US embassy cable - 05ATHENS2647

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR - DAS BRYZA AND EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CY, GR, CYPRUS 
SUBJECT: THE WAY AHEAD ON CYPRUS: THE VIEW FROM ATHENS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 1617 
 
     B. ANKARA 6036 
 
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Embassy Athens welcomes an exchange with 
the Department, Nicosia, and Ankara on the way ahead on the 
Cyprus issue.  From our perspective, the October 3 accession 
wrangle provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the 
Cyprus problem, and underscore the importance of grasping 
this nettle again.  While we believe Athens can play a 
constructive role, simply asking Greece to put pressure on 
Papadopoulos is not likely to take us very far.  We would 
expect a repetition of the stock answer of how difficult 
politically it is to intervene.  To break the logjam on 
re-starting negotiations and to change the atmosphere, we 
recommend exploring whether the UNSYG would appoint a "group 
of wisemen," chaired by an internationally respected figure 
of moral stature and comprised of prominent Greeks, Turks and 
Greek/Turkish Cypriots.  To be successful, such a group would 
have to have a focused mandate -- excluding (if possible) 
contentious zero-sum game debates and placing the emphasis on 
a possible positive future of Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
living together in a bizonal, bicommunal federal state.  Some 
additional ideas are presented in para 8.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Cyprus Issue: The Greek Context 
 
2.  (C)  Embassy Athens endorses Nicosia's observation that 
there is a window of opportunity, and a new reason for taking 
a fresh look at the Cyprus issue following the October 3 EU 
decision on Turkey.  In our view, Greece, which played a 
generally positive role on Turkey's EU track, can be engaged 
to play a positive role in contributing to a Cyprus 
settlement.  Aside from the undoubted stability that a united 
Cyprus would bring to the region, Greece has other compelling 
reasons to want to see Cyprus solved: big savings on the 
troops and equipment it provides to Cyprus to balance Turkish 
forces and savings in contributions it makes to UNFICYP 
(Greece pays 6.5 million USD annually). 
 
3.  (C)  But getting the Greeks to pressure Papadopoulos to 
take a more conciliatory approach to an Annan Plan-type 
Cyprus settlement is at best a small part of the answer.  Any 
Greek government -- especially the current one headed by 
ultra-cautious PM Karamanlis -- fears creating the impression 
with its voters that it does not support its Hellenic "little 
brother" far more than it fears Turkish troops on northern 
Cyprus.  In fact, during this past summer of de Villepin's 
discontent with Turkey's EU prospects, the Greek Government 
came under fierce criticism at home for being seen as less 
vigorous in support of Cypriot "rights" than France (or 
Austria).  FM Molyviatis has told us repeatedly that 
Papadopoulos, who is not personally popular with Greek 
Government officials, has more leverage on Greece than the 
other way around, since he can play the pan-Hellenic card 
whenever GoG actions are not to his liking.  For his part, 
Karamanlis has kept Papadopoulos at arm's length (and 
Molyviatis does everything he can to avoid FM Iacovou), and 
keeps relations with Cyprus and those with Ankara on two 
separate tracks, whenever possible.  In short, he believes 
(and we agree) that relations with Ankara are too important 
to be held hostage to the obstructionist Papadopoulos and the 
day-to-day vagaries of the Cyprus issue. 
 
