US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4147

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: IRAQI MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS TRANSFER OF SECURITY 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3853 
     B. BAGHDAD 3731 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), (d 
) 
 
1. (S//REL GBR AUS)  SUMMARY:  The Iraqi Ministerial 
Committee on National Security (MCNS) met on October 4 to 
discuss, among other subjects, the conditions for the 
transfer of security responsibilities from the Coalition to 
Iraqi civil authorities.  Prime Minister Jaafari stated a 
preference for a "go slow" approach on the transfer of 
security responsibility.  Before Iraqi authorities can assume 
responsibility for security, he noted, the militia problem 
must be addressed and more locals must be recruited into the 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to serve in their own cities or 
regions.  In addition, Jaafari stressed that the chain of 
command for Iraqi forces, both military and police, must be 
articulated clearly in the plan.  He clearly will not agree 
to any plan that gives provincial governors authority over 
national forces. This cable focuses on the conditions for 
transfer of security responsibility; other issues discussed 
at the meeting will be addressed in a septel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S//REL GBR AUS)  The MCNS met at the home of Prime 
Minister Jaafari the night of October 4.  Present were 
Jaafari; Minister of Defense Saadoun al-Dulime; Minister of 
Interior Bayan Jabr; National Security Advisor Mowaffak 
al-Rubaie; the Prime Minister's Spokesman Laith Kubba; the 
Ambassador; MNF-I Commanding General Casey; British Charge 
d'Affaires Tim Torlot; and MNF-I Deputy Commanding General 
Brims.  A translator and notetakers also attended.  Minister 
of State for National Security Affairs Karem al-Anzi was 
absent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (S//REL GBR AUS)  First on the agenda was the presentation 
to the Prime Minister of the final report of the Joint 
Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) 
Principals Group.  The Principals Group, which comprises most 
members of the MCNS save Jaafari and al-Anzi, was originally 
scheduled to deliver its report on September 25, but their 
presentation was postponed when Jaafari called an emergency 
meeting of the MCNS (septel).  Briefly, the report sets forth 
the conditions which must be met before security 
responsibilities for urban and/or provincial areas may be 
handed over by the Coalition to Iraqi civil authorities. 
These conditions are described in reftels. 
 
4. (S//REL GBR AUS)  This was the first time Jaafari had seen 
the report.  His initial reaction was to suggest that 
everyone look through it over the next day or so and then 
reconvene the MCNS to reach a decision.  NSA Rubaie wanted a 
quick resolution and described in general terms the contents 
of the report.  Minister of Interior Jabr described how it 
had been completed in close cooperation between Iraqi and 
Coalition leaders and that after some initial disagreements, 
it now fully reflected the views of all parties. 
 
-------------------- 
JAAFARI'S CONDITIONS 
-------------------- 
 
4. (S//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari responded that he has spoken to 
President Bush about this topic and the President assured him 
that U.S. forces will not leave Iraqi cities until the Iraqis 
are fully capable of handling all security problems.  Jaafari 
explained that, in his opinion, the following three 
conditions must be met prior to the transfer of security 
responsibility: 
 
--There must be sufficient Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
available to handle any problems that arise, and if 
additional forces must be called from other areas to assist, 
these forces must be able to respond without leaving their 
own areas of responsibility unprotected; 
 
--The militias, which are a "two-edged sword," must be 
absorbed into the ISF before the MNF turns over security 
responsibility; 
 
--The security forces in each city must comprise at least 
some members who come from that area, as they will be more 
likely to preserve security in their own cities and also 
because a city,s population will be less inclined to make 
trouble or distrust the ISF if their sons are among the 
police and army assigned there. 
 
