 
IECI and took the opportunity to attack the commission,s 
planned outreach in Falluja (historically a rival of the much 
larger provincial capital) as &a waste of time8.  Mamoon 
overestimates his role in the elections process, suggesting 
he should designate polling centers in Anbar and promoting 
the use of mosques for the vote.  However, his role in urging 
the battered and embittered population to vote remains 
critical.  The vote in the referendum in Anbar is likely to 
be against the constitution, but the referendum has two other 
important aspects.  First, it will be a dry run for the 
December 15 elections.  It also will confirm that the 
Transitional Iraqi Government was sincere in including all 
those who want to participate in the political process.  The 
governor has questioned this sincerity..   He is concerned 
that if the designated Limited polling sites, are not located 
great near distances from pmajor population centers, the 
referendum wwill stir a most likely backlash from the Anbar 
electorate.the next administration.  I'm confused - are there 
limited polling sites far from population centers or is this 
confirmation of the ITG's sincerity - which is it ?? 
Embassy Baghdad is working with the IECI and UN to ensure 
Ma'mun's concerns are understood and that the IECI explains 
to him what it is doing.  End Comment. 
Khalilzad 

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