US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2723

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DUTCH REFLECTIONS ON THE OCTOBER 3 GAERC

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2723
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2723 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-10-07 16:45:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL NL EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071645Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: DUTCH REFLECTIONS ON THE OCTOBER 3 GAERC 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 02640 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew J. Schofer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. According to MFA interlocutors on October 4, 
the Dutch were pleased that the October 3 GAERC started 
accession talks with Turkey, and "can live with" the 
insertion of "absorption capacity" to the negotiating 
framework.  Although it took them by surprise, the Dutch 
believe Carla del Ponte's assessment of Croatian "full" 
cooperation with the ICTY is justifiable.  The Dutch are 
satisfied with the imposition of sanctions against 
Uzbekistan, but are unclear on next steps.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  On October 4, Pim Dumore (MFA, Director of Political 
Affairs), Bahia Tahzib-Lie (MFA, Deputy European 
Correspondent) and Jeroen Boender (MFA, Senior Policy 
Advisor) shared with POLCOUNS and POLOFF their reactions to 
the October 3 GAERC meeting. 
 
TURKEY: "ABSORPTION CAPACITY" FOR "ACCESSION" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Despite the high-noon drama and last-minute 
bargaining, Dutch interlocutors were pleased with the results 
of GAERC discussions vis-a-vis Turkish accession talks. 
Tahzib-Lie explained that the resultant version of the 
negotiating framework is "something we can live with," 
despite substantive changes made to the pre-GAERC version of 
the framework.  The Dutch had resisted what they colored as a 
"weakening of the text"; Dumore explained that FM Bot's goal 
for the GAERC had been to ensure the UK presidency cleaved as 
closely as possible to the requirements for beginning Turkish 
accession talks that were set in December.  At the end of the 
day, however, the Dutch viewed the inclusion of Austrian 
language regarding "absorption capacity" as a small 
concession necessary to secure the larger victory of 
retaining "accession" as the explicit goal of negotiations. 
 
4. (C)  All MFA counterparts predicted that the Dutch 
Parliament would respond negatively to the start of accession 
talks with Turkey, pointing out the disharmony between the 
Dutch government's position and the Dutch electorate's 
discomfort regarding EU enlargement.  Dumore noted that Geert 
Wilders, a parliamentarian openly hostile to Turkey's 
accession to the EU, had called him to protest Dutch 
acquiescence to the agreement only moments before POLCOUNS 
and POLOFF arrived.  Any bumps in the road to accession will 
be subject to intense scrutiny domestically, he noted. 
Tahzib-Lie suggested that Turkish implementation of human 
rights-related legislation will be a key factor in 
determining how quickly progress on accession can be made, 
while Dumore pointed to practical implementation of the 
customs agreement -- i.e., receiving Cypriot vessels in 
Turkish ports -- as the first significant potential hurdle to 
be overcome.  All Dutch counterparts indicated that the 
process of Turkey's accession will invariably move more 
smoothly if it is kept in the background, or as Boender 
argued, "on the technical level." Dumore was confident that 
Austria would not derail the process during its upcoming EU 
presidency, though it may seek to reopen dialogue on various 
substantive issues of Turkish accession. 
 
CROATIA: DEL PONTE'S FINDINGS COME AS A SURPRISE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5. (C) ICTY Prosecutor-in-Chief Carla del Ponte's glowing 
assessment of Croatia's cooperation with the Tribunal came as 
a surprise to the Dutch, according to Dumore.  Del Ponte's 
gloomy assessments only days before had led the Dutch to 
believe that her final determination would fall short of 
"full" cooperation. 
 
6. (C) Although all Dutch interlocutors agreed that del Ponte 
was under considerable pressure to in her assessment of 
Croatian cooperation, none believed the pressure had affected 
her objectivity.  The Dutch also argued that del Ponte's 
determination of "full" cooperation was not inconsistent with 
the fact that Gotovina remains at large.  Dumore pointed to 
del Ponte's three-page report as evidence of her resistance 
to outside influence and of improved Croatian cooperation: 
two of the three pages in the report are devoted to actions 
taken by Croatia to improve its cooperation with the ICTY in 
the recent past, while the final page criticizes Croatia's 
failure to surrender Gotovina to The Hague. 
 
UZBEKISTAN: NL SUPPORTS EU'S TOUGH STANCE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) All interlocutors were pleased with the quartet of 
penalties against the Karimov regime adopted by the GAERC, 
including the arms ban and restrictions on travel for those 
suspected of involvement in the Andijan massacre.  They were 
guarded, however, when POLCOUNS asked about the conditions 
under which these sanctions, especially the arms embargo, 
might be lifted in the future.  Boender pointed to two 
particular issues of Dutch concern: the "show trials" of 
fifteen men accused of involvement in the Andijan massacre 
and Karimov's cooperation with the international 
investigation into the massacre.  He refrained, however, from 
postulating on the point at which progress monitored by these 
standards would justify lifting the embargo and did not 
explain what other factors might figure in the decision. 
 
 
BLAKEMAN 

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