US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA9566

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, EAID, ASEC, SNAR, CO, OAS, Demobilization, AUC, FARC 
SUBJECT: GOC SEEKS ASSISTANCE TO REINFORCE SECURITY AFTER 
PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The GOC is seeking USG assistance to strengthen 
security in areas formerly occupied by demobilized 
paramilitaries.  Thus far, there have only been isolated 
incidents of FARC incursions into former paramilitary 
territory, but the FARC could become emboldened as the 
demobilization process advances.  Peace Commissioner Restrepo 
provided the Embassy with an analysis and budget request for 
USG financial assistance to place an additional 10,000 
National Police forces in areas left by paramilitary fighters 
(copy e-mailed to WHA/AND).  The updated proposal warns that 
recent demobilizations in disputed areas could lead to more 
guerrilla control unless the Colombian public forces move to 
defend them.  In particular, the GOC is concerned that Norte 
de Santander, Valle Del Cauca, and Antioquia Departments, all 
with significant guerrilla populations, could be at risk. 
The Police and Army forces have stressed that redistributing 
forces will tax other missions, including the operation 
against the FARC, Plan Patriota.  End Summary. 
 
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SECURITY A POTENTIAL ACHILLES HEEL 
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2. (C) High Commissioner for Peace Restrepo submitted an 
updated proposal to the Embassy on September 27 that requests 
financial assistance to place 10,000 police in zones where 
paramilitaries have demobilized.  GOC officials, NGOs, and 
international interlocutors like the OAS, argue that 
demobilization successes could be undermined if the GOC fails 
to strengthen its forces in areas of former paramilitary 
influence.  In mid-September, paramilitary leaders in the 
Atlantic region warned that they would probably not 
demobilize before the GOC's December 31 deadline because they 
feared the government would fail to secure the area in time 
-- approximately 6,000 are expected to demobilize in this 
region. 
 
3. (C) The GOC is concerned that Norte de Santander, Valle 
Del Cauca, and Antioquia Departments, all with significant 
guerrilla populations, could face further FARC incursions. 
For example, during a demobilization that took place in Santa 
Fe de Ralito in late August, the FARC kidnapped four 
individuals in a municipality close to Ralito area.  News of 
the kidnapping set off the mass displacement of at least 400 
peasants, some declaring that the FARC had warned them to 
leave.  Government authorities expressed concern at the time 
that the FARC would seek to move into the Ralito area as 
police forces were assuming control. 
 
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GOC SEEKS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY PRESENCE 
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4. (C) The Restrepo proposal stresses that the greatest 
challenge faced by the peace process is the consolidation of 
state presence in areas where the paramilitaries formerly 
operated.  It also identifies problems, defines objectives, 
and proposes solutions to prevent guerrilla incursion: 
 
-- Problems: 1) the National Police currently lack the 
personnel and resources to guarantee a permanent presence in 
demobilization areas; 2) drug cartels could return to 
demobilization areas; 3) communities fear armed groups 
returning; and 4) citizens lack confidence in the GOC's 
ability to respond to security threats against their 
communities. 
 
-- Specific Objectives:  1) reinforce police stations in 
areas that previously had a significant paramilitary 
presence; 2) create new police stations in areas designated 
by the National Police; 3) strengthen the Counternarcotics 
Police to eradicate more drug crops and dismantle drug 
infrastructures; 4) implement the &Safe Departments and 
Municipalities Programs" led by the National Police and the 
Ministries of the Interior and Justice; and 5) identify 
financing alternatives at departmental and municipal levels. 
 
-- Proposal: The GOC proposes to create a permanent presence 
in demobilization areas by: 1) Increasing the size of the 
National Police force by 10,000 trained personnel that can 
guarantee security in urban and rural demobilization areas. 
The GOC proposes a gradual increase in police strength of 
10,000 spread equally over three years; and 2) training 
officers during a period of six months on Community, 
Antidrug, Judicial, Intelligence, and Urban and Rural 
Vigilance policing techniques. 
 
-- Costs: The GOC's request solicits international assistance 
for approximately 1.07 trillion pesos (roughly USD 465 
million) over three years to train 10,000 new police and 
build 150 new police outposts.  The GOC estimates the amount 
could increase by 5 percent over the second and third years, 
making the potential total USD 479 million.  The GOC is 
expected to pay for the salaries and benefits for the new 
police, but it is not clear if it has yet identified the 
funds. 
 
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SECURITY FORCES REQUIRE COORDINATION TO RESPOND 
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5. (C) Army officials indicate they would be able to place up 
to 3,800 soldiers in demobilized areas by the end of 2005 if 
directed.  The new forces would be made up of Mobile Brigade 
14, Mobile Brigade 15, the new 30th Brigade, and other units. 
 If the National Police moved all new police school graduates 
to the area and received new resources, it would be able to 
have 6,000 new police in the areas by December 2006. 
 
6. (C) The Police and Army could establish a prioritized 
order and staffing plan to cover the former para-controlled 
areas, but neither has yet been advised when or how to begin 
a buildup.  Moreover, the Army's mission is to defend the 
nation rather than to maintain public order, making it 
unclear when the Army forces would leave those areas and turn 
over operations to the Police. 
WOOD