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| Identifier: | 05THEHAGUE2723 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05THEHAGUE2723 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2005-10-07 16:45:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL NL EUN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 071645Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002723 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN SUBJECT: DUTCH REFLECTIONS ON THE OCTOBER 3 GAERC REF: THE HAGUE 02640 Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew J. Schofer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY. According to MFA interlocutors on October 4, the Dutch were pleased that the October 3 GAERC started accession talks with Turkey, and "can live with" the insertion of "absorption capacity" to the negotiating framework. Although it took them by surprise, the Dutch believe Carla del Ponte's assessment of Croatian "full" cooperation with the ICTY is justifiable. The Dutch are satisfied with the imposition of sanctions against Uzbekistan, but are unclear on next steps. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) On October 4, Pim Dumore (MFA, Director of Political Affairs), Bahia Tahzib-Lie (MFA, Deputy European Correspondent) and Jeroen Boender (MFA, Senior Policy Advisor) shared with POLCOUNS and POLOFF their reactions to the October 3 GAERC meeting. TURKEY: "ABSORPTION CAPACITY" FOR "ACCESSION" --------------------------------------------- 3. (C) Despite the high-noon drama and last-minute bargaining, Dutch interlocutors were pleased with the results of GAERC discussions vis-a-vis Turkish accession talks. Tahzib-Lie explained that the resultant version of the negotiating framework is "something we can live with," despite substantive changes made to the pre-GAERC version of the framework. The Dutch had resisted what they colored as a "weakening of the text"; Dumore explained that FM Bot's goal for the GAERC had been to ensure the UK presidency cleaved as closely as possible to the requirements for beginning Turkish accession talks that were set in December. At the end of the day, however, the Dutch viewed the inclusion of Austrian language regarding "absorption capacity" as a small concession necessary to secure the larger victory of retaining "accession" as the explicit goal of negotiations. 4. (C) All MFA counterparts predicted that the Dutch Parliament would respond negatively to the start of accession talks with Turkey, pointing out the disharmony between the Dutch government's position and the Dutch electorate's discomfort regarding EU enlargement. Dumore noted that Geert Wilders, a parliamentarian openly hostile to Turkey's accession to the EU, had called him to protest Dutch acquiescence to the agreement only moments before POLCOUNS and POLOFF arrived. Any bumps in the road to accession will be subject to intense scrutiny domestically, he noted. Tahzib-Lie suggested that Turkish implementation of human rights-related legislation will be a key factor in determining how quickly progress on accession can be made, while Dumore pointed to practical implementation of the customs agreement -- i.e., receiving Cypriot vessels in Turkish ports -- as the first significant potential hurdle to be overcome. All Dutch counterparts indicated that the process of Turkey's accession will invariably move more smoothly if it is kept in the background, or as Boender argued, "on the technical level." Dumore was confident that Austria would not derail the process during its upcoming EU presidency, though it may seek to reopen dialogue on various substantive issues of Turkish accession. CROATIA: DEL PONTE'S FINDINGS COME AS A SURPRISE --------------------------------------------- --- 5. (C) ICTY Prosecutor-in-Chief Carla del Ponte's glowing assessment of Croatia's cooperation with the Tribunal came as a surprise to the Dutch, according to Dumore. Del Ponte's gloomy assessments only days before had led the Dutch to believe that her final determination would fall short of "full" cooperation. 6. (C) Although all Dutch interlocutors agreed that del Ponte was under considerable pressure to in her assessment of Croatian cooperation, none believed the pressure had affected her objectivity. The Dutch also argued that del Ponte's determination of "full" cooperation was not inconsistent with the fact that Gotovina remains at large. Dumore pointed to del Ponte's three-page report as evidence of her resistance to outside influence and of improved Croatian cooperation: two of the three pages in the report are devoted to actions taken by Croatia to improve its cooperation with the ICTY in the recent past, while the final page criticizes Croatia's failure to surrender Gotovina to The Hague. UZBEKISTAN: NL SUPPORTS EU'S TOUGH STANCE ----------------------------------------- 7. (C) All interlocutors were pleased with the quartet of penalties against the Karimov regime adopted by the GAERC, including the arms ban and restrictions on travel for those suspected of involvement in the Andijan massacre. They were guarded, however, when POLCOUNS asked about the conditions under which these sanctions, especially the arms embargo, might be lifted in the future. Boender pointed to two particular issues of Dutch concern: the "show trials" of fifteen men accused of involvement in the Andijan massacre and Karimov's cooperation with the international investigation into the massacre. He refrained, however, from postulating on the point at which progress monitored by these standards would justify lifting the embargo and did not explain what other factors might figure in the decision. BLAKEMAN
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