US embassy cable - 05VIENNA3321

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Austrian Response to DHS letter on VWP

Identifier: 05VIENNA3321
Wikileaks: View 05VIENNA3321 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Vienna
Created: 2005-10-07 13:35:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: CVIS CMGT PREL AU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


UNCLAS VIENNA 003321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO, and EUR/AGS 
 
DHS FOR MNEIFACH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: CVIS, CMGT, PREL, AU 
SUBJECT: Austrian Response to DHS letter on VWP 
 
 
certification based on Personal Identity Card 
 
REF:  A) STATE 183690 B) VIENNA 2646 
 
1.  Per Reftel A, Post transmitted the text of DHS' 
 
certification letter response to the Austrian central 
 
VWP contact, Heinrich Pawlicek.  Pawlicek, who had 
 
meanwhile obtained an electronic copy of the signed 
 
original, was eager to point out that the problems in 
 
reading the ID card are a result of an intentionally- 
 
introduced error used only in sample cards to prevent 
 
their misuse.  For DHS to test the readability of 
 
genuine cards, the Ministry of Interior is now 
 
providing a new batch of ID cards for DHS testing. 
 
These new cards should be readable by DHS readers.  We 
 
understand that the cards will be mailed directly to 
 
Martin Kraemer, Consul General at the Austrian Embassy 
 
in Washington.  The text of the Austrian response 
 
follows. 
 
2.  Begin text:(informal Embassy translation) 
 
During the [September 23] Visa Waiver Program 
 
conference in Washington, D.C., representatives of DHS 
 
and DOS were presented with a possible solution in the 
 
case of Austria, whereby national identity cards might 
 
be used to sufficiently compliment Austrian passports 
 
issued on or after Oct. 26, 2005.  In particular, it 
 
was noted that the Austrian personal identity cards are 
 
recognized among the most secure documents in the world 
 
due to the state-of-the-art technology employed in 
 
their design.  Also, in the course of the conversation, 
 
sample identity cards that met the exact technical 
 
standards required by DHS were passed along to U.S. 
 
officials.  DHS representative, Mr. Brad Wing, offered 
 
his individual thanks after the conversation for the 
 
suggestion of an outstanding solution. 
 
The Austrian personal identity cards that were handed 
 
over to DHS officials are samples - and only samples - 
 
of such cards, which is signified on the cards in 
 
writing by the word "Specimen."  Each card includes an 
 
ICAO-compliant, machine-readable zone; the zone is, 
 
however, deliberately tagged with an error number to 
 
render the cards invalid and thereby prevent their 
 
illegal use.  Therefore, when scanned, the sample cards 
 
will register as unreadable.  This feature is 
 
absolutely necessary to prevent misuse since government 
 
officials of foreign countries who do not speak German 
 
cannot be expected to realize that the name 
 
"Musterfrau," printed on the card, translates as 
 
"sample woman," and is not in fact someone's actual 
 
name.  Were a person of passable likeness to acquire 
 
the sample card and travel onward to one of the 29 non- 
 
German speaking countries where this card is recognized 
 
for identity purposes, this security feature ensures he 
 
or she will be stopped.  This practice is commonplace 
 
among manufacturers of sample documents throughout 
 
Europe. 
 
The sample cards that were provided should thus have 
 
been readable but the DHS readers would likely have 
 
recognized the intentionally-introduced error number 
 
and have produced an error message. 
 
To address the problem, we will now produce and 
 
directly deliver from the Austrian printing office to 
 
the US Consulate new sample cards that do not contain 
 
this error number.  From a security standpoint, these 
 
are not "sample" cards, but the "real deal," and as 
 
such, we would like to express our concern for their 
 
safety and ask that they be kept under lock and key. 
 
I would like to kindly request that these comments 
 
along with the newly submitted cards be passed along to 
 
DHS representative, Mr. Brad Wing, Biometrics 
 
Coordinator, US-VISIT, Border and Transportation 
 
Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and 
 
that under his supervision, the new cards be tested. 
 
End text. 
 
VAN VOORST 

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