US embassy cable - 90KHARTOUM12303

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 12303 
 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR 
TAGS:  PREL, PINR, MOPS, MARR, SU, IZ, SA, US 
SUBJECT:  DEMARCHE TO GOS REGARDING INTELLIGENCE 
          SHARING WITH IRAQ 
 
REF: A) STATE 397758, B) CAIRO 23889, C) KHARTOUM 12254 
 
1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 
 
2.  SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR PRESENTED REF A DEMARCHE TO 
FOREIGN MINISTER SAHLOUL MORNING NOVEMBER 26.  FOREIGN 
MINISTER GRAVELY ACKNOWLEDGED SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
GOS AVOWED POSITION OF NEUTRALITY IN GULF CONFLICT AND 
ITS RELATIONS WITH USG AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF ANY 
SHARING WITH IRAQ OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED 
FROM THE SAUDI FIGHTER PILOT DEFECTOR.  HE AGREED 
PROMPTLY TO CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS 
OF THE GOS.  END SUMMARY 
 
3.  AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY ECON COUNSELLOR CALLED ON 
FOREIGN MINISTER ALI SAHLOUL MORNING NOVEMBER 26 TO 
PRESENT DEMARCHE AS INSTRUCTED REF A.  ALSO PRESENT ON 
GOS SIDE WERE DIRECTOR TWO AMERICAS DEPARTMENT, AMB. 
OMAR ABDEL MAGID, AND HIS DEPUTY KAMAL AHMED FADUL 
(NOTETAKER). 
 
4.  AMBASSADOR BEGAN BY RECALLING HIS AUGUST 28 MEETING 
WITH PRESIDENT AL BASHIR DURING WHICH HE HAD WARNED THE 
PRESIDENT AGAINST ANY GOS ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND 
VIOLATIONS OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CONFLICT. 
HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED HIM AT THAT TIME 
THAT GOS HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORT IRAQ 
AND THAT IT WOULD RESPECT UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON THE 
GULF.  SINCE THEN THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF 
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAQUI SHIPS IN PORT SUDAN WHICH WE HAD 
BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOS.  GIVEN THIS 
BACKGROUND WE WERE NOW SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ COULD GATHER INTELLIGENCE FROM 
THE SAUDI FIGHTER  PILOT WHO DEFECTED TO SUDAN RECENTLY 
AND REMAINED IN GOS CUSTODY.  THIS CONCERN HAD 
INCREASED IN RECENT DAYS AS A RESULT OF INDICATIONS 
THAT THE GOS MIGHT ALLOW THE IRAQUIS TO EXPLOIT THE 
SAUDI PILOT FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. 
 
5.  THE AMBASSADOR THEN SLOWLY READ TO THE FOREIGN 
MINISTER THE FULL TEXT OF THE TALKING  POINTS IN PARA 2 
OF REF A AND GAVE HIM A NON-PAPER WHICH CONTAINED 
THEM.  THE FOREIGN MINISTER GRAVELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 
THIS WAS A MOST SERIOUS MATTER WHICH HE APPRECIATED THE 
AMBASSADOR PROMPTLY BRINGING TO HIS ATTENTION.  HE 
AGREED WITH THE POINT THAT SUCH ACTION BY THE GOS WOULD 
DESTROY ITS CLAIM TO NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES 
IN THE GULF CONFLICT AND UNDERMINE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING 
ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WITHIN THE ARAB FAMILY.  HE 
ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH ACTION 
FOR GOS RELATIONS WITH THE USG AND OTHER ALLIED 
GOVERNMENTS.  HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE 
TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOS.  AMBASSDOR URGED HIM 
TO DO SO QUICKLY GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE ISSUE AND THE 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR SUDAN.  AS AMBASSADOR OMAR 
ABDEL MAGID ESCORTED AMBASSADOR TO HIS CAR HE CONFIDED 
THAT THIS WAS THE MOST SERIOUS MEETING HE HAD ATTENDED 
DURING HIS TENURE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.  AMBASSADOR 
AGREED THAT IT WAS INDEED SERIOUS. 
 
6. COMMENT: I DOUBT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN THE 
LOOP ON GOS HANDLING OF THE DEFECTED SAUDI FIGHTER 
PILOT.  HE NOW IS AND I BELIEVE HE WILL DO AS HE SAID 
AND CONVEY OUR DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT.  IT MAY WELL 
BE TOO LATE TO DETER THE GOS (REF B).  NEVERTHELESS, AS 
I NOTED REF C, WE HAVE AT LEAST PUT THE GOS ON NOTICE 
AND LAID DOWN A MARKER SHOULD A MORE SEVERE RESPONSE BE 
REQUIRED LATER. 
 
7.  POSTSCRIPT:  AFTER DRAFTING ABOVE, AMBASSADOR OMAR 
MAGID TELEPHONED TO INFORM ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER 
SAHLOUL HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT OUR DEMARCHE 
THIS MORNING AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO SEE ME 
TOMORROW (NOVEMBER 27) AT 0845. 
 
 
CHEEK