6.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari stated that he is not ashamed 
to say in the media that the MNF must stay until the Iraqis 
are fully capable of handling all problems.  He is not yet 
confident that the ISF are at that point.  Jabr assured him 
that the plan for transfer specifies that the MNF will remain 
nearby and prepared to respond if needed, so there is no need 
to worry about leaving other parts of the country exposed by 
bringing in ISF reinforcements from elsewhere.  He and Rubaie 
also stressed that a transfer of responsibility will take 
place only in areas that are considered to be safe and where 
the threat level is low.  Jaafari brushed this aside and 
asked what will happen if conditions in an area subsequently 
change for the worse.  He then returned to the need to 
integrate the militias into the ISF and to recruit more 
locals.  Rubaie reiterated that he was confident that the 
report addresses all of Jaafari's concerns. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
QUESTIONS OF INTRA-IRAQI COMMAND AND CONTROL 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (S//REL GBR AUS)  Minister of Defense Dulime raised the 
issue of the lack of clearly defined lines of authority and 
chain of command for national forces called to assist local 
police forces controlled by each province,s governor.  Under 
the plan, security responsibility will be turned over to 
committees headed by the provincial governors.  Dulime said 
he does not trust the judgment of the governors on security 
matters and stated that firm command and control procedures 
must be clearly established before security responsibilities 
are accepted.  Jaafari strongly concurred, saying that he 
wants everyone to clearly realize that Iraq is not a "vast 
democracy or Scandinavian country."  There are serious 
problems, Jaafari said, between the central government and 
the provincial governments.  In some past cases the ISF has 
taken sides when such problems arose, he continued, and this 
cannot be tolerated.  The recent incident in Basrah in which 
local police arrested two British soldiers and then handed 
them over to militiamen, which the Prime Minister mentioned 
several times, loomed large in Jaafari's thinking.  Jaafari 
stressed that there can be no question about lines of 
authority and chains of command: the police must respond to 
the commands of the Minister of Interior, the army to the 
Minister of Defense, and both of those ministers to the 
commander-in-chief -- the Prime Minister.  He stressed, "If 
it were up to the governor of Basrah, he would declare war on 
the British.  We cannot let the governors decide when to call 
in ISF or, on the other hand, give them the authority to 
prevent ISF from entering their provinces when security needs 
arise." 
 
8. (S//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey noted that Jaafari's concern is 
fundamental: "What is the role of the central government in 
providing security in the provinces?"  He suggested that 
language be added to the conditions to specify that MOD 
forces would be under the command of the Minister of Defense. 
 All present agreed that this should not be a problem. 
However, a more difficult issue is how to define who has the 
authority over the police, given the provisions of the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that give the authority 
to appoint chiefs of police to local councils and not to the 
MOI.  Rubaie and the Ambassador echoed that taking control 
over local police away from a governor potentially violates 
the TAL and possibly the new constitution, which guarantees 
to the provinces some rights over security matters. 
 
9. (S//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari stressed that when he talks about 
difficulties between the provinces and the central government 
he is not talking about simple matters such as local crime. 
Rather, he continued, he is speaking of issues that have 
national consequences, namely the fight against terrorists 
who would see the government and democracy defeated.  Command 
and control issues, he said, must be clearly defined in favor 
of national authority.  In addition, he added, the militia 
issue must be addressed and plans must be made to ensure that 
portions of the ISF in each area include members indigenous 
to that region.  It was agreed that the JCTSR needs to 
address these fundamental points in more detail before the 
plan can be accepted. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (S//REL GBR AUS)  COMMENT: Many of Jaafari's concerns 
about the transfer of responsibility are clearly addressed in 
the report, which he had not had the opportunity to review 
prior to the meeting.  These concerns include provisions for 
MNF troops to reinforce Iraqi units should the need for 
assistance arise.  Coalition members of the JCTSR foresaw the 
command and control issue.  Much effort was expended to get 
the Iraqis to address this question during the committee 
meetings.  The underlying problem appears to be an immature 
and yet to be fully-developed governmental system from the 
local level through the provinces to the national level.  An 
example is the basic distrust between local and provincial 
governments and leaders in some areas.  In fact, the nature 
of these relationships was at the heart of some of the most 
difficult issues during the constitutional drafting process 
and have yet to be fully resolved.  The Working Group of the 
JCTSR continues to meet and work on an implementing 
arrangement memorandum of understanding based on the 
conditions specified in the final report, which would clarify 
the command and control relationships that are needed to 
allay Jaafari's concerns. 
 
11.  (S//REL GBR AUS) COMMENT continued:  Jaafari's 
insistence that the militia problem be addressed before MNF 
relinquishes control is a new twist, as is his call for more 
local recruitment.  In fact, they are probably linked since 
Jaafari hopes to see militiamen absorbed into the security 
forces.  However, the integration of the Peshmerga and/or the 
Badr Corps into the regular ISF is not something we see 
happening in the near future.  (NOTE: Jabr pointed out that 
he is working already on recruiting locals for police forces 
assigned to certain regions.  Dulime said that his budget 
will need to be augmented if Jaafari expects him to recruit, 
train, and integrate locals into already formed units.  END 
NOTE.)  Jaafari's "go slow" approach seemed to surprise Iraqi 
members of the JCTSR, particularly Rubaie, who has been 
pushing for the rapid transfer of security responsibilities 
in certain areas.  The JCTSR will continue to work on a plan 
that will address Jaafari's concerns.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad