US embassy cable - 05SANAA2912

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, YM, MARITIME SECURITY, ENERGY 
SUBJECT: MOI ALIMI DISCUSSES OIL TERMINAL SECURITY AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 
 
REF: A. SANAA 01377 
     B. SANAA YM 071445Z 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In a October 3 meeting with Ambassador and 
Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Chief, Interior Minister 
Rashad Alimi discussed security arrangements for the Safer 
oil terminal and the transfer of protection duties to the 
Yemen Coast Guard (YCG).  Alimi stated that the YCG, a 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) organization, would not begin 
continuous patrols until responsibilities were clearly 
delineated with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which is 
currently responsible for protecting the Safer.  Ambassador 
also requested Alimi's support for the installation of a 
USG-sponsored communications system between MOD and MOI 
forces involved in counter-terrorism operations.  End Summary. 
 
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Safer Oil Tanker Security 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Ambassador opened the meeting with Alimi by 
inquiring when the YCG would assume primary responsibility 
for protection of the Safer oil platform, operated by Yemen 
Hunt Oil.  The YCG appears ready to provide increased 
security patrols, he continued, with the establishment of an 
operating base in nearby Salif Port.  (Note:  The Safer is a 
stationary tanker located 9 kilometers offshore and 
approximately 35 kilometers north-northwest from Hodeidah 
Port.  The tanker serves as a storage and transfer facility 
for approximately 30 percent of Yemen's annual oil wealth). 
 
3.  (C) Alimi replied that certain issues must be resolved 
before MOD will allow the Yemen Navy to transfer 
responsibility for maritime protection of the Safer to the 
YCG.  According to Alimi, MOD believes YCG should also take 
over coastal land defense from the Yemen Army, which Alimi 
opposes.  Alimi added that additional boats must first be 
deployed to the Salif base before operations could begin. 
Even with additional boats, Alimi contended that patrols of 
the Safer could not begin for another five to six months when 
rough sea conditions subside. 
 
4.  (C)  Comment:  Protecting the Safer is instrumental to 
Yemen's economic and political security.  It is also the most 
vulnerable highly profile target in the country.  Currently, 
the Yemen Navy remains responsible for maritime protection of 
the Safer, but ROYG intends to transfer responsibility to the 
more capable YCG, which has developed into a professional and 
capable force with assistance from the Foreign Military 
Financing program.  The transfer had been stalled due to a 
commercial dispute with a prominent local businessman who was 
blocking the creation of an operating base (ref A).  Even 
after the 
issue was resolved in July (ref B), it appears that other 
obstacles remain.  YCG officials informed post earlier that 
they were willing and able to assume responsibility.  Despite 
Alimi's protestations of rough seas, it appears that the 
rivalry between MOD and MOI forces is preventing YCG from 
assuming full control over the Safer's security.  End Comment. 
 
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Point-to-Point Wireless Communication System 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador also requested Alimi's support in 
completing the point-to-point wireless system that will link 
MOI and MOD forces involved in counter-terrorism operations. 
The CJTF-HOA sponsored project will link MOI headquarters, 
Central Security Forces (an MOI organization that contains 
Yemen's premier counter-terrorism unit) the 
YCG, and the Yemen Air Force (which provides helicopter 
support to MOI forces). Ambassador noted that the hardware 
had already been installed within the various organizations 
but stressed that the system would not be operational until 
post received the necessary approval to install the required 
connecting fiber optics and antennas.  Alimi promised to 
provide a MOI point of contact to assist in coordinating the 
approvals. 
 
6.  (C) Comment: While all the necessary equipment is already 
in-country, the project is stalled for reasons that remain 
unclear.  Whatever the source of opposition is within the 
ROYG, Alimi's support will be crucial for coordinating the 
installation with relevant security agencies and President 
Saleh.  MOI's willingness to help secure the necessary 
approvals is a step forward in installing a communication 
system that will significantly  improve MOI's ability to 
coordinate counter-terrorism operations. End Comment. 
Krajeski