4.  (C)  That said, there are good reasons to believe that 
Greece could be brought to engage positively now on Cyprus. 
First, it is in Athens' interest to keep the Cyprus issue out 
of the EU and under the UN umbrella.  After the 
rough-and-tumble of fashioning EU positions on the 
counterstatement and negotiating framework, we should be able 
to reinforce to the Greeks -- and more to the point, get the 
Greeks to reiterate -- that it is logical and natural to 
reinvigorate the UN process on Cyprus.  The fight about 
Turkey clearly demonstrated (to everyone except President 
Papadopoulos) that the EU is not the place to pursue a 
comprehensive settlement, and that a settlement is needed now 
more than ever.  More importantly, it seems clear from Athens 
that Papadopoulos has every intention of continuing to make 
life miserable for Turkey -- whether it is pressing for 
Cypriot membership in international organizations or 
insisting on early Turkish parliamentary ratification of the 
customs union protocol.  Athens does not want to see the 
recognition debate reignited or take the risk of being 
carried along as an unwilling partner in prolonged Cypriot 
interference in the EU accession process.  Inevitably, 
Nicosia's actions in this regard would spill over into 
Greek-Turkish relations and Karamanlis might no longer be 
able to keep his two tracks quite so separate. 
Some Vision Please? 
5.  (C)  From our vantage point, the central problem is that 
neither the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot side seems 
anxious to engage.  President Papadopoulos must feel content 
with the leverage his seat at the EU table gives him and 
happy to have changed the subject from why the Cypriots did 
not support the Annan Plan to why Turkey won't recognize 
Cyprus.  "TRNC" President Talat prefers to focus on ways to 
reduce the North's "isolation" as the overdue reward for 
supporting the Annan Plan.  To escape this trap, and to get 
to a situation where outside interested parties such as 
ourselves, the Greeks and the British can make a difference, 
we agree with Nicosia that we must find a way to foster an 
environment where the two communities can build trust and 
practice communication. 
 
6.  (C)  In other words, we need to start focusing on a 
vision of Greek and Turkish Cypriots living together in a 
common state.  Perhaps a way to break the logjam and make the 
issue larger than just the sum of its details is to suggest 
that UNSYG Annan appoint a "group of wisemen" who want to see 
such a vision become reality.  Such a group might be chaired 
by highly respected, internationally known figures with 
impeccable moral credentials but not currently in government 
(President Havel?) and have prominent Greeks (former PMs 
Simitis and Mitsotakis, for example) and an equal number of 
respected Turkish and Greek/Turkish Cypriot leaders (former 
President Clerides?) who could inspire goodwill and a create 
an atmosphere far more conducive to a settlement than the 
current situation.  The wisemen could meet with the 
interested parties and perhaps at some point hold a 
high-level meeting in a neutral place (perhaps Australia, 
with its large contribution to UNFICYP) to signal their 
resolve on finding a solution.  Blessed by the UNSYG, this 
high-powered group might be able to reach the Greek Cypriot 
people over the heads of the defensive Papadopoulos and his 
insincere repetition of a solution based on a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation. 
 
7.  (C)  We would want to make sure these wisemen have a 
positive, visionary influence.  They could have terms of 
reference that preclude their getting bogged down in property 
claims in the North or other contentious details.  The role 
would be to set the tone and change the atmosphere, not 
figure out all the  fine points of negotiation. 
 
Other Efforts 
 
8.  (C)  In addition to the idea of the wisemen, we suggest 
the following actions: 
 
--  With Greece: In the short-term, we need Greece to 
reiterate publicly its commitment to a Cyprus settlement, 
that the time is right, and that the locus of activity 
remains the UN (not the EU).  This could be done in a variety 
of ways -- FM interview, as part of the MFA's weekly press 
briefings, statement at the UN, etc. 
 
--  Also with Greece: In the medium term, look for issues 
that are important to Papadopoulos and on which he relies for 
Greek support.  Perhaps there can be some pressure brought to 
bear here. 
 
--  At the UNSC: There should be a debate by year's end on 
Cyprus next steps to highlight the primacy of the UN in the 
settlement process.  The British could take this lead, as 
both a permanent UNSC member and EU President; Greece could 
help here as well, as it is a member until the end of 2006. 
We would want to have close P-5 consultations to make sure 
Russia/China do not use their veto to block, but also because 
it makes sense to have these two influential, non-EU 
countries behind this effort. 
 
--  Within the EU: Identify 2-3 key members who agree with 
our view that the EU is not the right place for pursuing a 
comprehensive settlement and who see Papadopoulos as the 
problem.  What can they do to help rein him in? 
RIES