US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI1005

C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/OPO/FPD, AF/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2030 
TAGS: ASEC, AFIN, DJ 
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REINSTATEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL GUARDS 
 
REF: A:DJIBOUTI 996 B:DJIBOUTI 983 
 
Classified By: DCM David Ball, reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (g). 
 
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT. 
 
2.  (C) AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2005, POST HAS REMOVED RESIDENTIAL 
GUARDS UNDER MANDATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BASED ON 
BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS.  THE REMOVAL OF POST'S RESIDENTIAL 
GUARD PROTECTION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL SECURITY 
REALITIES, WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF 
EMBASSY EMPLOYEES OF ALL AGENCIES TO CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST 
ACTIVITY.  POST UNDERSTANDS THAT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS ARE BASED 
ON SETL'S CRIME RATING, BUT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS IN DJIBOUTI 
ARE A DETERRENT TO TERRORIST ATTACKS AS WELL AS CRIMINAL 
ATTACKS.  THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DETERRENT IS HIGHLIGHTED BY 
THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF DJIBOUTI TO SOMALIA AND RECENT THREAT 
REPORTING (SEE REF A). 
 
3. (C) RESIDENTIAL HOUSING IN DJIBOUTI NOW IMMEDIATELY STANDS 
OUT FROM NEIGHBORING HOUSES BECAUSE U.S. EMBASSY RESIDENCES 
ARE THE ONLY RESIDENCES WITHOUT GUARDS.  THIS HIGH 
VISIBILITY, PLUS EXISTING THREATS IN COUNTRY, MAKES EMPLOYEES 
HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO INCREASED CRIME, HOSTILE SURVEILLANCE, 
AND TERRORIST ATTACK.  EMPLOYEES CANNOT ADEQUATELY SCAN THE 
EXTERIOR OF THEIR COMPOUNDS FOR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PRIOR TO 
DEPARTURE OR ARRIVAL.  THERE IS CONSTANT PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC, 
THE PERSISTENCE OF "SQUATTERS", AND THE PRESENCE OF LOCAL 
VENDORS THAT MAKE IMPOSSIBLE THE EMPLOYEE'S ABILITY TO JUDGE 
ADEQUATELY THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE HIS OR HER 
RESIDENCE.  EMPLOYEES HAVE NO WAY TO DETERMINE IF THE 
INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS SURROUNDING THEM ON ARRIVAL AND 
DEPARTURE FROM THE RESIDENCE ARE HARMLESS OR HAVE CRIMINAL OR 
TERRORIST INTENT.  SUCH A DETERMINATION WAS POSSIBLE WITH 
RESIDENTIAL GUARDS USED IN THE PAST. 
 
4. (C) REGARDLESS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTER-MEASURES TAUGHT TO 
AND UTILIZED BY OUR EMPLOYEES, DEPARTURES FROM AND ARRIVALS 
TO  RESIDENCES WILL RESULT IN A POLICY-IMPOSED CHOKE-POINT, 
RATHER THEN A NATURAL CHOKE-POINT, BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS 
TO DEPART AND RETURN TO HIS OR HER RESIDENCE EVERY DAY.  IT 
IS A KNOWN FACT THAT ONE OF AL-QA'IDA'S TARGETING SELECTION 
METHODS INCLUDES WHETHER OR NOT A SELECTED TARGET HAS 
SECURITY GUARDS WHEN SELECTING A POSSIBLE TARGET.  BY 
REMOVING OUR RESIDENTIAL GUARDS, U.S. EMBASSY EMPLOYEES ARE 
AT A GREATER RISK OF BECOMING POSSIBLE TERRORIST TARGETS OR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME.  OVER THE PAST YEAR DJIBOUTI HAS SEEN AN 
INCREASE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY THE RECENT 
BREAK-IN OF AN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE'S VEHICLE (SEE REF B). 
ANOTHER CONCERN IS THAT OTHER AGENCIES (ORA HAS ALREADY 
RECEIVED APPROVAL) WILL FUND THEIR OWN RESIDENTIAL SECURITY 
GUARDS THUS AFFECTING THE MORALE OF STATE EMPLOYEES WHO WILL 
NOT HAVE GUARDS. 
 
5.  (C) POST WOULD THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT 
RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO CUT RESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND ALLOW 
POST TO REINSTATE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  IF YOU HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS ISSUE CONTACT RSO GARY STONER AT 
(253) 35 39 95 OR VIA CLASS EMAIL AT STONERGM@STATE.SGOV.GOV. 
 REGARDS. 
RAGSDALE