US embassy cable - 05AMMAN8050

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CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH'S CHIEF OF STAFF

Identifier: 05AMMAN8050
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN8050 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-10-11 05:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER KISL KPAL IZ IS JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

110530Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 008050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, KPAL, IZ, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH'S CHIEF OF 
STAFF 
 
 
Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  CODEL Shays met on October 8 with Marouf 
Bakheet, Chief of Staff to King Abdullah (and Deputy Director 
for National Security), to discuss progress in Iraq and other 
regional issues.  Bakheet emphasized the need for greater USG 
interaction with Iraqi Sunnis to bring them into the 
political process, and questioned the wisdom of disbanding 
the Iraqi army (a decision made under the CPA) as well as the 
breadth of the early, CPA-initiated de-Ba'thification 
process.  Bakheet characterized the 2002 Arab initiative on 
the Middle east Peace Process as a missed opportunity.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (U) Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT), transiting Amman 
en-route to Iraq, was joined in the meeting by Congressmen 
Michael McNulty (D-NY), Michael Capuano (D-MA), Ron Kind 
(D-WI), and delegate Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa), as 
well as DCM. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
3. (C) In response to Rep. Shays' request for an assessment 
of USG performance in Iraq, Bakheet told the CODEL that the 
U.S. decisions in 2003 to disband the Iraqi army and broadly 
dismiss Ba'thist Party members from government jobs were 
major mistakes.  Most Ba'th Party members were such out of 
professional obligation, according to Bakheet, and were not 
ideologically aligned to the party.  By engaging in 
widespread de-Ba'thification, the U.S. disenfranchised these 
marginal Ba'th Party members, who otherwise might have become 
valuable partners in the rebuilding of Iraq.  The disbanding 
of the army was even more damaging given it led to thousands 
of young men with military training being let loose with no 
prospect for gainful employment. 
 
4. (C) Bakheet reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to working with 
the USG on bringing stability to Iraq through careful 
analysis of its "political map", and to coordinating closely 
through both diplomatic and intelligence channels.  He said 
that Jordan is engaging all three major communities in Iraq 
(i.e., Kurds, Sh'ia, and Sunni Arabs), trying to help put all 
major players on the same path toward a viable future. 
Jordan is working with the Iraqi Kurds, assisting Kurdish 
region president Mustafa Barzani on the "Arab world" language 
in the draft Iraqi constitution.  Jordan is also working with 
Iraqi Shiites, and is attempting to coax Muqtada al-Sadr off 
of the extremist path and into the political process, he said. 
 
5. (C) Responding to several CODEL members' questions about 
when the U.S. should leave Iraq, Bakheet cautioned against 
withdrawing too early.  A premature, substantial U.S. 
withdrawal would harm U.S. interests in the region, anger 
U.S. friends, damage U.S. prestige, and undercut regional 
democratization. 
 
6. (C) The U.S. needs to work more on Sunni inclusion, 
according to Bakheet.  Active Sunni Arab participation in the 
political process is needed to calm the insurgency.  The U.S. 
needs to offset Iranian influence and tamp down the 
expectations of the Kurds and Shia.  Both Jordan and the U.S. 
need to do more to engage and empower the Sunnis. 
 
7. (C) Bakheet predicted that the constitution will pass the 
October 15 referendum, but emphasized that meaningful 
elections are ultimately more important than the 
constitution.  In his estimation, a new Iraqi parliament and 
government that are representative of the whole of Iraqi 
society - though not necessarily a pure democracy - are the 
means by which internal peace will be attained and will pave 
the "way out" for the U.S. military presence. 
 
------------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Bakheet noted the centrality of the Palestinian 
question to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the continuing 
ability of terrorists to attract new recruits throughout the 
region.  He said that the Arab peace initiative that came out 
of the 2002 Beirut Arab League summit was a potential way 
forward that was not embraced or properly promoted, and that 
the Arab initiative would likely have been better than the 
Quartet-led roadmap - even from the Israeli point of view - 
given its inclusion of broad security guarantees from all 
Arab states.  Bakheet twice stated that whatever happens in 
the process on the right of return of displaced Palestinians, 
the Jewish character of Israel needs to be preserved. 
 
9. (U) CODEL Shays did not have the opportunity to clear this 
message. 
HALE 

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